New Perspectives on Religious and Moral Development

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To Daniel, who, when another child bumps his head, feels the pain himself.

To Carolyn, who, when I tried to hurry her down from the mountain as a rainstorm swept in, said, "Why don't we wait; if there's rain, there might be a rainbow afterwards."

To Rose Marie whose favorite word is "challenge," and who, in her eagerness and gentle love, does not exempt others (her husband included) nor herself from the power of that word.

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PART ONE

RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

"Always the beautiful answer who asks a more beautiful question."
—e.e. cummings

After teaching a course in the psychology of religious and moral development for a few years, I had a new insight. It occurred to me one fine spring day, when other things were growing too, that, basic to the content of the course, yet sometimes not expressed or even consciously appreciated by myself or all my students, were certain unspoken themes, a hidden curriculum, behind it all. The "facts" were there in the course outline, but questions lingered like, "Why these facts and not others?" "What's there and what's missing?" "What presumptions are behind it all?" These were questions I had not really asked, and students were often too polite to press. So I sat down on that warm spring afternoon to uncover this hidden curriculum. What came of these ruminations was a list of presuppositions and a record of roads already taken that were now setting the directions of the course. The list initially was short. But over the years, and following many eager class discussions, the items on the list evolved, meshed, merged and new ones emerged until, on the first day of each new term, I could hand my students a paper revealing what I thought was behind the course outline. The paper came to be entitled: "Ten Tenets Tentatively but Tenaciously Tendered." The stunning beauty of this subtle use of alliteration was lost on a few of my students over the years, but the substance of the tenets gave some indication of where I was at as we began the course, and challenged them to reflect on where they were at personally regarding religion and morality.

I think I owe you, the readers of this book, a similar manifestation of underlying themes, presumptions, roads taken and roads not taken before you make the investment of choices and begin to read. I promise (with some

small exceptions) to spare you any annoying attempts at alliteration, even though such alternatives may be allowable at times. I would then, here at the beginning when all is fresh, dig a good bit beneath the topsoil and reveal what lies below the surface. These are some of the major presuppositions of what is to follow.

Someone has said, "There are two kinds of people in this world: those who divide everything into two and those who do not." In presenting my approach to the psychology of religious and moral development, I have tried to be one of "those who do not." In other words I have attempted a holistic approach, taking into account the whole human person in process, trying to avoid as much as possible those dichotomies like body-soul, natural-supernatural, reason-emotion, and even religious-moral. Dichotomies are neat ways we use to try to understand the human psyche. Sometimes they are helpful, but whether they correspond to anything in reality is another question. Sometimes, I think, they are something we force upon reality for our own convenience, but then get caught up in them, and are led to see separation, antagonism and conflict within the human person which is not really there. I have tried to emphasize the essential unity of human nature, of all nature in fact, seeing it as organic and whole.

One of the themes that flows from this holistic approach and runs through this book is that of convergence. Teilhard de Chardin, if he did not use the exact words, at least expressed the beautiful idea: "All that rises must converge." You will find these words, rich with meaning, sometimes on the surface, sometimes buried deep within this book. Throughout your reading you will find my images (and I hope your own) and the image here is one of ascending spirals merging, flowing together. There is a flowing together in the process of the universe so that all that evolves to higher levels, while becoming more complex within itself, more individually developed, becomes, paradoxically, more at one with others and integrated in itself. True individuality, true diversity is creative of unity and oneness, This, I propose is the major thrust of individual religious and moral development. As an individual moves through the ascending spirals of human development, the religion that is part of this development becomes more potent in creating a unity and oneness with other human beings, with all creation and with God. The same is true of religion as a social phenomenon. Religious sects, if they evolve to higher levels, returning sometimes to the

original vision of their founder, do not emphasize divisions, differences and distinctions, but note similarities and encourage unity. They are synergistic.

The same flowing together is evident in another mainstream beneath the surface of this book. It is the convergence in recent years between religion and science, particularly the science of psychology. There never really should have been any enmity between the two of them in the first place. Science truly concerned with whatever is true, would see religion as friend and map maker, giving the bigger picture, the overall view, perspective on the factual. Religion, playing its role of perspective-giving, and not embroiled in sectarianism, power struggles and other pursuits more worthy of politics than religion, would have seen science as an ally with something to give to enrich the religious view. It would have been a mutually enriching relationship, for science has often been more in need of support and guidance than condemnation, especially a condemnation stemming from ignorance, threat and fear of the unknown. But it is my contention that both religion and science have grown up, developed over the last few years. And, because they have risen to new levels they have converged, and we enter now into an exciting era of cooperation and mutual growth for religion and science, including the science of psychology of course. As a result we can say: "Good religion is good psychology, and good psychology is good religion."

Obvious by now is the conviction behind all this that the world is not a static place or even some gigantic clock, once set in motion and ticking on now with the precision and predictability of a perfect machine. No, the world is not static, or even machine-like. If it is organic, it is in process. The universe is still being built, and all beings involved in that process are called upon to contribute their value to it. As part of the organic whole of creation, human beings with their higher levels of consciousness and free will are called to contribute value to the building of the universe. That religion has something to say about the nature of such things is an evident theme by now. That religion has something to say about how we should contribute to that process is an idea that will lead us to the understanding of how religion and morality flow together.

Before you have read very far into this book you will find the word "levels" used frequently and the term "multilevelness" cropping up over and over again. That is because it is my conviction that a multilevel

approach to anything (psychology, religion and morality included) opens up new paradigms for understanding and new skills for diving to great depths within the currents of process. Hopefully, you will find this important concept of multilevelness adequately introduced at the appropriate place.

The multilevel paradigm steers us away from the narrowing approach that says there is only one right way to be religious. On the contrary, this book is about the *varieties* of religious experience, going a step beyond by maintaining that religion is not something added to human nature as a nice alternative like an optional part that a car buyer may or may not add on to his purchase. Religion in its vast variety of forms is integral to human nature at all levels. All human beings are religious in some sense of the word; they just practise their religion at their level of development. It will be our task to distinguish and explore these levels from the lowest abuses of the word "religion" up to the highest levels of its actualization. If we want to know what religion is supposed to be, the best religion, we should look at those persons who have reached the highest levels of human development, for they epitomize the qualities of true religion and true morality.

I do not pretend that what follows in this book is a study of comparative religions. It does not study very many specific sects or religions. This is a limitation, and in some respects a deficiency, for I am sure it would have been a richer study of the varieties of religious experience had its author not been limited in his knowledge of history and comparative religions. Instead it is primarily a psychological study, seeking to find some depth in philosophy and theology, especially Christian theology. Those of you from other religious traditions, will, I hope, be gracious enough to accept these limitations.

Certainly this book is not based on the all-too-prevalent idea in some religious circles that human nature is essentially evil; nor hopefully is it based on cynicism about humanity or, on the other hand, a naive optimism. It is based rather on a belief that man can transcend himself because there are transcendent dimensions within the human personality, and that it is the primary role of religion and morality to explore and develop these dimensions.

The passages through life toward these higher levels are not spontaneous and easy, demanding no conflict or pain. It seems a basic

paradigm of creation that ecstasy comes only with agony, that tears and joy mix, that only effort leads to triumph, that pain and birth are one, that life and death dance together at the stillpoint of the turning earth. My own experiences, my relationships as a counselor with people in distress have led me to believe that all these paradoxes abound in the human journey. Surrounded by pain and ugliness, and frequently because of pain and ugliness, the will toward health and growth is vibrant in the human heart, and life springs forth out of the most unlikely situations. Religion is there nurturing this life, not by giving reasons, not by always answering the question "Why?" but by helping with the question "How?" And that is why, again, religion flows on into morality, and, lofty as it is, speaks to the most practical of realities.

Another item buried quite deep within the hidden agenda of this book is a tendency to emphasize the role of emotion in human development. This is contrary to mainstream psychology which has stressed the study of cognition. I emphasize emotion for two reasons: (1) Cognition has had more than its share of attention by psychologists. This is because an ancient philosophical tradition has for centuries given a preeminent place to the controlling powers of intellect, and because cognitive factors have seemed easier for a behavioristic psychology to measure. Psychological literature is full of cognitivistic studies; only recently has emotion begun to capture wide interest and respectability as the proper subject of science. (2) I do believe that the aspect of the human psyche that we parcel out and label as emotion, feeling, passion does have a large and respectable part to play in human development. Large, because feeling is a pervasive thing and a powerful force in human decision making. Respectable, because emotions, passions at their higher levels, are as good or better guides to objectivity than cool intellect which for so long has held the center stage of objectivity and thus respectability.

It is pleasant to go on like this, making dogmatic statements without a shred of evidence. But perhaps it is time to conclude this introduction with a few more personal remarks. Throughout this book you will find many metaphors of mountains, trees and rivers. That is because I live not far from the Rocky Mountains of Alberta and was fortunate as a child to travel through them in old steam trains that huffed and puffed their way over high mountain passes, and then trundled heavily down to the Pacific. I learned to love

and be impressed by the beauty and proportions of those mountains from my parents, particularly my mother who was perhaps the first to put mountains and life in perspective for me. In later years I was fortunate, too, to climb among the crags and to feel a real relationship with the old twisted trees that clung to the mountainsides with a tenacity and vigor that seemed a model for human endeavor and vitality. I have seen mountain rivers rushing to the sea, and noted the swirling eddies, brief occasions in the process but integral to the system. I have seen shimmering white mountains mirrored in calm blue-green lakes, broken only by the jump of a tiny fish or a squirrel coming for a drink, and that has told me something about the perspective of space and the dimensions of a man within the universe. I have climbed over rocks that were there long before me and will be there long after me, and that has said something about the perspective of time in my brief life. That is why you must forgive me if I bring my friends the mountains into my psychology. They have been good to me. They are beautiful. Perhaps I can acknowledge that beauty and give back to them something of what they have given me.

And now a word about you, the reader. Who do I visualize you to be? An ordinary, everyday human being, probably a university student interested in religion and morality, and bringing to your study all the "baggage" of your past experiences with religion and morality. Some of you will, I know, affirm that you are already devoutly religious and even certain of your own personal salvation. Others, like a Saturday afternoon shopper will say, "Just looking, thank you," and move on. Still others will deny that you are religious and insist that you gave up all that years ago when you got away from home and finally grew up. Do I see you as a religious and moral person? Yes. But not necessarily in any sense of belonging to some specific religion or being sure of your moral principles. I see you as religious in that, by even opening a book about religion and morality, you have taken some steps in a quest for meaning, perspective and responsibility in your life.

I hope this book is something with which all of you, males and females, can identify. Authors are currently called upon to write in a non-sexist style. Sometimes this can be done smoothly; sometimes it leads to contortion and clumsiness of language, distracting from the content. If you do not always find male and female acknowledged in the form of this book, I hope you will find both the masculine and feminine experience of religion and

morality always acknowledged and frequently celebrated in its content.

Some years ago when I first started teaching, I felt a need, a moral responsibility to cover everything I could in a course and to give as many answers as I could to important questions. Since then I have met many of my "old" students who greet me with a statement such as: "I always remember what you said about . . ." Invariably it is something I don't remember saying, maybe because it did not seem important at the time. But the understanding the student had was what made it important and meaningful to him or her. This is what the great teachers have been telling us all along: Teaching is not transfer of knowledge where everything depends upon the teacher. Teaching is exposure to greatness, and the greatness, even if it is not in the teacher, may still be in the questions asked. It is this "meeting over great questions" that makes education great. The questions of religion and morality are great. In the process this meeting is an occasion to which you bring the specialness of your self and your questions, asked not just of the teacher but of life itself. May this study of religion and morality be an occasion in which you learn to love the questions themselves and sometimes experience the beauty of an answer.

RELIGION AND MORALITY AS TOPICS OF STUDY

The scene was Venice. Two dauntless shoppers, my daughter Carolyn and I, were wending our way through narrow streets and over arched bridges in search of the perfect Venetian crystal. We were out to buy; the only question was, "Which color?" We had seen thousands of them in the store windows, flashing a rainbow of colors at us—each crystal different. After much discussion at a shop window, comparing the merits of radiant red with cool green, we decided on a brilliant blue, merging into violet. We entered the store to claim our prize. I lifted the crystal carefully from its place in the window. The blue disappeared. The crystal was just clear glass. So were all the other crystals in the store—just clear glass! Our carefully chosen color was gone. But Carolyn, from her vantage point three feet below my eye level, cried out: "Look Dad; hold it up to the light. It's red and orange and yellow and green and blue—all the colors of the rainbow. All *the colors are in* our *crystal!*

Few words are so emotionally loaded as "religion" and "morality." When you put the two words together, the emotional temperature rises even more. "Religion" and "morality" are words laden with a great deal of our emotional baggage. Think of the word "family." It is not an abstract term for most of us, but a very concrete word, loaded with the experiences, the memories, the values—the emotional baggage—that we associate with our own experiences of family. So, too, "religion" and "morality" are words that for most of us symbolize our experiences with religion, our personal conceptions of morality. Because these impressions are very concrete, vivid and emotion-laden, it is difficult to find anyone who can remain truly indifferent when either of these topics crops up.

This makes for great difficulty in talking about religion and morality. Because we often reach into the depths of our subjective selves and come up with impressions and feelings that are very personal, we tend to talk to others about our subjective experience, and, since we are using the same

words as others use, we presume these words mean the same thing to them. But your concept of religion for example may date back to your childhood experiences in Sunday school, and you may see religion as an ecclesiastical organization stifling in its dogmatism. I, on the other hand, may see religion as a liberating, purely personal experience gained most easily by a good shot of drugs. Thus, we each use the same word, but we are miles apart in our meanings. We cannot communicate until we come to some sort of mutual understanding, until we free ourselves as much as possible of that personal baggage that prejudices the meanings of these words.

We cannot communicate about religion and morality until we see some new perspectives on what we mean. You will notice I have said "new perspectives" and not "definitions." It is tempting when we want to communicate to try to create a definition, but definitions are not the answer here. Definitions are elusive and illusory. They depend on other words which themselves are slipping and sliding about in their meanings. They are illusory because they give us a false sense of security, a sense that, once we have pinned them down with a definition, we can fully understand concepts and experiences with our minds alone. Something perhaps more perfidious about definitions is that they tend to kill. They kill their subject. Defining is something like catching and pinning a butterfly to a table, dissecting its parts, classifying them, and then proclaiming an understanding of what a butterfly is. We tend to forget that such a process involves killing the butterfly first. A definition used in this manner leaves out what is most important about a butterfly—that to be a butterfly it must live. Definitions, in their attempt to be precise often leave out the vitality, the complexity, the beauty, the uniqueness of each occasion and the process of each existence.

Should we then give up hope of communicating about anything so individual as the experience of religion, anything so vital and personal as the conduct of morality? Certainly not. If the answer is not to rush into definitions, neither is it to say that one cannot communicate with another on such a subjective topic. The answer lies, I think, in seeing these topics for what they are: immensely complex, multilayered, multifaceted, vital experiences of mankind. The more we appreciate the complexity of concepts the more we are forced to look at them from various perspectives. Perhaps the word "multifaceted" is the best introduction to a metaphor. Any important concept is multifaceted like a cut diamond. Looking at it from one angle it

flashes red, from another it flashes blue; that is why, to get at what a diamond is, you turn it round and round, cocking your head from side to side to get new glimpses of the whole spectrum of colors coming through. And you come to realize it is not just red or blue or yellow; it carries all the colors of the spectrum, and yet paradoxically it is none of them for it is perfectly clear. This is an appreciation we would never have had if we had kept our static view, if we had not stretched for new perspectives and thereby appreciated the complexity, the multifacetedness, the changeability of the diamond in new light. Once we see reality as complex, multileveled and in process, we know it demands of us an appreciation from more than one perspective.

With this in mind, I would like now to approach that enigmatic vital thing we call "religion" with some appreciation of its multi-dimensionality. We will leave the term "morality" for the second half of the book. "Religion" will be quite enough of a challenge for us now.

Chapter I

What is Religion?

The Dimensions of Religion

"A god comprehended is no God."

One multi-dimensional approach is that taken by Glock and Stark (1965). In an attempt to measure religion, Glock and Stark have looked at it from five dimensions: ideological, ritualistic, experiential, intellectual, and consequential. The ideological dimension includes religious activities such as prayer and worship. The ritualistic refers to church attendance. The experiential dimension encompasses intense religious experiences like conversion, mystical experiences, visions, prophecy, speaking in tongues. The intellectual dimension is meant to include knowledge of religious dogmas and practices, while the consequential dimension deals with the flow of religion outward into behavior in other spheres of life.

The Glock and Stark approach has been most useful to psychometricians, interested in measuring religion for research purposes and their inventory (Glock & Stark, 1965) has been used extensively.

Perhaps for our purposes a more useful way of getting various perspectives on religion is the approach taken by Michael Argyle and Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi of Oxford University (Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975, pp. 178-207). They chose to look at theories of religious behavior from the perspectives of the theories of *origin* of religion, theories of the *maintenance* of religion and theories of the *consequence* of religion. The origin theories attempt to explain how religion first arose. Maintenance theories attempt to explain why individuals or societies hold certain belief systems. Consequence theories deal with the effects of religious behavior on either individuals or groups. Argyle's approach will serve as a general framework here for looking at some of the many facets of religion.

Theories of the Origin of Religion

A way of handling the forces of nature. Religion arose as a way for primitive man to explain and control as much as he could the forces of nature. Storms, fires, floods, earthquakes are devastating forces that man must come to terms with. To personalize them into a god who could be placated, manipulated into changing things for the better, appeased by sacrifice and then worshipped and thanked when salvation came, was, and is, a primtive urge of man. James Michener expressed it in a fictional yet realistic way in *The Source*, describing a rainstorm experienced by cavemen.

> In these critical moments, when the fall of rain was greatest, obscuring even the mouth of the cave, Ur saw his wife standing in the storm, her tired face uplifted, crying, "Storm, go back! Go back and leave our fields!" And whether the spirit of the storm heard or not, no one could later say but it abated and the waters receded.
>
> When the storm was gone Ur sat bewildered on a rock, marveling at how close the flood had come to destroying his home . . . Then out of the corner of his eye, he saw his wife doing a most perplexing thing. "Wife," he shouted, "what are you doing?" And as she threw handfuls of wheat into the swirling waters she explained in a low voice, "If the storm has left us our wheat, the least we can do is offer him some in thanks." (p. 104)

It was probably in just such stressful situations that man saw "god" as a human-like deity that could be argued with, bargained with, propitiated and thanked.

This approach to God and the religious experience is not one of merely antique, historical interest. Pushed to their limits by any kind of adversity, a man or woman today will discover and begin to bargain with a personal god he or she was unaware of in normal times. Catastrophe, private or public, sends one searching for a higher power to control it all and make it "go right" for us.

Family projection. Freud, considered God as only a father projection stating that, (1913, p. 244) "God, at bottom is nothing but an exalted Father." But, apart from Freud's image of the nineteenth century Germanic family with its solid patriarchal structure, we still can see that religion is full of familial images: "God the Father," "Holy Mother Church," "Christ our Brother," and the saints as dutiful "Children of God." Those who maintain this approach base it on two assumptions (1) Belief systems are

not original creations of each individual as he or she grows up, but are transmitted from generation to generation, (2) Belief systems endure because the private fantasies and images of individuals correspond to these cultural traditions (Spiro & D'Andrade, 1958). Whether one takes the limited orthodox Freudian view of God as a Father projection or the more contemporary approach supported by research (Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, p. 185) that it is possible that culture conveys the paternal image of God, while the affective attitude towards God is derived from relations with parents, it is impossible to deny a psychological link between a child's conception of God and his relationship with his parents.

Conscience projections. This Freudian-based theory of the origin of religion (Flugel 1945) is based on the idea that when the child is punished by its parents it feels anxiety. To overcome this, it identifies with the parents and wishes to be like them, conforming to their demands. Parental demands are internalized in this way, and the child becomes conditioned to feel guilty on his own, even when the parents are not around. This is the Freudian "superego." The superego or conscience projection hypothesis states that "There is a being, God, and an institution, religion, that serve the adult as magnified parents who enter the conscience and punish or reward, helping to maintain the adult's typical balance between desire, morality and action" (Ostow & Sharfstein, 1954, p. 76). When the superego comes into conflict with instinctive desires, this conflict is relieved by projection of the superego which now appears as God. The repressive demands of the superego can then be seen as prohibitions of some outside person. Often this person is God the all-knowing one, the heavenly bookkeeper who records rights and wrongs, who never forgets and punishes eternally. God, according to this theory, arises from the guilty individual's need for the complete and total conscience.

The need to explain. Human beings need belief systems to provide themselves with a coherent, subjectively rational account of their behavior and the apparently irrational world around them. Research has shown that individuals feel pressured to have a set of beliefs compatible with one another (e.g., Asch, 1958) and compatible with the individual's experiences (Festinger, Riecken & Schacter, 1956). One remarkable thing about belief systems is that they are most acceptable when shared with members of some social group such as a church. In fact, Festinger et al. (p. 40) showed that

when the evidence for religious beliefs fails to materialize or is contradicted by other evidence, church members become *more* fervently entrenched in their beliefs. A sect predicted the end of the world for a specific day and it did not happen. The lack of proof did not weaken their belief but induced followers to increase their church membership by trying to convert others. There may well be, in fact, an inverse relationship between the security with which persons hold their religious beliefs, and the ardor of their attempts to convert others to them. If I, deep inside, feel shaky about my beliefs, it is reassuring to me to see others being "converted" to them.

Belief systems cluster around two main centers—my experience of myself and my experience of my world. Some belief systems help me explain myself to myself. They form my identity and purpose in that they tell me who I am and where I am going. My sense of identity needs to be fortified with some assurance that what I am is valuable. Religion, as we shall see when we look at Erik Erikson, very often provides this feeling of personal worthwhileness. Religion provides too a sense of personal life meaning. "Man's search for meaning" has been thoroughly and graphically documented by Victor Frankl (1959, 1965, 1967, 1969, 1978). He prefers to have his psychology identified as "spiritual" rather than "religious" but is perhaps reacting to the baggage of sectarianism that the word "religious" usually carries with it. Here we are trying to preserve the word "religion" from being associated only with religious sects and seek to look at it in a broader sense. In that sense religion does have as its purpose to give meaning to life, to draw the big picture, "to paint life in broad strokes."

Not only does religion have a function of explaining oneself to oneself and giving personal meaning to life, it has a more general, abstract "philosophical" function of explaining some of the great questions of life that revolve around the agonies of pain, suffering, death and injustice. The biblical Book of Job is an attempt to answer, "Why should the just man suffer?" And, although it finds its "answer" in the inscrutable mind of an all-powerful God, it is a theological treatise with intense psychological themes.

Later we will see that William James wrote about the "twice-born man" who agonizes over questions of ultimate meaning: Why live? Why be moral? Is there any hope for a just world, or is justice an illusion? These are the kinds of questions firmly in the domain of the religious.

One important advantage that religion has over philosophy in considering questions of meaning and identity and making them relevant to the individual is the diversity and richness of the language of religion. Philosophy is largely limited to words and logic and all that is intellectual and verbal, whereas religion goes beyond words into the language of symbols in poetry art, ritual and myth. Since, as Susanne Langer says (1951, p. 127) the human mind is "profoundly symbolific" we should not be surprised to find the human mind working with "symbols far below the level of speech." Words often fail to fully express religious ideas. Nonverbal expressions such as art, ritual and music often convey more surely than words what religion has to say to each individual about his or her own identity within the community, the directions of society and the ultimate meanings of life. For example, the stained glass windows of Europe's medieval cathedrals were specific teaching devices for simple, non-literate people. The rich collection of symbols in art, ritual, and myth that religions of all kinds have drawn men to are witnesses to man's need to express the inexpressible, to answer the unanswerable, to grasp the individual with a sense of life meaning. We have the myths and legends of ancient people that tell us what their belief systems were. We can recreate the Gregorian chant of a medieval monastery. We can interpret the stone carvings of Mayan civilization to learn about their belief in human sacrifice and the need to constantly rebuild their pyramid temples to appease their gods. One outstanding benefit of climbing medieval cathedral church towers up never-ending spirals of stairs is to get a sense of the power of belief systems. There at the top of the tower, hundreds of feet above the ground and perhaps tucked away in some corner of the roof, stands a stone angel or a saint carved with exquisite care. Being far from the busy market square below, very few may ever have seen it, still fewer breathless tourists would have stopped to admire it. But it has stood there for five hundred years as symbolic testimony to the art and loving concern of some craftsman whose whole life meaning may have been taken up in carving just such statues "for the glory of God" and not for the eyes of man. Over the countless years how many lives have found meaning, and expressed this meaning in the creation of religious symbols that still communicate man's beliefs to us?

Theories of Maintenance

Social learning. Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975, p. 189) describe social learning theory in this context as a statement that religious behavior, beliefs and experiences are simply part of the culture, transmitted from generation to generation like any other set of customs. This theory hardly needs any proof. It is quite evident that individuals are reinforced for maintaining the religious practices of their forbears and their society. Catholics encourage Catholicity, Jews, Judaism, and so on. One of the great limitations of this theory is that it cannot account for variations in religious activity. Left to itself, it would postulate a never-changing religious tradition making no room for Christ to rise up out of a Judaic tradition or Luther to come forth out of Roman Catholic Europe. This theory does not readily account for individual motivational forces and how religion fails to satisfy individual human needs, thereby calling forth new religious expressions as a means of satisfying those needs.

There are features common to nearly all religions such as seeing God as a personified (usually male) presence, and recognition of the existence of good and evil forces. One could attribute the universality of these and other concepts to social learning, or explain them as something innate in the nature of man, as we shall see later in the Jungian view.

Deprivation and compensation. Some have epitomized this view in the statements: "The greater a man's dissappointment in this life, the greater his faith in the next." Marx formulated it in an often-quoted sentence: "Religion is the opium of the people." Glock (1964) distinguishes five kinds of deprivations which may give rise to religious reactions: economic, social, organismic, ethical, and psychic. Religious activities are a kind of compensation for the deprivations of poverty, social class, ill health, old age, perceived immorality in the world around, or personal feelings of inferiority. Rachel in Margaret Laurence's, *A Jest of God*, with all her self-consciousness, nervousness and feelings of inferiority is open to the intensely emotional religious experience of a prayer meeting. Religion provides a ready rationalization for "the evils of this world" and a promise of happiness in the next when "the humble shall be exalted and the mighty brought low." Not only does God keep account of suffering and deprivation in this world but He will set things straight in the next when justice shall be done. This kind of thinking has two effects: one, to give some sort of rational meaning to

suffering and loss, the other to sometimes excuse oneself from the obligation of eliminating deprivation since this life is only a temporary sojourn in this mortal body, and the prelude to real life which is eternal and blissful for those who have suffered on earth. This rationalization is particularly appealing to some religious leaders who use it to demand more sacrifice, more alms, and more submission from their church members. These leaders avoid responsibility for delivering any kind of compensation for such sacrifices beyond the promise that "God will reward you in the next life." We need not go back to the selling of indulgences in medieval times for examples; "religious hucksters" are doing the same thing on television today.

Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975, p. 194) indicate an interesting offshoot of the deprivation theory: "The greater level of church membership and church attendance among those in higher socioeconomic status in both the USA and Great Britain has been used as an argument against the validity of deprivation theories of religiosity." They counter this argument on two grounds: the nature of middle-class religious activity, and the possibility that church attendance may well be a response to a kind of middle-class deprivation. They quote Goode (1966) as suggesting that church attendance should not be used as a measure of religious behavior since it has become a secular activity, a tendency of the middle class to be involved in socially acceptable volunteer organizations. The church then becomes a source of satisfaction for middle class social needs.

Relief of guilt. Guilt relief as a motivation for being religious is founded in psychoanalytic theory, one prediction being that people with guilt feelings should be attracted toward any religion that has as its doctrine either the forgiveness of sin and salvation or some sort of self-punishing rite that may compensate for the feeling of guilt.

Douziech (1981), makes some important distinctions about different kinds of guilt, expanding the concept beyond personal guilt to existential guilt feelings and thus broadening the role that religion plays in relieving guilt. Contrary to some of the mainstreams of psychology (especially those of Freud and Albert Ellis) which see guilt as just another neurotic symptom to be cured, Douziech recognizes a constructive, even growthful kind of guilt. He distinguishes subjective guilt into neurotic guilt and real or true guilt. Neurotic guilt is a distorted experience marked by fear and psychological paralysis and it centers around real or imagined moral failures.

True or real guilt, on the other hand, can be of three kinds: Constructive, Existential and Collective. Collective guilt is a failure through omission to take appropriate action when political authorities violate human rights. It is a communal sharing of the guilt of inaction. "For evil to persist, it is not so much necessary that bad men have their way, as it is that good men remain silent." Existential guilt is an awareness of the disparities that exist in the world, and feeling in some way responsible especially by inaction. Constructive guilt or value guilt is a sense of wrongdoing arising out of real, unnecessary failure towards the moral order or objectively valid social contraventions, or one's own principles of conduct. This kind of guilt, far from being "sick" is a real and objectively based sense of the disparity between what one is and what one ought to be. This contradiction in one's life, this gap, this disparity can be a healthy motivator toward change and improvement. Religion then has a very powerful and positive role to play in the relief of guilt, pointing out the disparity between what is and what ought to be, and closing the gap between the two by positing ways of behavior that are both objectively moral and growthful for the individual and healing for the community.

Fear of death. We saw when considering theories of the origin of religion that seeking answers to the meaning of life and the question of death was a way of answering cognitive needs. Here we consider death from a more emotional, personal point of view in which religion becomes a solace, a comforter, and in some cases a guarantee of immortality, assuaging the individual's fears about the after-life.

As we would expect, people become progressively more religious as they get older. From the age of 60 onwards there is an increasing amount of religious concern and an increasing belief in an after-life (Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975, p. 68f). The most avid and participant followers of religious television are older people seeking reassurance of immortality.

Some existential writers (Tennensen, 1966) go so far as to state that religion is a death-denying institution, an ontological hebetant. At first glance it is difficult to agree that the institutional religions deny death. Death is a recurring theme of religious writings, religious art and liturgy. Some sects center their whole cult around a kind of worship of death. Yet in a certain sense religion is "death denying" since its theme so often is that death is not the end of life but the beginning of a new and better life. "Vita mutatur non

tollitur . . ." said the preface from the Requiem Mass. "Life is changed, not taken away . . . and when this earthly dwelling falls apart, a new and glorious eternal dwelling place is prepared in heaven."

To an existentialist of the most gloomy ilk this kind of thinking is religion at its worst—rationalizing window dressing, covering up the harsh reality that death is *it*—the cold and bitter end. With the sweet picture of something better to go to, the chilly fear of that "undiscovered country from whose bourne no traveller returns" (*Hamlet*) is warmed considerably. In between the two extremes of absolute death denial and the acceptance of the "fact" that there is nothing more beyond, lies the role of religion in meeting the individual's cognitive and affective needs for an understanding and a personal acceptance of what death means. The individual, faced with the anticipation or the looming fact of his own death can turn to religion with its potentially broader perspective to give some kind of death acceptance and reconciliation.

Ingmar Bergman has given us many an example of institutional religion failing in this role, notably in his film, *Cries and Whispers*. In this film, centering around the death of a young woman, a minister is called in to pray at the deathbed. He begins a long and solemn prayer, but a prayer riddled with the word "if." Ironically the traditional comforting, perspective-giving role of religion is more than negated by the minister's own doubts: "If there is a God; if he is just; if he rewards the good; if one actually does any good in life . . ." With these pre-conditions the resolution of the prayer is null, and nothing is left but the void.

Sexual motivation. One need not adhere to the Freudian approach to see sexuality as something closely linked with, and motivating religious behavior. Religion and fertility have been closely linked through history and prehistory. Some religious rites as an expression of man's oneness with nature, have shown overt sexuality through rituals of sacred prostitution and other forms of sexual activity (Delisle, 1976). More subtle but explicit expressions of sexuality are contained in sacred literature such as the biblical Song of Songs.

> His left hand is beneath my head,
> While his right embraces me.
> I adjure you, O daughters of Jerusalem,
> . . . That you disturb not, nor interrupt our love,
> Until it is satiated (2:6-7) (Gordis, p. 51)

The mystics have expressed their experiences with God in terms loaded with sexual symbolism "By Command of the Bridegroom when He intends ravishing the soul," says St. Teresa, "the doors of the mansions and even those of the Keep and the whole castle are closed; for he takes away even the power of speech . . ." (Underhill, 1961, p. 377).

The Tantrics of northern India symbolize the union of consciousness and energy by statues and paintings depicting the sexual embrace of Shiva and Shakti. They seek to experience the state of cosmic oneness implied by such symbolism through Yogic breathing and visualization exercises combined with ritualistic sexual practices.

Obsessive-compulsive behavior. Religion in some form provides a legitimate outlet for some obsessive-compulsive behavior. Frequently recurring thoughts that one cannot rid oneself of are often laden with religious and moral content. Reik (1951) has elaborated on this theme. The recurring thoughts of the chanting Hare Krishna member, the repetitions involved in brainwashing a Moonie convert are techniques used by so-called religious sects to employ the power of repetitiousness on the mind to induce a "religious" obsession. For some obsessive neurotics, their repetitive thoughts take the form of religious symbolism and ideas.

Religious rite also provides a mode of expression for compulsive behavior—rituals that one must perform to satisfy some inner need, allay some guilt feeling, or avert a calamity. "Step on a crack, you break your mother's back" sing the children as they dance down the sidewalk in a kind of game that becomes all too serious for the compulsive neurotic who cannot step on a crack for fear of dire consequences. Compulsive hand washing is another ritual that not only finds itself reflecting the dramatic actions of Pontius Pilate but the hand washing rituals of religion. The Catholic Rosary with its repetition of "Hail Mary" through five or even fifteen decades of "the beads," is another example of repetitious ritual, as is the bowing of Jewish pilgrims as they pray at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. Thus, religious ritual can provide a socially acceptable outlet for existing neurotic compulsions, but can also become a form of compulsive behavior in itself.

To say that all this is "simply neurotic" is to misread what religion does. Life and nature are full of cycles and repetitions just as music has rhythm

and beat. It gives a reassuring sameness that bespeaks stability. Religious ritual is also a means of focusing the mind so as to exclude mental and sensory distractions, and thereby precipitate into consciousness the various forms of religious experience. Its deliberateness and conscious intentionality distinguish it from the rituals of the obsessive-compulsive neurotic who performs them as a defence which *prevents* certain dangerous, anxiety-provoking thoughts from entering the conscious mind. If religious ritual and ideas strongly appeal to obsessive-compulsive neurotics with a pathological need for security, this does not denigrate religion but shows that religion, which speaks so deeply to the basic needs of man, is sometimes used to answer those needs and sometimes abused in the service of neurotic pathology.

Theories of Consequence

For society. We have seen how religion may well arise from the need of a society to find some sort of identity and integration of its belief systems. Sociologists from Durkheim's time (1915) have explained religion's function as that of providing legitimation for social arrangements. When things work well for the good of society such as obedience to authority or prohibition of incest, they come to be sanctioned by religious norms, rewarded by religion's promises or punished by religion's threats. According to this view, the socially acceptable and workable comes to be the norm which religion sanctions. Religion then becomes a great integrating force in society. It has the power to reward the believer with membership in the group and thereby satisfy some of his safety and belonging needs. Religion can also threaten to punish the intransigent with shunning, excommunication, death, or eternal damnation. The intertwining of religion and politics throughout history bears witness to the elements of truth in this view that religious behavior becomes meaningful in the context of the consequences of the interaction of religion and society.

For individuals. Religion has consequences for the individual too, consequences that go beyond the mere explanation of myself to myself as we saw in the origin theories of religion. Personal integration is one such consequence. Personal integration can be taken in two senses a sense of wholeness within myself, and a sense of connectedness with other people, with other things, and with God, whatever that "god" might be. Another

consequence is that religion can give meaning to life, paint life in broad strokes. This is where religion excels at putting our individuality and fragile uniqueness in perspective. Religion helps figure to emerge from ground in the gestalt of our lives. It brings out the true dimensions of the things of this world, the worthwhileness of ourselves, and reveals our individual place in the cosmos thereby causing it to shine forth. We will work this out more fully later on, but suffice it for now to say that one of the great consequences of religion is perspective—perspective of myself against the background of the universe.

It is here in this last dimension of religion that we find its most valuable contribution, and come closest to understanding what religion is—not defining but understanding. We come closest to understanding because with this concept of religion as that which gives perspective to life, the possibility of experiencing the integrating power of religion is opened up. It is experience rather than definitions that leads to understanding.

What then is Religion in the "Definitions"?

We have eschewed definitions of religion as being too limiting and destructive in themselves of the elements that are vital for the individual experience of religion to be. We have seen that experience is the only way of understanding. Despite their drawbacks, however, definitions are useful to the act of verbally communicating to others those aspects of our understanding of religion not destroyed by the confining limits of those definitions. To communicate the theme on which the remainder of this book is based, and explore the roots of that sense, we should pursue directly now some meanings of the word "religion."

Paradoxically, the most direct route would be what seems to be the most indirect route. If the so-called exact sciences fail to be exact in "measurable" areas like physics (cf. Capra, *The Tao of Physics;* Zukav, *The Dancing Wu-Li Masters)*, how much more so psychology in the realm of religion—a notoriously inexact science dealing with one of the most mercurial of concepts.

Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi (1975) adopt a straightforward, everyday, limited definition of religion as: "a system of beliefs in a divine or superhuman power, and practices of worship or other rituals directed toward such a power" (p. 1). The limitations of this definition will become

apparent as we go along. Other attempts (Spinks, 1963) at defining religion do shed new light on the idea from various angles. Sir James Frazer *(The Golden Bough*, 1911, VI, p. 222), defined religion as the "propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct or control the course of nature and of human life." Frazer's definition brings out two aspects of religion: the theoretical and the practical. The theoretical may be called "theology," while the practical finds expression in two forms: worship which is an attempt to propitiate the gods by rituals and prayer, and morals which are the attempt to propitiate the gods by good conduct.

Definitions themselves have followed two mainstreams, one emphasizing the communal aspects of religion, the other, the individual's psychic life. Emil Durkheim (1915, p. 50) emphasizes that aspect of religion which attracts social scientists, because it is eminently measurable—participation in a religious community. It is relatively easy to measure some aspect of religion by the amount of church attendance. Although this measure falls far short of the full meaning of religion, it is tempting for social scientists to measure the quantity of church attendance and believe this to be an accurate measure of religion. Participation in a religious group is a measure of one aspect of the communal component of religion but neglects individual experience.

Durkheim (1915) saw religion as a "unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them." For Durkheim the idea of religion is inseparable from church. Faith then becomes the acceptance of a set of dogmas and moral norms. By accepting, believing and doing as the church requires, one becomes part of the "in" group, and the potential recipient of whatever social, spiritual, and eternal benefits promised to that "in" group. By rejecting the teachings of the church, either by not being converted to it or, once converted, rejecting the teachings of the community, and thus being "excommunicated" one is susceptible to the social consequences, and threats of temporal or eternal punishment that the church decrees for non-believers. By this definition, creed and code form the core of religion, and faith is the acceptance of these. This is a concept to which Jung and many others reacted strongly.

A definition which emphasizes the communal aspects of religion to the exclusion of the individual's psychic life is deficient. Some scholars, taking the opposite tack, have emphasized religion as an individual's faith in a power beyond oneself, an attempt to gain stability and emotional security in life. God in this context gives the individual some sort of security in life in the face of life's limitations and manifold threats. Worship and serving a god offer appeasement to that god, and guarantee as much as possible the surety the individual seeks, whether it be tomorrow's sunrise, a good harvest or eternal salvation. This individual approach can be called the religion of self-conservation.

Another approach to individual religion, coming to it from the opposite (yet, paradoxically, complementary) direction, is the religion of self-transcendence. This view of the religious person sends him off on a quest, emphasizing the courage to go beyond the stability of mere self-conservation to higher levels of consciousness. Paradoxically, this is the ultimate in self-conservation, for religion has always presented the paradox that to find oneself one must lose oneself. Since self is inextricably bound up in relationships with others, self-transcendence is the ultimate self-discovery. In transcending oneself one finds oneself; in finding oneself one finds others; in finding others one finds oneself reflecting in others through the medium of relationship. Such paradox upon paradox is the beauty of religion.

You will find these themes recurring throughout this book, for they are some of the facets of religion that reveal themselves when we make the effort to examine religion from various perspectives. For now, in an attempt to get something of common understanding of the concept of religion, a statement follows under the title "What is Religion?" It is, of course, not *the* statement; it is *a* statement. It is not proven, nor are all its points systematically developed to a final conclusion, for our notion of religion is in process. This statement, besides providing a common ground for discussion, is a preview of what is to come and what will be developed more in subsequent pages. But, incomplete as it is, the time is ripe to present it so we can go on.

What is "Religion" as the Word is Used Here?

Religion as we have seen is often identified with membership in or attendance at a "church" (a handy measure for sociologists). Attendance at a church may be an outcome of religion, and, indeed, religious teachers have usually drawn around them a group of followers who have organized a "church" with certain dogmas as criteria for membership and certain rituals (liturgy) as a type of community interaction and worship. This liturgy is better than the creed in taking us back to the essence of religion which is awareness (consciousness) of my true complexity and multilevelness as a human being, and the relationships that flow therefrom.

An evolving world is continuously involved in the activity of organization because this is a basic characteristic of mass/energy. Each person is a manifestation of that same activity like an eddy in a flowing river. What organizes the system is awareness (consciousness)—awareness of ourselves as part of this great organization of both persons and things.

We can let a limited personal awareness blind our view of our part in the total complexity; or limited awareness may even seem to *be* membership in the total organization. This may happen in two ways: religion in the narrow sense may show itself as isolationism, insularity, pietism, the "Jesus and I" phenomenon. Or we may have exclusivism in the dogmatic sense of the "in" people and the "out"—the saved and the damned. This may be based on "orthodoxy"—adherence to a set of dogmas, or legalism where conformity to a set of religion-based laws is the criterion of membership. This type of religiosity often manifests itself in crusader-like attempts to convert others to *our* way (which of course is the only "right way"). History is strewn with plentiful examples, many of them bloody, of religious bigotry and zeal for this great rationalization called "God." Often the ardor of attempts to convert others is in direct proportion to the narrow insularity and gnawing insecurity of the religious person. Religious zeal can be a compensation for deep feelings of insecurity, a compensation for the security that should come from establishing one's identity rooted in relationships with other persons both human and divine.

Man seeks the security of an identity rooted in relationships; these are founded in the earliest years of childhood and continue throughout a lifetime, becoming successively more integrated.

To the extent that we separate ourselves conceptually from others we form a barrier to oneness with our fellow man. Caught in this separateness which we can help create ourselves, we behave in a way that brings suffering to ourselves and others. This is hell. Hell truly is "other people" (Sartre) if we really believe it to be so.

Truly religious people, especially the mystics by exemplifying its peaks, have shown us what religion really can be. Rooted in a secure sense of personal identity from which they can dare to launch out, to risk loving (to transcend themselves), and passing through the disintegrative crises of life in a positive, growthful way, these people find the delimiting barriers crumbling. There is union with others based on consciousness of what I am—a person who by nature *must* be in relationship with others or I am no person at all.

My more or less consciousness of this (to a degree that wavers from time to time) is my ordinary experience of religion. When the barriers between myself and others fall totally in those rare and precious moments of full awareness of who I am, these are mystical religious experiences. Heaven would be the perfect and continual possession of this experience which is at one and the same time both transpersonal and perfectly personal fulfilling—the omega point (Teilhard de Chardin, 1973).

Thus, this striving for full consciousness we call "religion." Its rejection we call "hell." Its temporary attainment is the mystical, fleeting experience of ecstasy in which we stand outside ourselves, distanciate ourselves from ourselves and thus obtain objectivity, putting ourselves in the right relationship of tiny figure against vast background, seeking and finding objective truth in the abstract and objective moral truth. This is love—universal love. Its idealization we call "God," who is love in action and who is personal, since God is the ideal of interpersonal and transpersonal union, calling for respect and awe at the distance between the human and the divine, and yet luring into the intimacy of friendship between persons.

The whole idea of "God as person" seems to fit quite comfortably for some, while for others it is awkward and uncomfortable, something outgrown in the passage beyond the remembrances of a childhood, filled with anthropomorphic images of God as an old man seated on the clouds of heaven. Some consequently throw out the whole idea of a personal God as something psychologically immature and theologically unsatisfactory. For

many, too, the image of God as "He," with all its masculine connotations, is enough to make the picture truncated and disturbing. However, the problem lies not with a personal God, but with our limited concept of person. If we continue to identify person with physical body, then the anthropomorphisms ("the eye of God," "the right hand of God") are controlling, limiting instead of aiding in the forming of a relationship worthy of persons. When we love, when we care, when we pray, when we worship, we enter into a personal relationship. Some day, when psychology and theology have communicated long and deeply, we may have a more adequate, broader concept of what a person is. We will have got back to the core message of the ancient religious myth of divine incarnation—God becoming man to show humankind what personhood might be. If God is not the exception to metaphysical principles but their exemplification, may He not also be the chief exemplification of personhood? May "He" as total person, not only exemplify what we have come to know as masculinity but also encompass femininity as well? The problem is not with God but with our language, our customs and ultimately with our limited comprehension of what it is to be a person. Perhaps at death, when the occasion which is each person perishes, each individual passes over into an interpersonal relationship the dimensions of which were incomprehensible throughout the passages of life. In the meantime, developing persons can have a truly interpersonal relationship with God expressed in terms meaningful to their level of development and comprehensive of their notions of gender. The concepts "person" and "God" are vast enough to encompass many interpretations and meet the relationship needs of a wide variety of human beings, male and female, and at every level of development. This power of religion to lure the individual into personal relationships both human and divine heightens the basic paradox that the person as religious, though at heart solitary in the quest for meaning, is drawn inevitably into community of persons.

A Note on Prayer and Ritual

If religion is both solitary and communal, do these two dimensions ever merge? Or is there, at least, some bridge that may cross the chasm between the two? The chasm is spanned by prayer and ritual. For most people, the solitariness of their religious quest becomes too much to bear. They yearn to fuse their religious insights and their religious aspirations with those of

others in a common set of symbols. These are the great religious symbols of art, of the coming together in the community of ritual, and the going apart in private prayer. The coming together seems obviously enough a fusing of community, but what of the going apart?

Christ in the garden of Gethsemane, the night before he died, withdrew a few steps away from his best friends to communicate in solitude with his Father. His prayer on that occasion was a model of solitary, mature prayer. Solitary because that is the lot of the man as he confronts death; mature because His prayer was shaped by the qualities of the integrated human being He was. Above all, His prayer was not manipulative. Often prayer is taken as an opportunity to manipulate God, to make him change the world to suit our individual wants. This is the "God, don't let it rain on my picnic" phenomenon. Freud was probably right when he concluded that some religious people are caught in a permanently childish dependence on God as an all-powerful Father who can be manipulated, cajoled, appeased and even bribed into running the world the way they want it to be run. My son, Daniel, at the age of five, said, "I'm going to blast off to God in a rocket ship and tell Him that I want to live forever." I was more impressed by Daniel, at that age, reflecting on his own mortality than by the means he took to do something about it, asking God to change things to suit him. But this was appropriate to his age. Perhaps we can all be impressed too by the modern means of transportation he chose to communicate with God. For many of us the single-seater rocket ship is the individual prayer of manipulation.

However, to induce God to change the course of the universe is much less the psychological function of prayer than to induce within ourselves a change—of heart, of mind, of perspective, of need, of wants. Doing this makes prayer no less a religious act or no less powerful; it simply switches the agents of change from being totally in the hands of a "sugar daddy" in heaven to being, at least to some extent, in one's own hands. Prayer then becomes reflective, all-things-considered time for turning from the egocentrism of the individual's part alone, to the perspective of the individual who emerges, figure against ground, and begins to grasp the whole scene. Whitehead said, "Religion is world loyalty." Maybe we are beginning to get closer to what he means. Prayer in this sense is perspective-giving. That is why it is essential to religion.

"Prayer is religion in act," says William James (1958, p. 352). Prayer distinguishes religion from moralizing or from the aesthetic sentiment, or from mere philosophy, no matter how comprehensive or perspective-giving that philosophy may be. Real prayer is not mere repetitious ritual, the vain exercise of words, like the empty-hearted turning of a prayer wheel, but a movement into personal relationship with the mysterious power we recognize as divine. James (1958) puts it succinctly:

> Wherever . . . this prayer rises and stirs the soul, even in the absence of forms or of doctrines, we have living religion. One sees from this why "natural religion," so called, is not properly a religion. It cuts man off from prayer. It leaves him and God in mutual remoteness, with no intimate commerce, no interior dialogue, no interchange, no action of God in man, no return of man to God. (p. 352)

It remains only a step beyond what William James is saying here about prayer being communication between the human and the divine to conclude that religion is a personal relationship between divine and human persons. That is a mystery beyond psychology. Some day we may know enough of what a person is to know in what way God is the chief exemplification of personhood. In the meantime, we will continue to relate to God according to our insights, and according to our individual levels of development, ranging from childish attempts at manipulation up to the highest levels of unity and oneness of persons both human and divine—a oneness found above all in union of wills with the divine. "Father, if it is possible . . . But not my will but yours be done."

This union of wills, this interpersonal communication, this mature relationship of human and divine persons is eloquently expressed by the theologian, William Marrevee in his commentary on the Roman Catholic liturgy:

> What may we expect from prayer? That we get God interested in us, in our concerns?
>
> What we may expect from prayer above all is that it brings home to us God's gracious presence to our life. Our day to day life has its pain and joy, its cracks and holes, its shattering and exciting experiences, and we wonder . . . does it really matter, is there any sense to it all?
>
> In prayer we bring all of life with its broken and incomplete features before God. Not everything will become clear; but what prayer can do in us is to make us grow in the awareness that all the things which make up our every

day life, our concern for daily bread, our disappointments and joys are not indifferent to God, but matter to Him.

That is expressed in the underlying theme of the Our Father: confidence and trust. The end result of prayer is not that we change God's mind, but that we perceive life differently. Prayer does not change God; it changes and renews us. Without taking the threatening and chaotic features away from our life, it sets us free from a paralyzing anxiety. It makes an element of peace and confidence enter our life; an awareness that in the final analysis we are cared for. It may help us to get on with life. Difficulty and pain will not suddenly disappear, but when honestly placed before God they may become the fertile soil from which confidence and trust are born.

God's most sought-for gift of prayer enables us to approach God as a Father who cares, a Father in whom we can trust despite and in the midst of at times seemingly contrary evidence.

Religion and Faith

The words "faith" and "religion" sometimes get used interchangeably. It is just as easy to talk about "faith development" as "religious development" and suppose we are meaning the same thing. However, I think it is important to distinguish the two. So, while we are about the task of clarifying how we shall use certain terms, we should turn our attention to what we mean by faith and religion.

First perhaps I should speak to the point of why I am using the word religion at all, with all its connotations of sectarianism and group membership. "Why not" some of my students have objected over the years, use the word "spirituality" or even "consciousness" and get rid once and for all of the need to make all these distinctions. "After all," they say, "the way you are using the word 'religious' certainly emphasizes the levels of personal experience that are spiritual." My main reason for hanging onto the word "religious" is to help save the concept of religion. Right now the word religion, weighed down as it is with sectarian connotations, still contains the concept of the individual in a relationship of love. I think we should use the word religion despite the difficulties, to keep it a rich and growing term expressive of both the individual and collective facets. Perhaps we can even add to the richness of the word religion. Let us attempt to do that now by comparing it with faith.

The great Protestant theologian, Paul Tillich, gave one of the most meaningful definitions of faith (1957, p. 1) when he said: "Faith is the state of being ultimately concerned." Perhaps we could better call it the *process* of being ultimately concerned, but, whatever, Tillich is trying to tell us that man has many concerns ranging from bare subsistence needs like food and shelter, up to spiritual concerns—cognitive, aesthetic, social, political. There are levels of concern and at whatever level a person fixes his ultimate concern that is where he establishes his faith. If his ultimate concern is in enjoying himself, then hedonism is his faith. If his ultimate concern is in making money or gaining power, then materialism or control is his faith. If his ultimate concern is the love of God and his fellow man then his faith is religious in the highest sense. Faith is an act of the total personality, including all the elements of personality and giving a centering force to the dynamics of personal life. As ultimate concern, it involves choice, belief and commitment to whatever we have chosen as being worthy of ultimate concern.

This is where religion comes in as something quite distinct but a partner and a guide to faith. If faith is the state of being ultimately concerned and religion is that which gives perspective to life, then religion tells us what is worthy of our ultimate concern.

Religion is that consciousness, at whatever level it is, that gives perspective to the lives of individuals and shared meaning to the community. If the religious consciousness of an individual or a community is at a high level, it tells us by experience, by example, by teaching, by tradition what is truly worthy of ultimate concern. Religion at its best thus confirms true faith, integrating the whole personality, since, as we have seen, faith is an act of the whole personal life. In other words, since religion gives perspective to life, if it is true religion, it gives true perspective, grounding our faith in that which is truly worthwhile, truly worthy of ultimate concern. If it is of lesser caliber or false, religion yields idolatry, for it sets up gods that are not worthy of worship and goals that are not deserving of pursuit.

We will see more about the psychological process of faith development and its interplay with religious development later. But perhaps it would be helpful now, while we are still concentrating on faith-religion relatednes to attend to a distinction that Peter Berger makes in his book, *A Rumor of*

Angels, Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural (1970). Berger distinguishes inductive and deductive faith and thereby clarifies two rather distinct ways of coming at faith via religion. He says:

> I use induction to mean any process of thought that begins with experience. Deduction is the reverse process; it begins with ideas that precede experience. By "inductive faith," then, I mean a religious process of thought that begins with facts of human experience; conversely, "deductive faith" begins with certain assumptions (notably assumptions about divine revelation) that cannot be tested by experience. Put simply, inductive faith moves from human experience to statements about God, deductive faith from statements about God to interpretations of human experience. (p. 57)

What Berger is saying has important implications for how we approach our own religious identity and how we approach the education of others in our faith. If we limit our view of religion to it being largely an institutional phenomenon, an organization clustered around a set of beliefs, doctrines, dogmas and traditions passed down from generation to generation, then the main task of the religious person is to learn these beliefs that his religion passes on, accept them "in faith" (which often means *blind* faith) and live by them. A grade three student I once encountered expressed this attitude very well: "Religion is fairy stories," she said, "except in religion, you have to *believe* them." Perhaps we had the makings of a religious conformist there, perhaps of a religious cynic. Whatever the case may be, she expressed the results of a kind of deductive approach to religious education very well—religion as a set of dogmas, and faith the passive acceptance of those dogmas no matter how incredible they might be. The inductive approach gives faith an entirely different role, that of a search for personal meaning stemming from one's own experience of life. This quest is urged and guided by religion which is there to call the person to seek answers and help find personal answers in the tradition of wisdom it passes on. Religion in this setting has the consciousness-enriching role of giving perspective to individuals and shared meaning to the community.

Life Meaning—Victor Frankl

Our discussion of religion and faith as the search for meaning would not be complete without including the man whose ideas and whose personal presence have centered on the problem of finding meaning in the contemporary situation. Viktor Frankl, an existential psychologist, has spoken directly to the problem of the need for meaning and presented practical means of achieving that meaning (1959, 1978). What Frankl has to say about the search for meaning is productive in our discussion of religion. He is so brilliantly clear and relevant to our times that he can enrich our study of the development of religion and faith in today's world.

Frankl certainly came to his theory inductively—from his own experience of life, torn open for observation in the rawest of situations, the concentration camps of Nazi Germany. Born of Jewish parents in 1905, he became a doctor and taught at the University of Vienna Medical School as a neuropsychiatrist. During World War II, he and his family were taken off to the concentration camps. There in the ugliest and potentially most dehumanizing situations, he saw that some prisoners were reduced to the level of animals, while others rose to new heights of humanness, not despite the situation, but, it seemed to him, because of the situation. What made the difference, Frankl concluded, was that some prisoners had a sense of purpose in their lives, or even discovered a sense of meaning there in the death camps. What is needed to survive or even develop in the most inhuman of situations is the conviction that life always has a meaning and a purpose. Frankl (1959, p. 121) recalled the words of Nietszche, "He who has a why to live for can bear with almost any how." The role of each individual is to actively discover and live that meaning. After the war, Frankl formalized his reflections into a theory which he called "logotherapy" and published it in a book entitled initially, *From Death Camp to Existentialism*, and later called, *Man's Search for Meaning* (1959). This book is the absorbing account of his sufferings and searchings and the sufferings and searchings of others in the concentration camps, and the conviction that grew out of that experience, a deep conviction of the importance of searching for meaning in life, not just in the threat of death camps but in the stresses of the everyday life all of us live. Nothing, he maintained, is without meaning if we could only understand that meaning is there to be found in every life, and every situation.

Frankl believed, as an existentialist, in the freedom of the will. "Man," he said (1969, p. 3) "is free to rise above the somatic and psychic determinants of his existence." From this basic assumption he moved on to his concept of the will to meaning. Man reaches out for meanings to fulfill; he is responsible for the specific meanings of his life.

Frankl outlined three ways in which meaning can be discovered: By pursuing some task, some work, some cause; by being involved in relationships to others; sometimes by accepting suffering.

Frankl, in advocating a search for meaning, is attempting to heal what he calls the collective neurosis of our time. In this task he is in the tradition of existentialist philosophers, theologians and psychologists such as Kirkegaard, Tillich, Rollo May, Karl Jaspers and Martin Buber. Rollo May in particular (1953) attacks Freud's tenet that sexual repression is the common ailment of our time. True as that may have been in Freud's Victorian Vienna, sexual repression is not today's most common ailment. The collective neurosis of our time is emptiness, alienation, separation, loneliness, boredom, aimlessness and existential frustration. The answer, Frankl and others maintain, to this noogenic neurosis is the search for meaning.

Basic of course to Frankl's theory is his conviction that life is not meaningless or totally absurd as some other existentialist philosophers and artists have maintained. Instead Frankl is a leader in that branch of existentialism that is convinced that life does have meaning. This meaning is available to everyone, and the meaning is there to be found under any condition. As an existentialist, Frankl believes that each life situation is unique as is the meaning of each particular situation. Thus individual meaning cannot be wholly transmitted through tradition. The task of tradition, rather, is to pass on universal meanings and values. Against this background of universal meanings, the human person emerges as an individual, figure against ground, discovering his own personal meanings. In finding his own personal meaning, an individual uncovers the spiritual significance of his life. Transcending the here and now, he can grasp the greater picture of life, finding himself in that larger context, putting his life, his task, his suffering in the perspective of the transcendent. This idea, as we shall see, flows beautifully into Whitehead's philosophy of process and illumines the place of the individual within the whole. It flows beautifully too into our theme of religion as perspective-taking.

That Frankl chooses to maintain that his psychology has to do with the spiritual (*geistig*) rather than the religious (*geistlig*) makes it no less pertinent to our understanding of religion and faith. Frankl's avowal that his psychology is not religious is primarily the result of his limiting the concept of religion to its narrow meaning of belonging to a religious sect (*geistlig*), and Frankl is anxious to maintain that meaning is available to all regardless of religious affiliation. I think the broader notion of religion that we have adopted avoids this difficulty; in fact it emphasizes the relevance of logotherapy for understanding religion and faith. If we take what Tillich and others are saying about faith involving ultimate concern, we see a remarkable convergence among psychologists, philosophers and theologians on the theme of the search for meaning in life. Faith is the process of the search for meaning. Institutional religion has no monopoly on providing the terms of this meaning; it can be found, as Frankl himself exemplifies, in the most "secular" of situations. However religions can provide meaning, and religiousness at the higher levels is best at pointing toward meaning in life. Religion is the guide and friend to the questing individual who seeks to discover what it is that will give ultimate meaning to life. It gives ultimate meaning because that task, that relationship, that suffering, that value is truly worthy of his or her ultimate concern.

Chapter II

Psychology and Religion— An Historical Overview

"In order to be at peace, it is necessary to feel a sense of history—that you are both a part of what has come before and part of what is yet to come. Being thus surrounded, you are not alone; and the sense of urgency that pervades the present is put in perspective."

—Elizabeth Kubler-Ross

To put the relationship between religion and psychology into perspective, we should look briefly at the modern history of that relationship. It will also give us a chance to review some of the most significant authors and see what they have to say about religion from a psychological point of view. We will begin with Freud and move up to significant contemporary authors. If there is any trend in this history it is one of convergence, with Freud creating great distance between religion and psychology, followed by others representing a gradual but sure movement of the two camps closer together. This convergence is characterized by diminishing mutual mistrust and increasing appreciation of what religion and psychology have to offer each other.

Sigmund Freud

Freud lived in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. We begin with him, not because he was the originator of a psychology of religion (we can trace western psychology and its interest in the spirit, the *psyche* of man, back to the Greeks), but because the psychology of religion as a separate discipline really emerges only in the nineteenth century studies in social psychology. Freud, as the father of modern clinical psychology made an immense contribution to the development of the psychology of religious and moral development.

It is important to recall the social setting in which Freud practised clinical psychology. Seated in his famous office at number 19 Bergstrasse in Vienna, Freud saw a constant stream of neurotic people who seemed, to him, to represent the problems of his time. It was the Victorian era, when sex was something not to be talked about and the established religions were much involved in encouraging what, to Freud, was profound sexual repression. One cornerstone of Freud's theory of psychopathology was that sexual repression was the wellspring of neurosis. Religion was constantly there in the lives of his patients playing its part in the neurosis. Religion either helped generate or helped express neurosis through the acceptable religious symbols that were conscious statements of unconscious repressions.

Freud was a product of nineteenth century materialism. As a scientist of his time he could not affirm values or faith. It was thought at that time that a truly value-free science was possible, and so a scientist could not speak of values and still maintain his credibility in the scientific community. Empirical knowledge, not evaluation, was the cornerstone of his science.

Freud was, of course, interested in morals, particularly as these were expressed in the working of the conscience. He devised a schema of the human psyche giving an important place to conscience which is part of what he referred to as the superego. A homely analogy to Freud's concept of the structure of the psyche would be that of the structure of an egg. The yolk represents the core of the psyche which Freud called the "id." Surrounding this is the white of the egg, representing the "ego." All of this is encompassed and held in by the shell, the "superego." The id at the core of the person is a boiling, seething mass of libidinal, sexual energy, seeking expression in the outside world. If the ego is strong and well developed it can control and direct the sexual urges of the id. For most people, however, the controlling structure that holds in the sexual drives is that hard, resistant shell on the outside, the superego. The conscience is part of the superego, and according to Freud, it is something the individual acquires as an infant when he learns the prohibitions and taboos of the society around him. Parents in particular are the source of these prohibitions as they tell him in a God-like way what is right and wrong. They punish him for wrongdoing, especially by inducing in him feelings of shame and guilt. Shame and guilt, then, caused largely by Mom and Dad as they teach the prohibitions of society to their children, form the dynamics of a repressive conscience, a conscience

largely concerned with holding in unacceptable sexual urges.

Freud was also influenced by the anthropology of his time. In 1913 he published *Totem and Taboo* in which he attempted to apply new psychological concepts to primitive cultures. Freud presented the idea that there was a psychological connection between the religious practices of primitive man and the neurotic behavior of contemporary men and women. Behind *Totem and Taboo,* was the Freudian notion that the mythologies of world religions show that religion is nothing more than the projection of psychological processes onto the outside world.

He attributed the origin not only of religion but of all civilization, culture, morality, and law to the psychological connection between the Oedipus Complex and totemism which existed in primitive societies. Freud had given the name Oedipus Complex to the situation in which the son hates and even kills his father because of his own desire to possess his mother. In *Totem and Taboo*, Freud made a psychological connection between this situation which he thought he saw in his Viennese clients and the findings of anthropologists that a totem animal must not be killed except communally, and that members of the same totemic group were not permitted to have sexual relations with women of the same tribe. From this psychological assocation Freud concluded that God was merely the projection of the father figure, and that guilt, the standards of sexual morality and the practice of sacrifice were derived from patriarchal totemism. In *Totem and Taboo* (1918, p. 242) Freud says: "The individual conception of God is in every case modeled on the father. God is at bottom nothing but an exalted father" (see Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975, pp. 183-184).

In *The Future of an Illusion*, which he published in 1927, Freud defined religion (p. 43) as consisting of "certain dogmas, assertions about facts and conditions of external (or internal) reality, which tell one something that one has not discovered oneself and which claim that we should give them credence." Here we see Freud as a scientist of his time, scorning faith because one has not discovered it himself, and visualizing religion solely as a set of dogmas and practices without considering religion as an individual and communal experience.

The word "illusion," as Freud uses it to describe religion, is worthy of comment. Freud carefully points out that, "an illusion is not the same as an error, it is indeed not necessarily an error . . . It is characteristic of an

illusion that it is derived from man's wishes." (1934, pp. 53-54). "Thus we call a belief an illusion when wish-fulfillment is a prominent factor in its motivation, while disregarding its relation to reality, just as the illusion itself does."

Religion according to Freud, is nothing more than an expression of man's wishful thinking—a desire to escape from the hard, cold facts of reality. This desire stems from the psychological factors of a small boy's relationship to his father, a relationship strengthened by the child's all too vivid awareness of his helplessness in the face of the realities of an unknown world which to him is a terrifying void of darkness.

Religion was something early man sought as a comfort and protection against this threat. The need, Freud contended, continued up to contemporary times. You can find it today expressed in the films of Ingmar Bergman who was heavily influenced by Freud. In Bergman's early films we see, set against the gray background of a bleak Scandinavian landscape, the man trying to find the comfort of a father with whom he could never communicate as a child. Usually the need for communication and comfort is projected onto God who does not speak, and the film ends as bleakly as it began in a black void of faith. This is especially true of *Winter Light* in which the main character is a religious minister without faith or ability to be a father to his parishioners who look to him for the comforts and reassurance of religion.

In *The Future of an Illusion* Freud indicated a number of resemblances between religious observances and the behavior of obsessive-compulsive neurotics. He found that a substantial part of religious law and ritual is concerned with feelings of guilt, a strong desire to control "evil" instincts, and scrupulous attention to detail. Freud saw religion as a universal obsessional neurosis.

Although psychoanalysis is anachronistic, and rests largely on idiosyncratic assumptions and tenuous conclusions derived by Freud from the limited scope of his clinical practice, Freudian psychology has continued to have a profound influence on psychology in general and religious psychology in particular. Much of the reaction to Freudian psychology has been negative condemnation: for example, papal statements have denounced psychoanalysis as materialistic, atheistic and pansexual. Freud, like the rest of us, brought to his understanding of religion his own personal

background and the attitudes of his time. Freud, as we have seen, conceived of religion as merely a set of dogmas and not as a personal experience. He never considered that man might be by nature a "religious animal."

Some of Freud's followers, as we shall see, had the courage to step outside the limited concept Freud had of religion, and Jung, in particular, did have a vision of man as an essentially religious being. Some of those who stayed within the realm of Freudian orthodoxy, and transcended their "Father" by seeing new and more contemporaneous repercussions of the theory have made valuable contributions to the psychology of religion and morals. Some of these neo-Freudians, particularly Fromm and Erikson are outstanding.

What positive things did Freud give the psychology of religious and moral development? He, first and foremost, planted firmly in our vocabulary the word "unconscious." To acknowledge that not all of man's psyche is out in the open, to recognize that dynamics of which we are not aware are acting upon us is a valuable concept for all psychologists to have. He shook moral decision making out of the purely rational flower pot in which it had been growing since Greco-Roman times and planted it in the more realistic, if stormier, garden of unconscious, biological needs (a more holistic view of mankind). He acknowledged the dynamic forces of emotionality as shapers of moral decisions, rather than enlightened reason, which had become enshrined in scholastic theology and canon law.

He saw moral thinking as a developmental thing, something that went through unfolding stages of development, and not something that arrived full bloom at the age of twelve as Roman, (and subsequently, Church) law had decreed.

Freud saw the human psyche, including the religious sentiment, as biologically based which helped religious psychology to avoid two errors: (1) confusion of the biological with the spiritual, and the resultant well-meaning but misdirected attempts to control the biological with spiritual means, and (2) the tendency to moralize, to consider the client as "bad" instead of ill.

It is interesting to note that in some ways we have come almost full circle: Today's emphasis in psychology on the ability of the human psyche to control physiological functioning, even to counteract pain by producing pain-controlling dopamines brings us back to the more "primitive"

attempts to affect the physiological by spiritual means. In the past and in contemporary primitive societies the very real connection between the spiritual and the biological was explained in terms of miracles and direct divine intervention. Today we know something more of the chemistry of the body and how subject it is to hypnosis, relaxation, sensory deprivation, ritual and even good old fashioned determination and will power.

The ascending spiral of psychology has come full circle too in the realm of morality. Today we no longer burn witches or put to death a Joan of Arc because she hears voices. Mental illness, partially thanks to Freud, does not carry with it a moral condemnation. The alcoholic is considered ill and not depraved or simply lacking in will power. But is there not too a reaction against the "bleeding heart" liberal syndrome which would explain away morally wrong behavior in terms of "bad" environment or defective genes? Philosophers and psychologists of the most humane and humanistic persuasion are reminding us that "we are our choices," and as we shall see, Dabrowski's "third factor" clearly puts responsibility in the hands of the individual.

If Freud were alive today, even given the limitations of his personal background, he would certainly not construct the same psychology as he did. He was too much aware of his times for that to happen. Freud would see that today, for instance, men and women are not guilt ridden over repressed sexuality, but rather, quite the opposite. He would discover with other great psychologists such as Viktor Frankl and Rollo May that the pervading neurosis of our time is emptiness, meaninglessness, and loneliness. He would discover that the neurosis of our time is not repressed sexuality, but lack of direction, purpose and meaning. Given the development in religious thinking (due partly to him) he would probably see more readily the positive contributions religion has to offer in resolving the neurosis of our time.

Carl Jung

Carl Jung was a contemporary of Freud's and indeed, in the beginning, a disciple. He separated from Freud over issues that centered on religion. Freud had seen religion as symptomatic of illness; for Jung it was the absence of religion that was the chief cause of psychological disorders. For Freud, God was nothing more than a projection of the father image; for

Jung the human father takes on a God-like image, not the other way around. Freud, as a rational scientist, looked for the day when psychology would succeed in explaining away religion, as an analyst would explain a patient's dreams to him. This would dispel the illusion, and the fundamental neurosis of mankind would be cured. Jung, on the other hand, saw religion as an essential activity of man, and, instead of explaining it away, psychology had the exciting role of throwing more light on religion so that man could explore that which is higher in himself and, in many ways, more real.

Jung concentrated on the unconscious as did Freud, but diverged from him by not centering on lower instinctual levels but higher spiritual levels. For Jung the developmental process of life is a process toward individuation. *Individuation* is "the unfolding of one's inherent and unique personality aided by the *transcendent function* and leading to the differentiation of the self." This is "a lifelong task that is rarely if ever completed" (Ewen, 1980, p. 98). Individuation is a stage beyond "mere health" and usually occurs in the second half of life when new meaning is sought and one strives to live up to one's potentialities. Through the process of individuation one becomes a full member of the human community. For Jung, the fully developed, self actualized human being would, by definition, be a religious person since religion involved actualization of man's highest potentialities. Without this high level actualization, any person would be a truncated specimen of humanity, cut off from his full development, and possibly pretending that such potential for meta-levels did not exist in him. For Jung, *the transcendent function* is "a process that joins various opposing forces into a coherent middle ground and furthers the course of individuation by providing personal lines of development that could not be reached by adhering to collective norms" (Ewen, 1980, p. 80).

Again, it is important to know what Jung meant by "religion." He outlines this most succinctly in his *Psychology and Religion* (1938), "I want to make it clear that by the term 'religion' I do not mean creed . . . Creeds are dogmatized forms of original religious experience. The contents of the experience have become sanctified and usually congealed in a rigid, often elaborate structure" (p. 6). Clearing the table of what he does *not* mean by religion, allows him to state what he *does* mean by the term, "Religion is the careful and scrupulous observation of the experience of the numinosum: a quality of a visible object or the influence of an invisible presence which

causes a peculiar, involuntary alteration of consciousness" (p. 4). From these statements it is clear that Jung was concerned with the human, psychological experience of religion rather than its content. Religion was not a belief system coming from without the individual, nor was it a set of behaviors that helped him fit in with the expectations of a religious group. It was instead something intensely personal, something mysterious and literally wonder-full, something mystical.

What was the source of this experience of the cloudy but awesome realms of the human psyche? It was the human psyche itself. It was the individual psyche imposing some order, searching for some understanding of the outpourings of the unconscious as they flowed into the realm of consciousness. Through dreams and fantasies the psyche expresses itself in symbolic language, and this expression, though intensely personal, is not unique. In fact the symbols of the psyche are shared by countless numbers of mankind, and have been shared over the ages in symbols that go back into the farthest reaches of human existence. Jung called this the "collective unconscious." It was as if by being human one participated in a legacy of symbols and unconscious stirrings that had significance and signification far beyond the individual himself, for they were born of participation in humanness. These symbols or dreams, doodles, paintings, dances, and literature were not similar from being to being by mere chance. They were similar because they shared in the collective unconscious.

Jung spoke of "archetypes of the collective unconscious," the themes of dreams and works of art since the dawn of man. Some of these archetypes are mandalas, generally circular, somewhat abstract figures that keep recurring in man's art, (for example, the Aztec sun calendar). That things go in circles or cycles is not just incidental to human nature; it is in the nature of the cosmos from which human nature derives its essential being. The theme of "earth mother" or "wise old man" are not mere coincidences as they appear over and over again in religious contexts. They are the fruits of the collective unconscious. The great myths of mankind follow symbolic themes; it is not coincidental that Jonah spent three days in the belly of the whale and Christ three days in the darkness of the tomb. Mystical numbers appear over and over, with three and seven appearing most frequently in religious traditions. There are three persons in the Trinity, seven branches on the Jewish menorah, and seven sacraments in the Catholic Church.

Myths encompass the crossing of the sacred and the profane in symbols that have meaning on many levels. I wondered when I saw the film, *The Deerhunter* why the sight of a deer with a magnificent rack of antlers staring calmly at its hunter had a special power for me, why it seemed to have a strength beyond other images. Then I remembered my father's gold watch chain. I went back to it, finding it stored away in a treasure chest of precious family keepsakes. On the watch fob was the image of a deerhunter and a deer with two great antlers; between them a shining cross. My father had explained to me when I was a little boy that this was the story of St. Hubert, patron of his parish church back in Lancashire, England. St. Hubert, so the legend goes, had been a hunter and an evil man. One day he confronted a deer in the forest with a cross shining in its antlers. He saw it as Christ, saw how he had been persecuting Christ, not only in animals but in other human beings, and was converted to a good life. I recalled the same story told to us by a German guide as we toured the Black Forest, but this time the saint had a German name. And so on and so on back to St. Paul on a sandier, sunnier road to Damascus, falling from his horse in a sudden realization of what he was doing to Christ in other people. From St. Paul through St. Hubert to the war in Viet Nam, the symbol of the deerhunter, Jung would say, is not coincidental. It is an archetype of the collective unconscious.

Many archetypes come from the ancient mythical past as expressions of how man experiences natural things such as day and night, birth and death, summer and winter, male and female. Archetypes transcend peoples and ages. They help us in a modern civilization get in touch with the "participation mystique" of the primitive man who does not build a wall between himself and his environment and therefore experiences what happens without as happening within, and vice versa. It is an organic view in which man's consciousness is free to participate in the consciousness of the world around him. It is no wonder that religion is full of archetypes: life blossoming from death, light coming from darkness, strength coming from weakness, salvation from the most humble and unlikely of sources.

The ripeness of Jung's psychology for the psychology of religion is evident. Given Jung's view on personal religion, his approach has an immediate appeal for those who come to the notion of religion as an individual experience, an individual relationship with God as something not abstract,

but a mysterious presence to which one can feel related in tension.

As for the realness of the spiritual, Jung makes a strong statement, again from the pages of *Psychology and Religion* (1938):

> It is an almost ridiculous prejudice to assume that existence can only be physical. As a matter of fact the only form of existence we know of immediately is psychic. We might well say on the contrary that physical existence is merely an inference, since we know of matter only insofar as we perceive psychic images transmitted by the senses. (p. 11)

Given Jung's view that the psychic is essentially spiritual, one can argue that, for him, the spiritual was much more "real" than the material; there were no fallible intermediaries between him and his internal experiences.

A paradox emerges for us if we follow Jung through this way of thinking: the more one delves into himself, searching his own unconscious and interpreting himself to himself, the more he discovers others within himself. He discovers something within himself which is highly personal and yet public, highly individual, but not isolationist, intensely experienced, and yet sharing of a common experience because it is part of the collective unconscious. In finding himself he finds that others are already there within himself. In withdrawing into himself he participates in the world outside himself. By individuation he becomes even more a part of the whole. These are the kinds of experiences the mystics tell us they have known. It is difficult to deny that what Jung is talking about is truly religion.

Jung's psychology places the individual within the vast schemata of time and place, giving man, in a world filled with consciousness at many levels, the highest level of consciousness and, with that high level of consciousness, the greatest possibilities of participation in the interrelatedness of the universe. This is what religion is all about and why it is central in Jung's psychology.

William James

No look at the giants of the psychology of religion would be complete without paying sufficient respect to William James, a man of universal genius whose insights in the field of religion are largely represented by a single book, the *Varieties of Religious Experience*. *Varieties* is old; it is the publication of the Gifford lectures delivered at Edinburgh in the period

1901-1902, but its value is such that it remains a classic.

William James was a philosopher trained in chemistry and medicine who majored in psychology. He wrote as a scientist of his time but without the arrogance of a scientist attempting to explain away religious phenomena as "nothing but . . ." in the tradition of the behaviorists that was so fashionable at the time. Rather he speaks of "man's religious constitution." In this book he marvels at the varieties of ways in which man expresses and experiences that religious constitution. Just as the book is usually famous for its small print, so is it equally famous for its intriguing footnotes, and the marvelous collection of case studies James uses to illustrate the varieties of religious experience.

The fact that William James could speak to his audience of academics about religion and that his *Varieties of Religious Experience* would still be a classic in psychology almost a century later is due to a basic premise on which he builds his presentation: James does not see religion as something apart from other psychic phenomena, something quite other and belonging in a separate compartment. He holds that religious phenomena are continuous with other psychic phenomena:

> There is religious fear, religious love, religious awe, religious joy, and so forth. But religious love is only man's natural emotion of love directed to a religious object; religious fear is only . . . the common quaking of the human breast, insofar as the notion of divine retribution may arouse it; religious awe is the same organic thrill which we feel in a forest at twilight, or in a mountain gorge; only this time it comes over us at the thought of our supernatural relations. (p. 40)

James does not pretend to cover the whole of religion. Early in the book he distinguishes institutional religion from personal religion and says he will confine himself to personal religion. This brings him abruptly to the question we have already faced: that of defining what he means by religion. For his purposes James defines religion as:

> The feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine. (p. 42)

Later James says, "Religion, whatever it is, is a man's total reaction upon life" (p. 45). He does not, however, hold that *any* total reaction upon life is religion. He does not maintain that *any* understanding, broad and encompassing as it might be, of the nature of the universe, deserves the name of religion in the strict sense because a concept of the universe may not include a solemn experience of the divine.

James takes this concept of the solemn experience of the divine and develops the distinctions that are subtle yet important to his idea of religion. "When," he says, "we compare these intenser experiences [of the religious person] with the experiences of tamer minds, so cool and reasonable that we are tempted to call them philosophical rather than religious, we find a character that is perfectly distinct" (p. 52). The stoic, the mere moralist, the man who is limited to philosophy lacks something which the religious person par excellence, the mystic and ascetic saint, has in abundance. That quality which distinguishes the religious person from the stoic who can only grit his teeth in the face of adversity, is a state of mind in which, "the will to assert ourselves and hold our own has been displaced by a willingness to close our mouths and be as nothing in the floods and waterspouts of God" (p. 53). James goes on to describe this state of mind as one which banishes fear in a state of trust in the divine:

> What we most dreaded has become the habitation of our safety, and the hour of our moral death has turned into our spiritual birthday. The time for tension in our soul is over, and that of happy relaxation, of calm deep breathing, of an eternal present with no discordant future to be anxious about has arrived. Fear is not held in abeyance as it is by mere morality, it is positively expunged and washed away. (p. 53)

In this passage James is describing not only the experiences of the religious mystics at their loftier heights, but a state of mind that can be had, to some degree, by all who experience religion at their own level of development. It is significant that this rhapsodic account of the heights of religious mysticism is a picture, too, of the very young child who has developed a basic sense of trust. We will see more of this when we explore the developmental stages proposed by Erik Erikson.

William James is very careful not to give the impression that religion is escapism, a getting away from evil or pain. Religion no longer cares to

escape; it consents to the evil outwardly, while inwardly it knows pain and evil have been overcome. How this experience, happiness despite suffering, comes about, James admits he cannot understand since it is in the domain of higher mysticism. But he does draw an analogy from a painting by Guido Reni in the Louvre showing St. Michael with his foot on Satan's neck. The allegory, he points out is that "the world is all the richer for having a devil in it, so long as we keep our foot upon his neck" (p. 55). In the religious consciousness that is the position in which the fiend, the negative or tragic principle is found; for that reason the religious consciousness is so rich in emotion. The colorful picture William James paints of religious experience depicts two main images: the ordinary experience of religion, and the extraordinary, conversion or mystical experiences. James considers these two states as different approaches to what he calls, "the more."

On this topic of mysticism, James addresses himself to an aspect which has widespread relevance for our time. James did not have the variety of drugs available to him, nor such a widespread usage as we are familiar with now, but he does consider the relationship between intoxicants and drugs, and "mysticism" (p. 297ff.). He speaks to the issue of mystical experience as a deliberately self-induced state and not as an integral part of an individual's religious quest. James tends to see drug-induced "higher" consciousness experiences as multifarious manifestations of mystical experiences separated from each other by the most diaphanous of veils. At this point I would like to depart briefly from my current task of "objectively reporting" what James said, to express an opinion which may well be in opposition to James's personal experience and convictions. However, it is an attempt to look at religious and particularly mystical experiences from a multilevel point of view. It is based on the conviction that truly religious experience is a *metanoia*, a lasting conversion of the whole person, and not just a passing consciousness-raising experience, beautiful and even profound as that may be.

The question arises in our culture where hallucinogenic drugs are so readily available whether there are "short cuts" to higher levels of consciousness and ecstastic experiences that do not involve the pain and suffering and long years of discipline of the mystics. Can one, simply by taking a drug, or having his brain chemistry naturally go awry as in schizophrenia, suddenly come to a deep experience of consciousness that is truly

mystical, or "over-belief" in James's sense? The final research data is not in yet, but I think that before arriving at any conclusions one must distinguish between the authentic mystical experience and transient chemical change. Mystical experience is the fruit of one's life intention and one's suffering, and flows over into lasting, loving action. The quick turn-on, however, is an experience which does not come from the depths of a personality but only from a transient chemical change, and does not subsequently flow into a style of life that puts into action the ideas of "love" and "peace" and "brotherhood" that were supposedly experienced while in ecstasy. We know that the great mystics such as Teresa of Avila, John of the Cross, Francis of Assisi, used techniques such as sensory deprivation, spending long hours alone in prayer perhaps transfixed before a crucifix in a secluded room. Recent experimentation has shown that when the mind is deprived of outside sensations, it tends to produce its own stimuli in the form of hallucinations. The actions of the great mystics, however, were part of their lifestyle, and the visions did flow out into a relationship with others that put into practice what they had experienced. Essentially, the mystics went the route of agony before they reached their ecstasy. Quite literally they experienced the loneliness (and discipline) of the long distance runner.

James sees religion as "belief in an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto" (1958, p. 58). James says that life is lived by millions of people as if there were "something more" than mere sense data. He believes that the "more" existed objectively and that man seeks union with it, but did not identify the "more" with any particular deity. He discerns in the "more" a "hither side" and a "farther side." The more in religious experience with which we feel ourselves connected is on its "hither side," and is the subconscious continuation of our conscious life. Since the near side of the more is a subconscious continuation of our very selves, this subconscious self forms a bridge between ourselves and the more and forms the basis for communication between theology and science.

But what about the mysterious farther side of the more? Can we come into contact with that? James says we can pass over to the farther side, and calls this "over-belief" (1958, pp. 386-387)—the state of those who have had a conversion experience or a mystical experience. They report to us what the more is like on the farther side. They tell us (as best they can for their experiences are literally beyond words) of their experience of beauty,

completion, total self-awareness and, at the same time, awareness of others in a new realization of their oneness with nature. They may describe their experience in traditional religious terms as oneness with God. The great mystics have given us many expressions of this; the footnotes throughout James' book are full of such accounts.

William James makes an interesting distinction, one with much promise for new understanding of the religious person, in the *Varieties of Religious Experience*. He distinguishes between the "once-born" and the "twice-born." The "once-born" see God not as a strict judge or a glorious, demanding king, but as the animating spirit of, what is to them, a beautiful, harmonious world. The once-born are not deeply reflective, nor are they particularly distressed by their own imperfections. They read the character of God, not in the disordered world of man, but in a romantic and harmonious world of nature. This religion which is blind to the evils of the world, is what James calls the religion of "healthy-mindedness." He cites Walt Whitman as an example of this, as Whitman who could write: "I celebrate myself, and sing myself . . ."

This is the kind of "healthy minded" religiosity that seems to permeate religious card and gift shops where pretty posters extol the glories of God's love, and cards ringed around with flowers carry sweet verses about the comforts of the Lord. If there is a crucifix, the wounds and suffering have been subdued in favor of ornamentation, gold filigree or even glow-in-the-dark paint. It goes beyond bad taste; it is a whole approach to life that sees it as a rose garden and God the gentle keeper of us flowers.

This "healthy-mindedness" James contrasts with the state of the "sick soul" who must be twice born in order to be happy. The sick soul is not blind to the evils of the world; he is very much aware of the injustices around him and of the evils and injustices within him. He reflects deeply on the human condition and anguishes over the evil that men create for their fellow men. He "hungers and thirsts" after justice. The sick soul is not morbid, perpetually depressed or obsessed with the existence of sin, but he is aware of evil, feels sadness that it exists, and experiences a torment and turmoil within himself that the world and man are not perfect. He is troubled that he has a hand in that imperfection, even if by way of default. Far from pessimistic, he knows the great mystery that agony and death lead to resurrection and life, that death is necessary for life, that joy is the by-

product of suffering. Unlike the cultivated rose garden of the once-born whose flowers are shaped to spell out immediately the words "joy," "peace," "happiness" without suffering, life is more like an old pine tree on the windswept side of a mountain, its roots clinging desperately to the little soil that is there, its trunk rotten, old and dead-like, its branches twisted by the wind into grotesque contortions. But somewhere, through it all there is an irresistible force that is budding forth into a new green sprig of life. The "sick soul" sees that this image of life is more true, and when he is twice born he comes to realize that it is more beautiful in its completeness.

An interesting piece of religious prose has become popular recently. It is called "Footprints" and perhaps it epitomizes the once-born soul that James talks about. It goes like this:

Footprints

One night a man had a dream. He dreamed he was walking along the beach with the LORD. Across the sky flashed scenes from his life. For each scene, he noticed two sets of footprints in the sand; one belonging to him, and the other to the LORD.

When the last scene of his life flashed before him, he looked back at the footprints in the sand. He noticed that many times along the path of his life there was only one set of footprints. He also noticed that it happened at the very lowest and saddest times in his life.

This really bothered him and he questioned the LORD about it. "LORD, you said that once I decided to follow you, you'd walk with me all the way. But I have noticed that during the most troublesome times in my life, there is only one set of footprints. I don't understand why when I needed you most you would leave me."

The LORD replied, "My precious, precious child, I love you and I would never leave you. During your times of trial and suffering, when you see only one set of footprints, it was then that I carried you."

For an interesting contrast to this "healthy-mindedness" try making a substitution for the last line. For example: "During the times of trial and suffering, when you see only one set of footprints, it was then that you were walking in *my* steps." Reflect for a moment on how that changes the whole sense of one's relationship with God and the place of suffering and the nature of religion.

Dag Hammarskjöld was such a man. His diary called *Markings* is an expression of the uneasiness of the twice born, the "sick soul." "Bless your uneasiness," he says "as a sign that there is still life in you" (1964, p. 119). The beauty and tension of the sick soul he expresses in "Single Form":

> The breaking wave
> And the muscle as it contracts
> Obey the same law.
>
> An austere line
> Gathers the body's play of strength
> In a bold balance.
>
> Shall my soul meet
> This curve, as a bend in the road
> On her way to form?
>
> (1964, p. 145).

Besides exploring for us the vast varieties of religious experience, James has reminded us that people do not simply *have* a god, but they *use* their god. To understand what he means I think we have to distinguish several meanings of the word "use." (1) "Use" can be taken in a very negative sense as exploiting God, in a kind of I-it relationship that seeks to fill up the deficiency needs of the human being. (2) "Use" can be taken in another pejorative but not quite so negative sense as "depending upon" out of weakness. We use someone in this sense when we lean on them for support either physically or mentally.

Perhaps one of the best examples of this is one woman's "proof" for the existence of God. She expressed it to me in these terms, "I know God exists because I need him."

We can "use" someone (God included) in an "I-thou" relationship when we utilize that person and our relationship for our mutual growth and development. When James says we do not simply *have* a god, but we *use* our god, I think he means that it is very difficult to put the concept of God on a shelf and forget it. The concept of a deity is so much a part of our human makeup that we use it even if it is something to react against and something whose existence we resoundingly deny.

James himself (p. 367) sums up his *Varieties of Religious Experience* in five brief points:

1. That the visible world is part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws its significance and meaning.
2. That union or relationship with that higher universe is our true goal.
3. That prayer and contemplation and inner communion with the spirit (whatever that might be for the individual) is the real activity of life, the process whereby spiritual energy produces real effects in the world as we know it.

Religion also includes the two following psychological characteristics:

4. A new zest for life, showing itself in "lyrical enchantment" or the driving forces of earnestness and heroism.
5. Feelings of safety, security, peace, and warm relating of self to others.

Alfred North Whitehead

"In the absence of perspective there is triviality"

—Whitehead
Modes of Thought

When the Greek philosopher Heraclitus supposedly stated that one could never step into the same flowing river twice, he proclaimed that the basis of reality is change and flow—the "becomingness" of things is their essence.

Alfred North Whitehead, the mathematician-philosopher-theologian, born and educated in England, who died in 1947 after a long teaching career in the United States, is the most thorough and powerful exponent of "process thought" in modern times. Whitehead was influenced by existentialism and employed its resources to analyze man's condition, proposing a faith answer to some of the questions existential philosophy raises. Whitehead was also influenced by the biblical work of Bultmann for whom revelation was not a dogma, not a message, but an event, an existential encounter, a personal meeting of God and man. Gestalt psychology (in its original European sense) influenced Whitehead too, leading him toward an organismic view of things. Whitehead insisted we must look at experiences as a whole, especially we must see man as organic with nature. Man is one with nature, distinguished from it mainly by his higher level of consciousness and his ability to be a purposive being. Experiences were above all to be "felt," by all creation, but most intensely by human beings. Enjoyment is

not something automatic, given, ready-made; it is to be achieved through discovering the "aim" of creation and joining in with it. The degree of joining in varies with the level of consciousness of the being and its intentionally directed striving.

Process

This "going-on" of creation is purposive, and each participant, each "actual occasion" is called upon to be creative in this dynamic process. By using the term "actual occasion," Whitehead avoids the static concept of the atom or molecule or even "entity" or "being." All is in process, and to express it one must grasp this central notion of "actual occasion." Actual occasions or "drops of experience" are the final real things of which the world is made; there is no going beyond them to find anything more real. All of reality from God downward is explainable only in terms of actual entities. There is a "perishing of occasions" as the old reaches its fulfillment, and, in its particular configuration passes away. But this is the cyclical death and resurrection theme of nature (and of religion) where the perishing of a summer into autumn becomes the opportunity for the blossoming of springtime. The new emerges from the old, like the tiny green redwoods sprouting out from the rotting hulk of an ancient tree that has died, fallen to the ground and is perishing in its present form, to appear again as a new occasion. Though occasions may perish, one thing that is never lost is their value, the genuine abiding contribution made by that which perishes. George Eliot recognized this in the concluding lines of *Middlemarch:*

> But the effect of her being on those around her was incalculably diffusive; for the growing good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric acts; and that things are not so ill with you and me as they might have been is half owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life and rest in unvisited tombs.

In Whitehead's sense, each occasion contributes in its own degree, varying from individual to individual according to its level of conscious participation in the building of the universe. Value abides because it is cherished by God, taken up into His nature, used and made contributory to that which continues.

The basis of experience is emotional and "living emotion" is given a central place in Whitehead's thought. We grasp and are grasped by

experiences. This is "prehension" in Whitehead's terminology, not just apprehension which implies mere understanding; prehension is relatedness. Because the world is a society of mutually prehending occasions, Whitehead called it "organismic"—interrelated and developing, not discrete and static.

Relatedness

The sources of this dynamic interelatedness, at least at its highest levels characterized by consciousness are rooted in intuition, a profound awareness deeply felt of something under consideration. Intuition may operate in different realms: the artist's intuitive sense of the "rightness" of a work of art, the moral sense of "rightness" which individuals feel at the higher levels of development according to Maslow, the religious perception based on intuition that there is, despite setbacks, a persisting stream of goodness and love in a world in process. "Rightness," and quality are characteristics one intuitively knows; they can't be attained by reason alone. For Whitehead, "tenderness" and "persuasion" are important words. They speak of that attractive dynamic of the universe which we call "love." It is the attractiveness of beauty that draws. No occurrence or occasion is identical with another, nor are they all on the same level of significance. Some things are recognizable as important because of their aesthetic quality—their beauty which attracts us. "Aesthetic" here does not mean solely artistic creations, although it certainly does include them; the word points to the deep feelings a particular occasion arouses. Language as we use it, portrays this powerful force of feeling for we say that something "appeals to us," "strikes us"; in other words it has the capacity to impel us to say, "Yes, that's it; that's right!"

Ethics

This concept of mankind being lured toward the rightness of beauty by his intuition has implications for Whiteheadian concepts of morality and ethics.

The impetus toward morality according to Whitehead does not rule out power and coercion, but it is persuasion that is basic. Love is the major motif. Whitehead has little use for moralism. Aesthetics are more important than ethics. God is no ruthless moralist and man is to be "lured" not driven to fulfillment. "Value" says Whitehead (1925, p. 94) "is the outcome

of limitation." An actual occasion is ultimately shaped by selection among various possibilities, by limitation. A new concrete occasion comes into existence as a result of how it prehends its relevant past and gives it new focus. Value is the intrinsic reality of the occasion, unique and with impact on further process. Value, therefore, is always concrete and realized only in individual actual occasions. Morality is "control of process so as to maximize importance" (1938, pp. 13-14). "Importance" occurs when intensity of feeling leads to publicity of expression. For morality this means there must be a constant transcending of the present moment toward public novelty and interest. Greatness of experience permits it to go beyond itself, and when greatness of experience is contributed to the process, greatness of value is achieved.

Process thought goes beyond humanistic ethics in its concern for the unity of mankind and the integration of all reality. The concern of a true morality goes beyond man alone to man as organic with the universe. It is the survival of the universe and not just man that is the ultimate and grand vision of Whitehead's morality.

Man has a special place in furthering the process of the universe by virtue of his high level of consciousness and free will. This leaves the way open for grand possibilities and terrible deficiencies. A person can strive toward his aims, rejecting that which does not seem to contribute or, alternatively, cut off valuable possibilities by his own decision or lack of decision and so fail to accomplish the achievement of enduring good. One might call this "sin." The possibility of participating in the process at a higher level of consciousness is the responsibility of each man who has his own identity and of each community which likewise has its own identity. Morality, done in isolation from the rest of reality, is never a private affair; every moral decision has some impact on the whole and bears the weight of that responsibility. Individual interests must be harmonized with the more general interests. Whitehead suggests that the aims of a civilized society are "fineness of feeling" and "generality of understanding." The first aim of morality is the continuance of process in its maximal effect at both the level of the individual and of society. Each individual occasion contributes its fineness of feeling, and the whole achieves a generality of understanding.

Qualities of Process

Whitehead in his book *Adventures of Ideas* suggests some qualities that ought to be furthered by process. These qualities are truth, beauty, adventure, art and peace. "Good" and "right" are not included in this list because they are, to him, overused words with imprecise meanings. These five qualities he lists do give sufficient clarity to symbolize what man actually finds valuable in process.

Truth is the conformation of appearance to reality. Sense perception is the primary way of attaining truth, because, despite some failures, it is our usual way of discerning the authentic nature of things. The things we perceive provide steady values, incorporated into the subjective form of the prehending occasion, becoming part of the data out of which new occasions emerge.

Beauty goes beyond truth in the spontaneous adaptations of some of the factors prehended by an occasion. These adaptations occur as the occasion pursues a certain aim in which intensity of feeling and conformity to a common pattern combine for the attainment of harmony. Beauty is thus wider and more fundamental than truth, because it deals not only with the conformation of appearance to reality, but also with the perfection of the subjective forms that are shaped by their interrelation.

Art is the purposeful adaptation of appearance to reality. Art depends on how man has been shaped by beauty toward perfection. But perfection is not a static concept; it must always promote novelty and originality. Thus Whitehead includes adventure as a necessary quality, lest inspiration yield to mere repetition. Finally peace calls the individual beyond himself without denying himself toward the integration of order and love.

God

Whitehead's concept of God is complex and harmonious with the rest of his thought. God is not the exception to all metaphysical principles but their chief exemplification. So many theologies have defined God as the exception to all we know, that one whom we can only begin to understand by denying the characteristics we know of ordinary things. Theology has described the "ineffable" as "unchanging," "limitless," "timeless," "immovable." We have defined God by saying what he is *not*. Whitehead takes a new and refreshing approach. He says that God is dynamic, changing with

creation, temporal; time is as real for God as for creation. Relationship characterizes deity. God's perfection is not that of an abstract being but is found in his capacity for and actualization of his relationships with all that is not Himself. God, then, is not a self-contained being requiring nothing but Himself, but a richly related being, participating and sharing. Since love is relationship-sharing, and caring, God is love. Since He is supreme and unsurpassable by all which is not Himself, He is not to be treated as only an exemplification of all metaphysical principles. He is their *chief* exemplification, and therefore He is worshipful. Only God may surpass Himself, moving on from a present stage to the fuller realization of His possibilities. The divine self identity is shown by his exemplification in an eminent fashion of that which constitutes all self-identity—faithfulness or self-consistency; awareness and use of the past; capacity for relating himself without any loss; inexhaustive reserves of strength in love; and purpose or subjective aim. All of this is continually being enriched as he realizes fuller and fuller relationships. Thus God is both eternally loving, faithful and perfect in his relationships and yet active in enriching these relationships. God acts in the world by providing the "lure" which evokes self-decision in respect to his purpose of love. He gives each entity its initial aim for self-realization but does not coerce that entity to fulfill that aim. He provides occasions and opportunities for entities to realize themselves as co-creators, opportunities which they may choose not to use.

Religion

Whitehead's notion of religion again is complex but in harmony with process thought. He has expressed it best in one of his books which is, fortunately, one of the easiest to read: *Religion in the Making* (1973). Early in that book he gives one of his many "definitions" of religion: "Religion is the art and the theory of the internal life of man, so far as it depends on the man himself and what is permanent in the nature of things" (p. 16). Perhaps better remembered, although more easily misunderstood is his famous more poetic "definition" of religion: "Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness." Some background will help in understanding this enigma. Religion is a multileveled thing, the levels being also a recapitulation of the stages in the historical development of mankind's religiosity. At its most primitive level, religion is mere ritual, which Whitehead defines

(1973) as "the habitual performance of definite actions which have no direct relevance to the preservation of the physical organism of the actors" (p. 20). Animals perform rituals, and rituals with man go back beyond the dawn of history. Ritual is the primitive outcome of superfluous energy and leisure. The actions involved in everyday pursuits such as hunting and fishing are repeated for their own sakes in ritualistic actions such as dances. Their repetition repeats the joy of exercise and the emotion of success. Gradually ritual is repeated and elaborated for the sake of its emotions, and this emotion is the second level. Whitehead claims that religion and play have the same origin in ritual, because ritual is the stimulus of emotion, and, according to the quality of the emotion elicited, a habitual ritual may diverge into religion or play. The Olympic Games of ancient Greece, for example, were tinged with religion.

The third belief stage emerges because mere ritual and emotion move on to a more intellectual level, usually expressed in myths. Myths explain the purpose of ritual and emotion. If the hero of the myth is a thing we call it "magic." If the hero is a person, we call the ritual with its myth "religion." The Jewish Passover supper is a good example involving the retelling of a story involving heroes of the past, the ritual standing to express haste, the ritual food, and the ritual questions: "Why is this night different from every other night?" In religion, Whitehead says, we induce and this can be progressive. In magic, we compel, and this, as we know from Whitehead's philosophy, is unprogressive. "Though religion can be a source of progress," Whitehead explains, "it need not be so, especially when its dominant feature is the stage of uncriticized belief" (1973). And here we see Whitehead coming back to the theme of so many others, that religion, reduced to a set of stagnant dogmas, is a stultifying situation and not religion as it is meant to be and can be—a transcendent and transpersonal experience. Whitehead continues:

> It is easy for a tribe to stabilize its ritual and its myths, and there need be no external spur to progress. In fact, this is the stage of religious evolution in which the masses of semi-civilized humanity have halted—the stage of satisfactory ritual and of satisfied belief without impulse toward higher things. Such religion satisfies the pragmatic test: It works, and thereby claims that it be awarded the prize for truth. (p. 27)

"The age of martyrs," Whitehead springs on us (p. 28), "dawns with the coming of rationalism." It is important to understand that by "rationalism" Whitehead does not mean "reason," "intellect," "cognition" as opposed to feeling and emotion. He sees "rationalism" as more of an ordering of things and rational religion is religion whose beliefs and rituals have been reorganized with the aim of making it the central element in a coherent ordering of life. This ordering of life affects not only thought (dogma) but behavior (morals). Religion in this sense is that painting of life in big strokes, seeing the big picture, figure emerging from ground—what is important, what is of ultimate concern, clearly emerging from the secondary, the background, the peripheral. "Rationalism" in religion is putting things in perspective.

The earlier phases of religion, according to Whitehead were essentially sociable. "Many were called and all were chosen" (p. 28). This final, highest phase introduces the note of solitariness and with it religion moves away from the psychology of the herd and toward the intuitions of the few. Because rational religion is universal it introduces the note of solitariness. "Religion" said Whitehead, "is what the individual does with his own solitariness" (p. 16). The reason for this connection between universality and solitariness is that universality is a disconnection from immediate surroundings. It is an endeavor to find something permanent and intelligible by which to interpret the confusion of immediate detail" (pp. 47-48). When religion matures it becomes something more than merely social, tribal—the blind following of dogmas—but something intensely individual (preserving at the same time that individual's relationships with his society). The appeal of religion moves from the tribal custom to direct, individual intuitions—ethical, metaphysical, or logical (p. 35), as the individual attempts to get distance from religion as social custom, to interpret for himself the meaning of his existence, the problems of good and evil, the reasons for being moral, the purpose of living itself. This history of rational religion is full of tales of disengagement from the immediate social routine. Christ had to withdraw from the customs of the Pharisees which in the name of religion had become something less than the high level of religiosity toward which He was leading His followers. But even though religion is what one does with his solitariness, it is not antisocial or even non-social. Precisely because it is the individual's withdrawal to a higher level, he becomes

capable of being engaged in his society even more deeply. "Religion is world loyalty" Whitehead says (p. 59), and his image of the religious man is one deeply in touch with his own intuitions rather than blindly adhering to a set of dogmas. It is one of deep social engagement too. Religious education should give a sense of sharing in a growing culture. It should be "exposure to greatness" and a moving on from the past into the future with zest.

Immortality. What does Whitehead have to say of immortality, life after death? The concept "soul" finds no place in process thought and there is no automatic presumption of such a soul continuing on after the individual's bodily death. Instead Whitehead proposes what has been called "objective immortality." All actual entities he says have two qualities, factuality and value. In their factuality all occasions perish as they achieve their ultimate completion. In their value they are taken by God into his consequent nature and forever are known to Him, treasured by Him and employed by Him in His further agency in the world to bring about increasing possibilities of good and increasing actualizations of these possibilities. Southwell expressed it "Not where I breathe but where I love I live." It was even better put by Whitehead himself who spoke the following recorded words near the end of his own life, surely the result not just of impersonal philosophy but deep personal reflection:

> It was a mistake, as the Hebrews tried, to conceive of God as creating the world from the outside at one go. An all-foreseeing Creator who would have made the world as we find it now—what could we think of such a being? Foreseeing everything and yet putting into it all sorts of imperfections to redeem which it was necessary to send his only son into the world to suffer torture and hideous death; outrageous ideas. The Hellenic religion was a better approach; the Greeks conceived of creation as going on everywhere all the time *within* the universe; and I also think they were happier in their conception of supernatural beings impersonating those various forces, some good others bad; for both sorts of forces *are* present, whether we assign personality to them or not. There is a general tendency in the universe to produce worthwhile things and moments come when we can work with it and it can work through us. But that tendency in the universe to produce worthwhile things is by no means omnipotent. Other forces work against it. God is *in* the world, or nowhere, creating continually in us and around us. This creative principle is everywhere, in animate and so-called inanimate matter, in the ether, water, earth, human hearts. But this creation is a continuing process, and 'the process is itself the actuality,' since no sooner do you arrive than you start on a fresh

> journey. Insofar as man partakes in this creative process does he partake of the divine, of God, and that participation is his immortality, reducing the question of whether his individuality survives death of the body to the estate of an irrelevancy. His true destiny as cocreator in the universe is his dignity and his grandeur. (Price, 1954, pp. 370-371)

Whitehead's "Stages" of Religious Development

Whitehead slips into his discussion of religion (1973, p. 16), a tiny system of stages of religious development. In the whole context of his work, it is certainly not very important, but it is interesting for our purposes here and does throw light on what he means by religion as "solitariness." Whitehead says that religion runs through three stages if it evolves to its final satisfaction. "It is the transition from God the void, to God the enemy, and from God the enemy to God the companion." "Thus," he goes on, "religion is solitariness; and if you are never solitary you are never religious." For a man who grew up in an English parsonage, taught mathematics most of his life in Cambridge, and then, toward the end of his life after having read through the theology books he collected, called a book dealer in, and sold "the whole lot" to him, this is an interesting stage theory, worthy of some further psychological development.

I see Whitehead's religion of "rationalism" as something akin to James's "sick soul," the individual who can no longer accept the placebo effect religion so often has when it remains primarily a social function. For religion to go on to its "final satisfaction," to reach maturity or better, "integrity," the individual must himself face up to questions of life meaning: the existence of God and what kind of being He is, what purpose he himself has and ultimately his own death. He does not do this on his own, alone. But he must do it for himself. To reach Whitehead's first level of "God the void" the individual must be able to untrammel himself from much of the religious baggage he acquired as a child—the presumptions, the myths, the father images, the superstitions, the fears, and, above all, the child-like way of dealing with God: "if I am good, You will reward me with good things in this life and salvation after it." To leave all this behind may well leave the individual searching for God and finding nothing but a dark void. This is frightening. But even more frightening is the second level of "God the enemy" when the "hound of heaven" comes charging after him out of the darkness.

Francis Thompson expressed this fearful pursuit in the "Hound of Heaven."

I fled Him, down the nights and down the days;
I fled Him, down the arches of the years;
I fled Him, down the labyrinthine ways
Of my own mind; and in the mist of tears
I hid from him: and under running laughter.
Up vistaed hopes I sped;
And shot, precipitated,
Down Titanic glooms of chasmed fears,
From those strong Feet that followed, followed after
But with unhurrying chase,
And unperturbed pace,
Deliberate speed, majestic instancy,
They beat—and a Voice beat
More instant than the Feet—
"All things betray thee, who betrayest me."

God becomes an enemy, a mighty pursuer who calls me to something I dread. I am pursued by him "down the labyrinthine ways of my own mind." This is not pressure from outside, from others; this is of my own mind, of my solitariness. The dread of the demands this pursuer makes are resolved only when the solitary man turns and responds to the pursuer's request "Rise, clasp my hand and come!" The resolution is Whitehead's ultimate stage, "God the companion," when solitariness is resolved (but not taken away) in a union of persons, human and divine.

Chapter III

Religion as Development— the Contributions of Allport, Maslow, Erikson and Fowler

"All rising to great places is by a winding stair."

—Francis Bacon

Implicit behind much of what has been said in previous chapters is the idea that the religious experience is something that develops. This idea has not always been accepted and appreciated. In previous centuries, a static notion of creation held sway in philosophy and theology. Faith and religious experience were looked upon as essentially adult phenomena, and any study of religion would see faith and religion as a *thing* adults *have*. Studying religion from that static point of view, one would do a cross-sectional analysis of what adult faith is, extrapolating from that to the "deficiencies" of the child's religious experience, and perhaps, for legalistic purposes, assigning a somewhat arbitrary age when the child would pass from childhood into the "age of reason," responsibility and adult maturity.

Today we have a much different view of religion, a more organic, holistic, evolving view of faith or, rather, "faithing" as a process. Religion is not, in this view, something that comes ready-made, to be put on like a cap at a certain age. It grows rather like a seed; and a pine tree is as much a pine tree whether it is pushing a few green tufts up just above the brown grass or if it towers hundreds of feet over the tops of the other trees; it is just at different stages in the process of its individual development. The individual practises religion at *his* level of development, and religion takes many forms. Thus there are, as William James pointed out, "varieties of religious experience," and they vary not only from individual to individual, but within the individual himself as his life process unfolds.

We owe this insight into religion as a process to philosophers, theologians and psychologists. Since our present concern is essentially to study the

psychology of development, I would like to turn our attention now to some fundamentals of developmental psychology in general, thereby laying the foundation for an exploration of the ideas of several psychologists who, I think, have especially contributed to our understanding of religion as developmental process. The four I have selected for fairly extensive consideration are: Gordon Allport, Abraham Maslow, Erik Erikson and James Fowler. Since these psychologists look at development from somewhat divergent perspectives, it is important for us first to consider the variety of possible approaches to human development. This will involve a rather brief glance at theoretical roads, which, though interesting, we will not take, and description of the roads which form the principal route of our present study.

Theories of Development

Theories of development fit into three main categories: psychoanalytic, behavioristic, and what, for want of a better, all-inclusive word, we can call, "organic." Psychoanalytic theories of development were reviewed when we looked at Freud's psychology: we will come back to them again when we study Erik Erikson who is a neo-Freudian, and later look at psychoanalytic methods as one of several "ways" of moral education.

The behavioristic approach really denies that there is such a thing as development in the way we are using the term. The core of this theory is a passive model of man which maintains that the individual grows to be what he is made to be by his environment. The philosopher Locke maintained that the mind is an empty slate (tabula rasa) until sensory impressions make their mark upon it. Simple ideas are impressed on the mind, adding on to those already there and forming complex ideas through association. Growth of the mind, from this point of view, is an adding on, quantitative process, an accumulation of elements supplied by the environment.

This emphasis of this approach is on behavioral reactions that an individual can be observed to make in response to environmental stimulation. The focus is not so much on the impressions themselves within the individual as on the external behavior which is observable and thereby measurable. This approach has an appeal to scientists who look for behaviors that they can measure. There is little room in this approach for words such as faith, love, values, even religion, for these things are unknown quantities

except insofar as they can be measured through observing the behavior that goes under the name of faith or love or religion. It is a limiting, reductionistic, quantitative approach to the topic of our study, religion. But it does have a great appeal for some psychologists who are interested in moral behavior. For such scientists it has the benefit of giving them something concrete to work with—actual behavior that can be judged and measured rather than non-quantitative internal thoughts, judgments, attitudes, principles, stages of development. We will come back to behaviorism in the final stages of our study when we will look at it as one of the "Ways of Moral Education."

Organic Theories

The organic theory pictures the human being as an active agent in his or her development. Development, then, is a self-constructive process. A person develops to be what he makes himself by his own actions. Kant, the philosopher, in contrast with Locke saw man as a self-organizing, self-moving, self-formative being and not a passive slate to be written on by the environment. Organic theories are of two major types: (1) one branch (Werner, 1948) characterizes development as an orthogenetic process. The central idea is that the individual initially is a rather general, global organization; he is composed of functional structures that are structurally undifferentiated and functionally unrelated. The orthogenetic process is directed towards increasing differentiation, centralization, and hierarchic integration of the individual's personality organization. (2) The other approach, represented by Piaget, (1967) emphasizes equilibration in the developmental process. For Piaget and others, development proceeds from relative disequilibrium to increasing equilibrium. If inbalance is created within the individual due to interaction with some sort of external perturbation, the individual will operate to regain his equilibrium. Consequently, according to this approach, the individual changes himself and develops in a never-ending response to the disturbances that upset his equilibrium. A simple thing like curiosity is a good example. An infant resting peacefully in a crib hears a sound, let us say her father's voice. At first the baby may react only by showing diffuse excitement, flailing her arms and legs about. But, with maturation and learning, she reacts to the perturbation of her equilibrium by doing something that helps decrease the disequilibrium; she

turns her head and satisfies her curiosity by looking at the source of the sound.

Developmentally, human beings are actors who operate to keep themselves adaptively interacting with their environment. In this way they conserve their own organization at the same time as they transform it. A new stage of development unfolds when a new or a transformed system becomes dominant and subordinates or incorporates previously existing systems. This way an individual maintains continuity, identity even though passing through stages which are themselves discontinuous. Werner and Kaplan (1963) describe development as a synthetic process, intertwining two antithetical organismic tendencies: the tendency to maintain continuity in order to conserve one's identity, and to elaborate discontinuity in order to move on in development. We will study Erik Erikson's developmental theory, centering on identity formation, as an illustration of this theoretical orientation. In general, Werner and Kaplan see development as an evolutionary process from passive, conforming reactions to external stimuli to interpretive actions, personal constructions of oneself, one's experiences, and one's environment. In other words, the developing human being moves from being the passive pawn of his environment, to being a self-controlled, self-directed, autonomous individual who actively constructs his environment instead of merely reacting to it.

Werner (1948) adapted the biological principle of orthogenesis and used it to describe the process which characterizes human development. For Werner the direction of development is toward: (a) increasing differentiation of primitive systems which initially are fused with each other into one global organization, causing (b) the emergence of novel and increasingly discrete systems that are, though more discrete, also increasingly integrated within themselves so that (c) the most advanced (i.e., differentiated, specialized and internally integrated) systems have the power to integrate into a hierarchy (i.e., functionally subordinate and regulate) less developed systems. Thus, in the course of development, the human's systems unfold organically into a complex of multiple and varied forms—but an organized, hierarchical complex controlled by the most highly developed systems. These orthogenetic principles will have special relevance when we come to consider in some detail Dabrowski's theory of Positive Disintegration which elaborates these principles and brings them to fruition in a comprehensive theory of human development.

Let's take a step back and try to summarize and put into perspective some of the main things we have been saying about human development. We have seen that developmental psychology can be looked at in three different ways according to whether you take a psychoanalytic approach, a behavioristic approach or an organic approach. But whatever the basic philosophical orientation, developmental psychologists of all brands are interested in the same thing—change within the person. So change, in a way, is what developmental psychology is all about; but only "in a way" because if the process were *all* change, if by developing I became *totally* different, then tomorrow I would not be the same person I am today. Development, besides moving on to something different, must also involve a certain element of sameness. If there is to be discontinuity there must also be some continuity. If there is to be a newly-developed me, there must also be a continuing me which supports my sense of continuity. Although I am somewhat different, I am convinced that it is the same I today who was yesterday. When I awake on a bright fresh morning, I may feel like a new person, but never a *totally* new person, and I know that the "I" who studies for an exam today will be the same (though much wiser!) "I" who some day will go up on the stage at convocation to receive my diploma. What will have changed is the complexity, the personal richness, the qualities of my personality. And that is the twofold thrust of developmental psychology—increasing compexity without losing unity. Or, on the other side of the coin, an enduring sense of one's personal integration which is strong enough to maintain one's identity through the myriad changes that must come about in the process of differentiation.

Psychologists are divided on what brings about these changes, but a common theme that seems to run through many theories is that change is brought about through some sort of disturbance of the status quo, some sort of disequilibrium, perturbation, crisis or disintegation that provokes growth. How does disturbance promote growth? Theorists are divided in their explanation into two main camps: ontogenetic and evolutionary. (We will see examples of each when we come to study the individual developmental psychologists in detail.) Some such as Erik Erikson maintain that a crisis flowing from the events of a biological and social conflict attuned to a certain period in the life cycle, brings on the need to move from a lower level

of development to a higher. If the individual successfully resolves the conflicts inherent in the lower level, he builds a higher level of development upon the foundation of the successfully completed lower level. Building higher levels of development depends upon the successful resolution of the lower level which serves as a foundation. Thus the individual moves from stage to stage, his qualities as a person being those at and below the rung of the psychological ladder to which he has at that stage climbed. One can, according to the individual's age and social environment, set criteria that should be met at each stage of development.

A second major approach to the developmental process (which we will later see exemplified at length in Dabrowski's Positive Disintegration Theory) also maintains that development comes about through some sort of crisis, disturbance or disintegration, but the development, instead of building on lower levels, causes the disintegration of lower, more primitive levels of development and replaces them with a higher level of development. This higher level of development is more complex, more discrete, but also more integrated, so that the most advanced levels of development have the power to integrate into a hierarchy the more primitive, automatic and less-reflective systems.

We have spoken here about stages and levels of development, and almost any developmental psychologist has his or her own set of stages or levels that describe some part or the whole life span of human development. The question is: Do they correspond to anything "out there" in reality? Do real children and adults actually go through stages? Grandmothers in their wisdom describe children as "just going through a stage," so I guess we must accept the existence of stages in a certain sense. But the diversity of stages and levels that scholars (and even grandmothers) assign to human beings makes one wonder how they can all be reconciled with each other. Perhaps it is better to consider all the stages and levels and charts and tables that we have as the various ways in which certain scholars (and grandmothers) have interpreted reality from their own observations. Each one reflects an expert but subjective interpretation of reality looked at from a different point of view. Each has its own value, but none is *the* way human beings develop. No need then to try to reconcile all the stage theories or try to force-fit them together. No need, above all, to try to force-fit ourselves, our friends or our children into the too-tight pigeon hole of a stage, a level. Stages help us

describe and understand, but they don't make watertight compartments.

Far from being a series of watertight compartments, a cluster of pigeon holes or even a ladder reaching to the upper floors of some psychological skyscraper, the image of human development is something quite other. The visual image which is most meaningful for me is the spiral. The spiral grows out of itself, each loop overlapping, growing out of the lower level loop yet surpassing the lower level in its breadth and comprehension. The spiral illustrates the fact that a human never remains in a state of stable equilibrium, but is in constant flux between one stage of disequilibrium and another. The mutually controlling and impelling dynamisms of development at the same time demand upward movement, not through chaos but through controlled process like the hands of a potter which draw out and up but do not scatter. The loops of the spiral overlap and grow out of each other, illustrating continuity within the developmental process. But each loop is progressively higher and distinct both quantitatively and qualitatively from other loops in the spiral, indicating developmental discontinuity. The spiral is an ancient mystical symbol and, in all its beauty, is illustrative of a profound paradox of development—that in order to go forward it is necessary in some way to go backward. The process of progress involves regress insofar as one moves on from what has been to what might be; one is called to reflect on what has been, what is and what might be. The very process of dissatisfaction with what is, given the right conditions, impels the movement toward what ought to be. For example, one twist of the spiral, and thus a movement upwards, may be incited by a twinge of dissatisfaction with one's egocentrism, one's limited vision, and a consequent endeavor to take the perspective of others in a situation. If the whole thrust of human development is a movement away from the egocentrism of childhood toward the broader vision and broader caring of maturity, then the spiral with its movement from a tight-knotted core outwards, always encompassing more, is an apt image of development as process.

The Optimal Person

The spiral forms an apt image also to take us to a consideration of another aspect of human development which will be particularly important when we want to cross over from talking about development in general to the study of religious development. It is the whole question of what is the

ultimate goal of human development; it is sometimes put in terms of: What is the best kind of person? What is the optimal person? What is the mature person like? The spiral is an apt image of our answer because the spiral has no top, no capital, no ending point; instead it spins off into infinity.

We are going to see Gordon Allport's description of the mature person, and we will look at Maslow's criteria for the self-actualizing person. Because both these men believe that development is a qualitative process, their notions of "best" are not static, but continuously open to growth.

Developmental psychology has frequently used the term "mature" to describe the optimal person, but it can be a misleading word. Mature is a concept borrowed from physiology. It means ripening without learning. If we carry over all the physiological (and therefore quantitative) meanings and connotations of the word, we limit our meaning to the notion of reaching a plateau, an end point, beyond which there is no going. Physiologically, when a person has reached his or her mature height (for example), that person will not grow any taller. Carried over too literally into psychology, the word maturity may lead us to conclude that there is a terminus of human development, a state of perfection, which is the ultimate and dreadfully static goal.

Integration

There is a word that some psychologists use to describe the higher levels of development, and that is "integrated," or, perhaps better, "integrating." This is a more dynamic, holistic concept, and better expresses the qualitative nature of human development with its limitless possibilities. We are already familiar with integration as the dynamic force in the developmental process which retains the unity of the individual throughout the process of differentiation. An integrated person is a unified being. Though composed of different parts, he or she is an operational, unified entity. We can describe a person at almost any level of development as being integrated in this sense unless the personality has undergone a massive breakdown with little hope of reintegration on a higher level. In this sense, the person, if developing, is differentiating and integrating throughout a lifetime. As we will see later when we look at Dabrowski's theory, an individual may form a unity, a functioning unit, at any level of development; he or she may even form a unit impervious to the forces of change in life and remain integrated

at a low level of development (primary integration) or the person may undergo disintegrating processes that make personality more complex, but still a personal unity.

There is another sense in which "integrated" is used, and that is in the sense of "integral" "whole"—having all those qualities present which *should* be present in a human being. In this sense an integrated person is not just a unity, but a whole. All those qualities are there which we agree make up the ideal human being. The criteria for what these qualities should be precisely will vary from culture to culture, and from psychologist to psychologist, and we are about to examine in detail the criteria some have set out. But one theme runs clear; these qualities are not stagnant, a formed picture; they are in process of development. Thus the integrated person, the best of humanness, is not perfect but in process. We have already seen that Whitehead proclaimed process as the very "stuff" of the universe and did not exempt God from being in process. One of the themes of this book is to look especially at the "high end" of human development and there find religion at its best; a sub-theme is to proclaim that even there, at the highest levels of development, nothing is finished, perfect.

Now that we have reviewed some of the basic questions any developmental psychologist must deal with, we can go on to look at the contributions of some outstanding recent and contemporary psychologists to our understanding of religious development. Only one of these men, James Fowler, has totally dedicated his study to religious or faith development; the other three are, ex professo, what we might call "secular" psychologists. Two of them, Allport and Maslow, have written quite extensively on the psychology of religion. All of them have, at some time, addressed the topic of the psychology of religion, and each has a unique contribution to make which is worthy of our consideration here. One stands out as an almost archetypal grandfather figure in contemporary psychology. That person is Gordon Allport who was once voted by members of the American Psychological Association as the second most influential theorist (after Freud) in their day-to-day clinical work. It is due in large part to Allport's insights, his vision and his daring to propose ideas about the psychology of religion to a scientific world that was not always convinced of the legitimacy of the study of religion, that the ice jam between was broken, and a mainstream of psychology's and religion's mutual interests joined. It is to Gordon Allport, then, that we will first turn our attention.

Gordon Allport

Gordon Allport was a man who combined scholarship and integrity as a scientist, giving him respect within the scientific community, with a personal depth and broadness of vision, giving him insight and boldness to explore the religious dimensions of man at a time when behaviorism and reductionistic views were sending psychology in a quite opposite direction.

Allport's interests and scholarship spanned a broad range of personality and developmental psychology. Among his many publications, the most relevant to our present topic are: *The Nature of Prejudice* (1954, 1958), *Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality* (1955), *The Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values*, a personality test based on Spranger's value types, and, *The Individual and His Religion* (1950, 1960) which we will later look at in greater detail. Foundational among his many writings in the area of general personality psychology is a major work entitled *Pattern and Growth in Personality* (1937, 1961). In this latter work, Allport presents an overview of developmental psychology which elaborates and illustrates some of the general principles of development we discussed earlier in this chapter. But what Allport does in this book which is unique and helpful to us here is devote a whole chapter to a description of what he calls "The Mature Personality." Considering the stature of the man, the comprehensiveness of the survey, the creativity of his criteria and their relevance to our study, his description of the mature person deserves a summary. It is important to note that Allport uses the word "mature" even though the concept it represents is one of personality *integration*.

After reviewing various descriptions of the mature or "sound" personality, including a summary of Maslow's fourteen criteria for the self-actualizing person, Allport goes on to present his own criteria which number six. He prefaces his list with two admonitions: (1) Healthy persons are not always as happy and as free from conflict as some might imagine; "Suffering cleaves two ways: sometimes it seems to break and sometimes to make, personality" (p. 282). (2) All the criteria point to an ideal seldom if ever achieved; "The sturdiest of personalities have their foibles and their regressive moments; and to a large extent they depend on environmental supports for their maturity" (pp. 282-283). The six criteria for maturity Allport lists are as follows.

Allport's Criteria for Maturity

Extension of the sense of self. The "mature" person has strong interests outside himself; he is truly participant in the world around him. This is different from being merely active in the world. Many people are intensely active; they are task-involved, but the mature person is ego-involved. He is not like an automaton, the passive reactor to what happens to him. Rather he sees himself as part of the whole, and is interested in participating by getting himself involved. Allport says: (p. 285) "Unless our work, our study, our families, hobbies, politics or religious quest become significantly appropriate, we cannot possibly qualify as mature personalities."

Allport says (p. 285) that, "True participation gives direction to life. Maturity advances in proportion as lives are decentered from the clamorous immediacy of the body and egocenteredness . . . Everyone has self-love, but only self-extension is the earmark of maturity."

Warm relating of self to others. The mature person is characterized by two quite different kinds of warmth—intimacy and compassion. He can be deeply involved with people, and, on the other hand, he has a certain detachment which makes him respectful and appreciative of the rights of others. This respect for others is achieved through an imaginative extension of one's own experiences of life. Here we meet tolerance and the "democratic character structure" which others such as Maslow list as desirable qualities. By contrast the immature person feels that only he himself has the distinctively human experiences of passion, fear, preference, and even salvation. "His church, his lodge, his family, and his nation make a safe unit, but all else is alien, dangerous, to be excluded from his petty formula for survival" (p. 286).

Maslow (1962, pp. 39-40) spoke about "B" or "Being" love and "D" or "Deficiency" love, and that is what Allport is contrasting here; the love that sincerely wants the welfare or becoming of the other with no strings attached, and the "love" that is given in a kind of marketplace mentality where it is literally traded off for something else—usually the filling up of some deficiency in onself. "I love you for youself" versus "I love you strictly because I need you to fill up a deficiency in me." Allport (p. 286) says, "A possessive, crippling love—such as some parents burden their children

with—is common enough but unwholesome for both giver and receiver." Kahlil Gibran's Prophet describes the ideal of intimacy without possession when he speaks of children:

> Your children are not your children.
> They are the sons and daughters of Life's longing for itself . . .

Emotional security (self-acceptance). This facet of maturity includes the ability to avoid inappropriate reactions to partial features of oneself. Allport takes the example of sexuality, and indicates that the self-accepting person accepts his sex drive without resorting to the salacious and the scatological, nor to the prudish and the repressed. Frustration tolerance is especially important. The mature person puts up with frustration, biding his time, circumventing the obstacle, or, if necessary, resigning himself to the inevitable. "It is definitely not true," Allport (p. 288) says, "that the mature person is always calm and serene, nor is he always cheerful . . . but he has learned to live with his emotional states in such a way that they do not betray him into impulsive acts nor interfere with the well-being of others." This self-acceptance (not to be confused with self-satisfaction) is founded on a sense of security—the kind of basic trust which we will see Erik Erikson describing as the task of the newborn infant and the foundation of all future securities, and indeed (according to Erikson) of all future development. Allport says:

> The sense of security is by no means absolute. No one has control of time, tide, taxes, death or disaster. As the sense of self expands, one takes on new risks and new chances of failure. But these insecurities are somehow held with a sense of proportion . . . Self-control is a reflection of a sense of proportion . . . [which] is not an isolated attribute in personality. It comes about because one's outlook is generally of a realistic order, and because one possesses integrative values that control and gate the flow of emotional impulse. (p. 288)

These words concluding this quotation from Allport are themselves particularly integrative of our present study. We have already touched a bit on the controlling role of higher level functions, and here is an example of higher level sense of proportion gating the flow of lower level impulses. It is noteworthy, too, that when Allport talks about a "sense of proportion" (a term which, by the way, belongs in aesthetics too), he comes easily to a

mention of values. You will find us, in the second half of this book, following much the same path as we search for the ways in which moral values are chosen and subsequently direct our lives.

Realistic perception, skills and assignments. Thought and feeling are, according to Allport, the warp and woof of the fabric of life. The mature person is realistic; he does not bend reality to fit his own needs and fantasies. Not only are perceptions mostly realistic and accurate, but the individual has the appropriate skills for solving problems and doing tasks. Along with veridicality and skill, Allport lists the capacity to lose oneself in one's work, pointing out that Freud, Maslow and other scholars have made the same claim. *Age quod agis*, says the old Latin motto: Do what you are doing; give yourself to the task and not to self-preoccupation. Mature people are problem-centered, not self-centered. Something worth doing is worth giving yourself to, and some things are worthy of intensive dedication; in fact, as we have seen with Frankl, some tasks can give life meaning.

Self-objectification: Insight and humor. Allport quotes the famous saying of Socrates: "Know thyself." He then goes on to comment on how rarely this rule is really followed on account of the peculiar difficulty of getting an objective picture of oneself. There are two "selves," the self I really am (real self) and the self I think I am (self concept). The more these concepts overlap, the more they share in common, the more objective the person is . . . "for what a man thinks he is in relation to what he really is provides a perfect definition and index of his insight" (p. 291).

Allport goes on to relate a sense of humor to insight, making the relationship clear. Quoting the novelist Meredith, Allport says (p. 292) that humor is, "the ability to laugh at the things one loves (including, of course, oneself and all that pertains to oneself) and still to love them." The real humorist sees the sometimes cosmic contradictions behind the scenes of life—often with himself in the starring and pretentious role. Humor is to be sharply distinguished from the cruder sense of the comic. Most people have a sense of the comic, a laughing reaction to absurdities and horse play—pie-in-the-face kind of humor. Primarily the mere comic consists in the degradation of another human being, with aggression not very far below the surface. "Related to aggressive wit . . ." says Allport (p. 293), "is laughter at the risqué which seems due to the release of suppression. Aggression and sex are at the basis of much that we call comic." Allport probably did

not have the plethora of "sit-coms" on television that we have today, but if you watch them critically you will see that much of what they call comedy is aimed at the release of repressed aggression and sexuality.

Allport makes a further interesting observation:

> A young child has a keen sense of the comic, but seldom if ever laughs at himself. Even during adolescence the youth is more likely to view his failing with acute suffering than with laughter. There is evidence that people who are less intelligent, who have low esthetic and theoretical values, prefer the comic and lack a sense of humor based on real relationships in life. (p. 293)

Insight and humor go hand in hand because they are at bottom a single phenomenon—self-objectification. "The man who has the most complete sense of proportion concerning his own qualities and cherished values is able to perceive their incongruities and absurdities in certain settings" (p. 293). Once again, the phrase "sense of proportion" comes into Allport's description of the mature person.

The unifying philosopy of life. "Maturity requires, in addition to humor, a clear comprehension of life's purpose in terms of an intelligible theory" (p. 294). It is not enough, says Allport, to have a sense of humor. An exclusively humorous philosophy would lead to cynicism, and the cynic is a lonely soul for he lacks the companionship of a life-goal. The mature person possesses a unifying philosophy of life. A philosophy of life gives directedness. Here we come back again to Frankl's theme that a sense of purpose is essential for mental health in general and certainly for the higher levels of development. The child lacks long term objectives, which become only vaguely defined in adolescence. But a lack of a sense of purpose or confusion over it is not restricted to teenagers. Lack of purpose is, as many commentators (e.g., May, 1953) have pointed out, perhaps the chronic illness of our time, and strikes at any stage of the life cycle, including old age.

Allport gives much emphasis to value orientations as an important part of a unifying philosophy of life. He outlines the six major value-types that Spranger used to describe the configuration of values that people hold. The six values are: Theoretical, Economic, Esthetic, Social, Political and Religious. According to Allport, any individual holds these values in a configuration of various proportions. Those values which are predominant give a

thrust to the life of the individual. For example, the highest value for the religious man is unity. He seeks to comprehend the universe as a whole and find his own relationship to it. Some people of this type are "immanent mystics," finding their religious experience in the affirmation of life and participating in it as fully as possible; others are "transcendental mystics," seeking union with a higher reality by withdrawing from life.

Allport's discussion of the importance of a guiding philosophy of life and the values accompanying it flows naturally into an examination of what he calls, "the religious sentiment." We will discuss this more thoroughly when we explore his book, *The Individual and His Religion,* in some detail, but suffice it to say for now that Allport saw religion as an integral part of the mature person. Religion may be merely extrinsic, in the sense that a person may find it useful in serving his immediate ends such as infantile self-assurance, exclusion of others, or feelings of superiority. It is no coincidence that studies (Allport, 1958) show prejudice is more common among churchgoers than nonchurchgoers. But religion is capable of giving the individual that sense of proportion which, as we have seen, is a pervading theme of Allport's descriptors of the mature person. "In fact," he says "a case might be made for the superior sense of humor of the religious person who has settled once and for all what things are sacred and of ultimate value, for nothing else in the world then needs to be taken seriously" (p. 301). It is interesting when religious people, especially the caricatures of religious people we sometimes meet, feel they have to make the point that, "Even religious people can have a sense of humor," as though there were some intrinsic contradiction between religion and humor, admitting of only rare exceptions. In fact, the opposite is true; if one truly has the sense of security that comes from knowing what is really of worth and what matters, then one can laugh at what remains; it no longer needs to be taken seriously. Religiosity, with all its pretentions and pomposity, is the perfect set-up for a joke. Religion, with all its perspective and proportion, is the haven and the heaven of humor.

For the mature person religion serves the function of telling him what is important, giving him a sense of proportion, giving him perspective on life that is objective. He knows what is of value, and what is not. This is Allport's description of the human person at his best; it is also, interestingly, a description of religion at its best. The rising spirals of development we spoke of earlier are beginning to intermesh. All that rises must converge.

The Individual and His Religion

We noted previously that, among the many writings of Allport, one stands out as most relevant to our study of the psychology of religion. It is, *The Individual and His Religion*, and, as a landmark publication in the psychology of religion, it deserves a fairly extensive review here. Following quite naturally from Allport's description of the mature person as someone who has a guiding philosophy of life, the theme of this book is that religion can give meaning to life. Unlike Frankl, Allport does not hesitate to call the search for meaning a religious quest. Formal, institutional religion has the potential to awaken and develop the transcendent dimensions within the individual. But it is on religion as a personal, individual phenomenon that the author concentrates his attention. Allport claims very early in the book (p. 3), "the subjective (personal) religious sentiments of mankind—whatever the fate of institutional religion may be—are very much alive and will perhaps always remain alive as their roots are many and deep." To find one's personal niche in creation as best one can is the right of each individual as a religious person.

Allport says that most people have a dual set of expressions; one deals with factors within comprehension and control, the other with factors beyond comprehension and control. The latter is the realm of religion. While science deals with problems of empirical causation, religion deals with problems of meaning. At the more highly developed levels of development, religion has, according to Allport, the following attributes:

1. A variety of higher-level, psychogenic interests which concern themselves with ideals and values beyond the range of viserogenic desire. Unless the individual transcends the lower levels of immediate biological impulses, his life is stunted and infantile.
2. The ability to objectify oneself, to be reflective and insightful about one's own life, to see oneself as others do, and, at least from time to time, to sense one's place in a cosmic perspective.
3. The possession of some unifying philosophy of life that will provide direction and coherence, and a pattern for integration. Later, we will see these same three themes reemerge in Dabrowski's Positive Disintegration theory as:

1. The process of moving beyond lower level, impulsive behavior, through its disintegration and replacement by higher level, more reflective functioning;
2. The dynamism of "Subject-Object in Oneself," providing at one and the same time, self-objectivity and the ability to identify with others;
3. A hierarchy of values and a hierarchy of aims, leading to an ego ideal.

The mature religious sentiment. Allport goes to great lengths in, *The Individual and His Religion*, to describe what he calls, "the mature religious sentiment." It is: "The disposition built up through experience to respond favorably and in certain habitual ways to conceptual objects and principles that the individual regards as of ultimate importance in his own life and having to do with what he regards as permanent or central in the nature of things" (p. 56). This is a definition worthy of reflection, and Allport helps us to appreciate the many facets of the mature religious sentiment by outlining its attributes:

1. *Well-differentiated*—Mature religion to a complex structure, but ordered in its complexity like any other well-developed system.

2. *Dynamic*—The mature religious sentiment provides its own driving force. Unlike immature religion or religiosity which is motivated by pressure from the outside, the mature religious sentiment is autonomous—not only autonomous in not being blindly conformist to outside persuasions, but "functionally autonomous" in that special sense that Allport developed. Allport rejected Freud's determinism that traces adult behavior directly back to events of childhood. Freud claimed to explain the "why" of adult behavior by finding some event, some trauma, some unresolved crisis that had occurred in childhood, and was now "causing" certain neurotic behaviors in the adult. Just as smoking, fingernail biting, chewing the end of one's pencil could be traced by Freud back to some unresolved oral fixation created by weaning, so religious feelings and behavior could be traced back to unresolved problems with the father, who had, in the adult's eyes, become the "Heavenly Father." Allport had no patience with this Freudian determinism that made adults slaves of what had happened to them in childhood. Instead, he proposed that motives are "functionally autonomous"; what one does is done for motives that by and large, are here and now. Allport says:

> A religious sentiment that has become largely independent of its origins, functionally autonomous, cannot be regarded as a servant of other desires, even though its initial function may have been in this order. It behaves no longer like iron filings, twisting to follow the magnet of self-centered motives; it behaves rather as a master-motive, a magnet in its own right by which other cravings are bidden to order their course. (p. 64)

3. *Productive of a consistent morality*—It was clear to Allport that the development of true religion included moral development, for morality was that dimension of religion in which the values intrinsic to religion flowed into judgment and action. The mature religious sentiment constructs a personal value hierarchy directive of moral standards and creative in character development. We will see this theme coming out again when we explore Maslow's psychology, and study Dabrowski's theory in detail.

4. *Comprehensive*—The mature religious sentiment is a comprehensive system. It calls for a broad philosophy of life that asks important questions and paints life on a broad canvas. Allport (pp. 67-78) says, "The hurly burly of the world must be brought into some kind of order, and the facts calling for order are not only material; they include emotions, values and man's strange propensity to seek his own perfection." The order in which the individual places the colors on the broad canvas is not just any order; it is the order of perspective, guided by a personal hierarchy of values. Comprehensiveness, as a quality of religion at its best, makes for tolerance. In a broad perspective, one knows that one's own life alone does not contain all values or all facets of meaning. Others have truth too. Mature religion is open to the truth of others. Albert Einstein, with all his intelligence, was not, it is said, in the habit of contradicting his opponents. Instead, he would listen to what they had to say, thanking them, if their objections brought new light to his own understanding. Religious people and religious sects would have fared much better over the years if they had been so open to new understandings, new contributions to their own process of development.

5. *Integrating*—If the mature religious sentiment mixes colors together on the broad canvas of life, it does not do so helter skelter. Values dictate that there must be perspective—an order of what is first and foremost, an appreciation that some things deserve more and some things less of our concern. Religion has the power to integrate.

One major task of religion is to integrate into our understanding and acceptance of life, the understanding and acceptance of death, and, more broadly, the problem of evil. For the religious person who relates to a personal deity, the abstract question of why there is evil in the world if God is good becomes concretized when facing the death of a loved one, the suffering of children, the starvation of some accompanied by the gluttony of others, the pain of the innocent while the guilty thrive. Reconciling evil with a good creator has been a task religion has attempted for centuries dating back to the Book of Job, translated into a modern idiom in Archibald MacLeish's play, *J.B.* and expressed in personal terms by Rabbi Harold Kushner who watched his son dying and wrote of the experience and problem in a book entitled *When Bad Things Happen to Good People*. Religion can be there, helping one to integrate the evil, whether it be the evil of a great injustice, or the pain of an opportunity lost and a love not known. This is expressed poignantly, I think, by a poem written by a graduate student, Gregg Janz, during his counseling internship at the Cross Cancer Hospital in Edmonton:

On life and limitations

long dangling translucent cords of precious oxygen
running frantically from the wall, your needed breath of life
lightly casting webs of shadow on your fragile face and arms
your silver ghostly hair delicately crushed by weight of head
you never looked or knew, but I was there

silently looking lost in my thougts of how we shall meet
who was this person behind the tired face and soft closed eyes
while still the grim seeds of death grew rapidly in your breast
so powerless against that inner roaring and devouring monster
you never felt my helplessness, but it was there

your thin white fragile arms bruised from needles and life
I sense your fear and pain through your deep wall of sleep
did you sense my growing impatience, frustration and doubt?
the paradoxical helplessness of the helper, a thinly worn veil
you never felt my fear, but it was there

your inevitable final days mirroring the fragility of my own
too hurried, too tired just too many things between you and I
one more day Mrs. B now is that really too much to ask?
but it was an eternity between you and I, being more than you could give
you never felt my anger and sadness, but it was there

> I'll always remember walking into your room and finding you gone
> it was finished the final chapter closed, the pages forever locked away
> the emptiness of the room echoed your loss and my deep felt guilt
> a humble and precious reminder of the limitations of my fleeting art
> you never felt my caring, but it was there

Always, as this poem exemplifies, real religion is there in times of profound feelings and great questions, helping to resolve, if not the question "Why?" as though there must always be a reason, at least the question "How?" for there can always be a way. It can be a way not just to adapt, not just to cope, but a way to contribute to our growth, our personal process and the process of the building of creation. Religion, the great integrator, takes up feelings of pain, questions of meaning and purpose, integrating them into our own "How" of how one may go on, not despite the questions and pain, but because of them. "Unless the grain of wheat falls into the ground and dies . . ."

6. *Fundamentally heuristic*—A heuristic belief is one that is held tentatively until it can be confirmed or until it helps us discover a more valid belief (Allport, 1960, p. 72). A mature religious person can act wholeheartedly without having or pretending to absolute certainty. As we saw in the first chapter of this book, religious dogma can be a haven of security for some, and the degree of certainty with which it is held, including the impossibility of any change, can be in direct proportion to the need for personal assurance, and the deficiency needs that assurance seeks to fulfill. Psychology speaks of "tolerance of ambiguity" as a desirable quality in human beings. It involves the ability to maintain security, and subsequently courage, in the face of the unknown and the unsure. If psychology calls it "tolerance of ambiguity," religion calls it "faith."

This brief treatment falls far short of doing justice to *The Individual and His Religion*, and falls much shorter of doing justice to the man, Gordon Allport. But perhaps this treatment, deficient as it is, can be best integrated with our main themes by quoting the words of Allport at the conclusion of this book:

> My theme has been the diversity of form that subjective religion assumes. Many different desires may initiate the religious quest, desires as contrasting

as fear and curiosity, gratitude and confirmity. Men show a varying capacity to outgrow their childhood religion, and to evolve a well-differentiated, mature religious sentiment. There are many degrees in the comprehensiveness of this sentiment and in its power to integrate life. There are different styles of doubting, different apperceptions of symbols, contrasting types of content that vary both with the culture and with the temperament and capacity of the believers. There are innumerable types of specific religious intentions. How the individual justifies his faith is a variable matter, and the certitude he achieves is his alone.

From its early beginnings to the end of the road, the religious quest of the individual is solitary. Though he is socially interdependent with others in a thousand ways, yet no one else is able to provide him with that faith he evolves, nor prescribe for him his pact with the cosmos.

Often the religious sentiment is merely rudimentary in the personality, but often too it is a pervasive structure marked by the deepest sincerity. It is the portion of personality that arises at the core of life and is directed toward the infinite. It is the region of mental life that has the longest-range intentions, and for this reason is capable of conferring marked integration upon personality, engendering meaning and pace in the face of the tragedy and confusion of life.

A man's religion is the audacious bid he makes to bind himself to creation and the Creator. It is his ultimate attempt to enlarge and to complete his own personality by finding the supreme context in which he rightly belongs. (pp. 141-142)

Abraham Maslow

Allport's concluding words, quoted above, form a natural transition to the ideas of Maslow, for he too saw religion as occupying, "the farther reaches of human nature." Maslow as a young psychologist freed himself from the two psychological mainstreams of his student days, Freudianism and behaviorism, and became instead an eminent exponent of what came to be known as Third Force or humanistic psychology, with its roots in existentialism, and its concern for the holistic. Maslow was especially interested in the "high end" of human development, and is subsequently best known as the father of "self-actualization," a term that has enjoyed much popularity and widespread interest, as well as some regrettable abuse, at the hands of those who have oversimplified, not appreciating the full developmental context Maslow created.

Almost any introductory psychology text presents Maslow's famous hierarchy of needs, usually illustrated with a diagram showing how one moves, as if ascending a staircase, from low level physiological needs through various intermediate needs up to the highest level need—self-actualization. Self-actualization is to be what one can be, to take the potentials within one's life and actually realize their fulfillment. The idea of self-actualization has an immediate appeal for most people. It grabs them. "Yes," they say, "that's what I want—to be what I can be!" It is tempting to begin the quest without further ado, attacking this psychological Everest without the proper equipment. But Maslow has provided the equipment and the maps, or, better still, has described the kind of person who successfully makes the ascent. Maslow (1973) described the qualities of self-actualizing persons, those special people he knew who were striving for and some of whom had reached the heights of human development; he called them the "growing tip" of the human race, few in number like the sparse needles at the top of a spruce tree, but leading the rest of the tree to new heights of development. Maslow (pp. 178-196) saw the self-actualizing subjects of his research as having these characteristics:

1. More efficient perception of reality and more comfortable relations with it;
2. Acceptance of self, others and nature;
3. Spontaneity;
4. Problem-centering;
5. Detachment and the need for privacy;
6. Autonomy: independence of culture and environment;
7. Continued freshness of appreciation;
8. The "Mystic Experience," the "Oceanic Feeling";
9. Social feeling;
10. Deep but selective social relationships;
11. Democratic character structure;
12. Ethical certainty;
13. Philosophical, unhostile sense of humor;
14. Creativeness.

Maslow sketched a picture of a strong and attractive personality—someone all would like to know and most would like to be. The similarity of these criteria with Allport's mature person is quite striking, as is the crossover of characteristics that we have come to recognize as those of the higher levels of religious development—especially concern for ultimate meaning, and contact in some way with it in mystical or oceanic experiences. Of special interest to our study too is Maslow's (p. 194) statement about the quality he calls "ethical certainty": "I have found none of my subjects to be chronically unsure about the difference between right and wrong in his actual living . . . they rarely showed in their day-to-day living the chaos, the confusion, the inconsistency, or the conflict that is so common in the average person's ethical dealings." "Needless to say," Maslow reports, "their notions of right and wrong are often not the conventional ones." Maslow goes on to say that he could describe all of his subjects as "godly men" although none of them were orthodoxly religious, and one called himself an atheist. Whether or not, then, Maslow concludes, one could call them religious depends entirely on the concept of religion that we choose to use. To that topic of how Maslow defines religion we should turn our attention now. To do this, we will pass from 1950, when he made the major presentation of his early research findings on self-actualizing persons, to 1970 when he published a revised, and somewhat more mature and reflected-upon edition of *Religions, Values and Peak Experiences*.

There he lays the foundation of his psychological study of religion by lamenting the dichotomization of both science and religion.

> It is because both science and religion have been too narrowly conceived, and have been too exclusively dichotomized and separated from each other, that they have been seen to be two mutually exclusive worlds. (p. 11)

Historically, science was once a part of the body of organized religion. It broke away from religion in the Enlightenment, and Maslow fears that the same thing may now be happening with problems of values, ethics, spirituality, and morals. Some humanistic scientists seem bent on denying the claim of the established religions to be the sole arbiters of questions of faith and morals; some established religions want to maintain their say in what is scientific truth. Maslow feels strongly that this paralyzing dichotomy need not be. Words which until recently had been thought to be the

exclusive territory of organized religion are, he comments, now open to scientific investigation. Maslow goes on to describe the dichotomies he discerns between organized religion and personal religion, between the legalistic ecclesiastic and the prophet, between what he calls religious "peakers" and religious "organization men." To understand the rather black and white dichotomies Maslow puts organized religion and personal religion into, one must see personal religion from Maslow's own point of view, centered around "peak experiences."

Peak Experiences

Maslow was captivated by the mystical, oceanic experiences that his self-actualizing people reported as part of their lives; he saw these peak experiences as the quintessence of personal religion. These experiences are special moments, rare in some lives, frequent in others, in which the person experiences feelings, understandings, attitudes, perceptions, integrations that are above and beyond the ordinary humdrum of life. Peak experiences, naturalistic as they are, closely resemble, according to Maslow, the religious experiences the mystics have described. Peak experiences are characterized by:

1. Perceiving the universe as an integrated and unified whole;
2. Tremendous concentration of a kind that does not normally occur;
3. Detachment from concentration on the self as subject, and greater objectivity;
4. Egolessness, unselfishness;
5. The experience itself is self-validating and an end in itself;
6. Disorientation in time and space;
7. Experience of the world as good and worthwhile;
8. An appreciation of the intrinsic values of Being;
9. Emotions of wonder, awe, reverence, humility, surrender, and worship;
10. Dichotomies, polarities and conflicts of life are resolved;
11. Fear disappears;
12. Sometimes there is the after-effect of action, love, or even conversion;
13. A feeling of being graced by the experience;
14. A sense of the sacred, glimpsed through the momentary, the secular.

This listing hardly does justice to the breadth and depth of Maslow's description of peak experiences. One can find them more fully described in Maslow's writings (1977, pp. 59-68), but for me, a concrete example is more illuminating than extending the list of descriptors. A friend described an experience she had, in the midst of a period of anxiety and depression. She was walking alone. The place was a scene of vast, sweeping dimensions at that spot on the prairie landscape where the Smoky River converges with the Peace. It was autumn; the high banks of the rivers were covered with yellowed grass, and a cloudless blue sky arched overhead. Lost in thought about herself, the direction her life was going, and a creeping sense of isolation she felt within her, she fell into the yellow grass, and gazed up at the blue sky. Suddenly an ecstatic sense of oneness overwhelmed her, a unity with all which she felt, a sense of oneness with others, with God, with the cosmos. Later, words could express the experience only as: "I felt at one with the blue and the yellow, because, for the first time in my life, I really knew what blueness and yellowness are!" Knowing what blueness and yellowness are, doesn't make much sense. But they were the best words the woman could find to express her ecstatic feeling of unity at that instant of peak experiencing. It went beyond the experience of color to the integration of a life.

Maslow would call this experience religious even though the setting was "secular." In fact, if I may put words in his mouth, he could call it religious because it was *not* in a traditional, churchy setting. Throughout much of Maslow's writings he depicts organized religion as more likely to quash true religious experience than nurture it. He does this because he sees religion largely as a personal, solitary experience, and there is much in the annals of history and the research of psychology to support the fact that organized religions, in the interests of self-conservation, have persecuted their prophets who have been forced to step out of the organizational circle in order to be truly religious.

The danger in what Maslow is saying is that he does exactly what he deplores: create a new dichotomy, a dichotomy between being a member of a religious organization and being authentically religious. Maslow in his lifetime did not deny the possibility of being authentically and personally religious within a religious organization, but the battles he was fighting in the times in which he wrote led him to create in the minds of some readers,

an impression that religious organizations and true religiousness were totally exclusive of each other. Part of the blame for this unnecessary dichotomy rests with Maslow's fascination with the peak experiences his self-actualizing people reported, and his tendency to equate the mystical, experiential with "religion." This Eastern, mystical emphasis seems to ignore the broader, social dimensions of religion which Western civilization has championed. The New Testament gives a succinct and less experiential definition of religion: "What God the Father considers to be pure and genuine religion is this: to take care of orphans and widows in their suffering and to keep oneself from being corrupted by the world" (James 1:27). Western mysticism has always balanced inner, personal experience with the social, compassionate aspects of religion. Maslow noted that his self-actualizing subjects had great social feeling, which must, if it was authentic, have flowed into action, but he was not inclined to incorporate this dimension into the concept of religion which he championed, at least initially.

In his Preface to *Religions, Values and Peak Experiences*, written in May 1970 (1977, pp. vii-xvii) Maslow does seek to right some of the imbalance he perceives in his former work. These second thoughts deserve highlighting here. Regarding the possibility of a self-actualizing person being a member of a religious sect, he says that the profoundly and authentically religious person does integrate the legalistic and organizational trends of religion "easily and automatically."

> The forms, rituals, ceremonials, and verbal formulae in which he was reared remain for him experientially rooted, symbolically meaningful, archetypal, unitive. Such a person may go through the same motions and behaviors as his more numerous co-religionists, but he is never *reduced* to the behavioral as most of them are. (p. vii)

Maslow later (p. xvi) summarizes his views on religion and peak experiences in a way that ties him in unmistakably with our major theme: "Man has a higher and transcendent nature and this is part of his essence."

Values

We have touched a little on Maslow's concern with values, but not enough to convey a sense of the important role he saw them playing in the human psyche. Self-actualization was, in a sense, what he set out as the

ultimate goal of human development, but Maslow proposed no simplistic concept of actualizing just any tendency, any inclination, any possibility within the human person or society in general. Instead he pointed to something beyond self-actualization, the guides toward what should be actualized, what was worthy and moral and truly humanizing. These guides, he said, are values. Values set the directions of development. In Maslow's terminology, they tell us what is worthy of actualization, what is intermediate and what is ultimate, what is only a means and what is an end.

Maslow (1962, 1977) addressed himself to the psychological function of values and to the place of values in education, stripping away the pretense of his time that society could have a value-free science, value-free psychotherapy, and value-free education. It is commonplace today to accept the role of values in science, psychotherapy and education, but it is so because people like Maslow were willing to look behind the façade and tell the world that all aspects of human development are permeated with values.

Let me narrow down the many things Maslow said about values and put them into a context directly relevant to our themes. If one sees oneself as a person essentially in relationships with other persons both human and divine, he or she will seek to actualize those relationships with other humans and with God. The religious person is actualizing some of his highest level potentials. The self-actualizing person, as Maslow describes him, bears a remarkable resemblance to the higher level human beings described by Dabrowski. Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) sub-titled the second volume of their major work: *From Primary Integration to Self-Actualization*. Michael Piechowski (1982) has continued to explore and develop the concept of self-actualization in such eminent people as Eleanor Roosevelt. The descriptors of the higher levels of self-actualization are very much in concurrence with Positive Disintegration Theory, which, as we will see, forms the core of our present study.

Synergy

Following our style of picking out from the psychologists we are surveying those points which are most relevant to our study, I would like to touch on a topic which, though not originated by Maslow, was something he researched and popularized. Synergy is a concept which, I think, has great relevance for religious and moral development. This idea of synergy

originated with Ruth Benedict, the anthropologist. While comparing various cultures, Ruth Benedict began to see two major themes emerging: that some cultures encouraged cooperation, shared ownership, mutual help, while others encouraged competition, exclusive ownership, exploitation. The former she called high synergy societies, the latter low synergy societies. It seemed that in a high synergy society the pervading motto was, "My good must be your good or it is no good at all," while in the low synergy groups, the motto seemed to be, "My gain must be your loss, and too bad about you." High synergy groups shared property in common; wealth was something to be given away; power was something to be shared. In low synergy groups, the right to exclusive use of private property was jealously guarded; those who had money could make more money; those who had power could use it to accrete more power to themselves. Maslow researched the concept of synergy, and found it present to a high degree, particularly in some of the native North American Indian societies which shared their meager goods in common while not far away, other tribes in more opulent surroundings exploited each other with high interest rates, and competed in the destruction of goods in the infamous Potlatch ceremonies. Maslow took his findings and applied them to how we might manage our society in a more mutually beneficial, "Eupsychian" way.

The concept of synergy is particularly relevant to the religious scene. Religious communities, at least in the first ardor of their beginnings, seem to be high synergy societies. The Acts of the Apostles (2:44) describes a community where, "All the believers continued together in close fellowship, and shared their belongings with one another." They sold their property and shared with all according to each their needs. Regrettably, religious groups seem to run out of synergy as they age and become more highly institutionalized. The institution tends to congeal into a rigid, pyramidal hierarchy, with power and sometimes wealth concentrated at its summit. Wealth and power become things not to be distributed but coveted. Politics takes over from real religion. Newness, freshness of ideas are discouraged if not actually persecuted under the watchful eyes of censorship, trials and inquisitions conducted by those who, though they may have little of the spirit of the religion, have in their hands the power of what can so easily be a total institution. Always there is present for the use of this power the convenient rationalization that one is "guarding morals" or "perserving the faith."

Regrettably, too, some so-called "religious" sects are, at least on the surface, high synergy societies, to which high-minded and dedicated neophytes give themselves and their work while some "religious founder" lives opulently off the profits of his organization. The word "religion" has been greatly abused; but it serves the organization well when recruiting novices or when getting around the law. It is remarkable that "religion" has maintained as much sparkle and attractiveness as it has when so many over the centuries have blackened its name by using it for just another low synergy organization.

All in all, Maslow has contributed much to our appreciation of what it is to be a religious person both within and without a religious organization. He has reminded the scientific and psychological world of the inevitable and important role of values in human development, and encouraged the confluence of religion and psychology.

Erik Erikson

Erik Erikson has been an immensely popular and influential developmental psychologist. Though coming from a Freudian tradition, he has introduced a dimension of sociocultural factors that have taken him well beyond Freud. Erikson incorporates into his description of the individual's passages through the life cycle, the need that arises at each stage to resolve certain crises that spring both biologically and socially from the challenges of each passage. Erikson (1963) has described the task of each stage as the resolution of a conflict created by both biological development and social expectations. On at least one notable occasion, when being interviewed by Richard Evans for his book, *Dialogue with Erik Erikson*, he assigned to each stage in the life cycle a certain "virtue" which was needed for the successful resolution of the conflict. Erikson was quick to clarify that he did not mean "virtue" in the traditional religious or moralistic sense, but was getting more at the root of the word in the original Latin "virtus" meaning strength (Evans, 1967, pp. 16-17).

Although Erikson has been interested in religious development, and wrote brilliantly on it in his study of Martin Luther (1959), we do not find a ready-made and complete system of religious development in his writings. Instead, our task here will be, as we have been doing—to discover some of the insights that Erikson contributes to our appreciation of religious

development. To do this we will go to Erikson for the basic framework, constructing some new dimensions with the help of other sources.

Thomas Droege (1972) presents some insights and the beginnings of just such a framework which we can build upon. Starting with the premise that faith, as described by Paul Tillich (presented in chapter one) is an act of the whole personality, we can see that faith and religion are not separate elements of life, like add-on options for a new car. Faith includes all those elements psychologists think of as factors of personality—knowledge, emotion, will. Faith is an act of the whole personality in self-surrender, obedience and assent. Since personality and faith are so intertwined, a process theory of faith is needed to match a process theory of personality development. Erikson steps in here to shed light on the dynamisms of this process and on some of its specific stages.

Basic Trust

Erikson says that the first stage of a child's development centers around establishing a basic trust. By "basic trust" Erikson means the realization "that there is some correspondence between your needs and your world" (Evans, 1967, p. 15). A child is not born with trust; it is something given. By giving the child in his or her first year of life a sense that somebody is there who cares, somebody is there to tell you that "all is in order," the mother or father or some reassuring person who enables the child to resolve the basic conflict of the first year of life—trust versus mistrust. The successful resolution of this conflict is accompanied by the "virtue" of hope.

Corroboration and a faith setting for the fact of this most fundamental of all tasks comes to us from an interesting and perhaps unlikely source. Peter Berger (1970) describes what he calls "Signals of Transcendence"—prototypical human gestures and words that are within the domain of our "natural" reality, but point to something beyond that reality. One such signal of transcendence is based on the human need for a sense of order. With echoes still in our minds of Erikson's claim that the child needs a foundation of trust, we can turn to Berger's own illustration of a signal of transcendence.

> A child wakes up in the night, perhaps from a bad dream, and finds himself surrounded by darkness, alone, beset by nameless threats. At such a moment, the contours of trusted reality are blurred or invisible, and in this terror of

> incipient chaos the child cries out for his mother. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that at this moment the mother is being invoked as the high priestess of protective order. It is she (and in many cases she alone) who has the power to banish the chaos and restore the benign shape of the world. And, of course, any good mother will do just that. She will take the child and cradle him in the timeless gesture of the Magna Mater who became our Madonna. She will turn on a lamp perhaps which will encircle the scene with a warm glow of reassuring light. She will speak or sing to the child, and the content of this communication will invariably be the same—"Don't be afraid—everything is in order, everything is all right." If all goes well, the child will be reassured, his trust in reality recovered, and in this trust will return to sleep. (pp. 54-55)

Beautiful as it is, this is a fairly routine episode, and most parents who have risen to meet a child's needs in the middle of the night would not see it as a particularly religious act. But if the mother is honest in her statement, if she truly means that "everything is all right," her statement transcends the immediate situation of two persons on one particular night in one particular home making a statement about reality as such. Instead it points to a basic trust in the order and meanings of things. It conveys a sense of trust and hope. It puts things in perspective. And that is religious.

But formal religion, too, as a community affair uses gestures and words to convey a sense of trust. Droege (1972) links this first stage of the child's development to formal religion by introducing the rite of baptism as a communal act of conferring trust:

> Meanings are often conveyed more richly in action than in words. Faith, in baptism, is the gift of God through the community, even as trust is the gift of the mother to the child. Through baptism . . . the child will realize the gift that is already his if the community really means this baptism. He is literally called into being by this community of concerned people . . . The language of the community, which is the language of faith, becomes familiar and understandable to him because he has grown up as a trusting member of the community. (p. 322)

Droege goes on to comment on the symbolic communication of trust by the community as it is presented in terms bespeaking a personal God:

> No other symbol for God other than the personal is adequate for the foundational stage of faith known as trust. One may cringe before the "terrifying and fascinating power" of the holy, or be grasped by an ultimate concern,

> but one trusts a person . . . personal symbols remain the foundation on which all other symbols are built, even as trust is the foundational element of faith on which all others are built. (p. 323)

This brings us back to an important question we considered briefly in the first chapter—the image we have of God as a person—allowing us to reconsider that image now in a developmental context. The inclination might be, following the point that Droege has just made that the personal concept of God is the only one adequate for the very young child, to agree with him, and to rejoice moreover that some people do outgrow this God-as-a-person idea and mature to something more abstract, and consequently more mature. Indeed, Erich Fromm in *The Art of Loving* (1956, pp. 63-82), does construct a stepladder of one's relationship to God with its lower levels mired down in deep Freudian attachments to protecting mothers and stern, punishing fathers, and its upper rungs in the lofty clouds of abstraction where God, now freed of all human images, is looked upon as the great exception to everything we know. But is it really so childish to see God as a person? It need not be. It is true that many who came through some sort of religious education as a child developed an image of God as an old man with a long white beard in a white robe, or at least some variation on that theme. After some mature consideration, most concluded that that image simply would not do; it is both psychologically and theologically unsatisfactory. Some, consequently, threw out the whole idea of a personal God. But the problem lies not with a personal God, but with our limited concept of person. If we continue to identify person with physical body, then the anthropomorphisms, the images we have of God as an old man, are controlling us, limiting us, instead of aiding us to form a relationship worthy of persons. A broader, more comprehensive concept of person is called for, not only in the developing individual but in society at large. What is needed, Sallie McFague (1985) maintains in *Metaphorical Theology, Models of God in Religious Language*, is a model for interpreting our relationship with God that is consonant with post-modern sensibilities which include, "a sense of the displacement of the white, Western male and the rise of the dispossessed due to gender race or class" (pp. x-xi). God as "the great, white Father" carries a load of heavy baggage, not least of which is the clutter of presumptions that go with our conception of what it is to be

masculine and not feminine. Some Eastern religions have been better than Christianity in giving an image of God that incorporates both masculine and feminine principles. McFague proposes the idea of God as friend as a metaphor that is neither racial, classist nor sexist, and still preserves the concept of God as person, someone with whom one can have a long, profitable and developing relationship.

Autonomy

The child who has resolved the conflict of trust versus mistrust, can pass on to the second major developmental task which is, according to Erikson, the development of autonomy. Most of us have at some time encountered (and I mean that word quite literally) the typical two-year-old whose most used word is "No." The-two-year old says "No" even when it deprives him or her of something he or she would really enjoy, like an ice cream cone. But the two-year-old is caught up with the task of gaining his or her independence, and being able to assert the new-found ability to choose. Being able to take the opposite direction from all-powerful adults, no matter how small the step, is often more delicious than any ice cream.

Erikson has penetrated this well-known period of child development, known as, "the age of opposition," and centered it on the child's quest for autonomy, with the development of the child's will power as the happy outcome of the resolution of this period. The trust that was established in the first year of life becomes the foundation upon which this further development involving autonomy and will power must be built. However, the contrast between the two stages is quite sharp. Trust was the response of reliance, of dependence; autonomy is the response of self direction, of independence. But the child chooses the targets of his rebellion carefully; those against whom he asserts his new-found will must be safe, and yet they must be worth rebelling against. The persons rebelled against must be reliable, trustworthy, and strong enough to stand for something of significance to the child. Given these two elements, trustworthiness and a stance against which the child can push, he goes to work to resolve the autonomy crisis of this period.

The conflict is often one of obedience, and thus it becomes a potential ground for faith development. Obedience is a lifelong element of faith, rooted in trust and growing out of it. If ever there was an example of being

"rooted in the resources, yet open to the possibilities" it is the child, adolescent and adult going through Erikson's stages. The human person's faith response to God is not an unmoved, unquestioning, blind submission in which "the will of God" (however that might be interpreted) is to be submitted to without any question. A personal relationship with God precludes that. Outside of a warm, positive, trusting relationship, the will of a father or mother becomes what Carl Rogers calls "a condition of worth": "I will love you *if* . . ." "You are a worthwhile person only *if* . . ." This can be one's view of the will of the "Heavenly Father." If the ground of trust has not been laid between child and God, then the "will of God" becomes a threat based upon estrangement, and obedience to it is the guilt-ridden burden of a lifetime. But if faith is rootedness, the image of healthy religious development is more like that of a tree, rooted in the ground of personal trust in God, and thus free to choose the possibilities of further growth. Hope can grow from this faith. Security then is not something to be clung to desperately, but something to be grown upon, to be the nourishment of that adventure, questioning and daring which is growth. "To venture causes anxiety, but not to venture is to lose oneself" (Kirkegaard).

Identity

This theme of needing to risk in order to develop, and being able to risk because of the firm securities already established is central to Erikson's entire developmental schema. It appears again at the next important stage of the life cycle—adolescence. Erikson points to identity formation as the theme of adolescence. The major task of the adolescent is to resolve a personal identity crisis, to answer in some way the questions: "Who am I?" "Am I worthwhile?" and "Where am I going?" Adolescence brings rapid change from the relative stability and security of late childhood. Biologically, the adolescent senses major changes within his or her own body. Socially, the adolescent is in a kind of no man's land between childhood and adulthood. The image that best illustrates the dilemma of adolescence for me is that of a tightrope walker over Niagara Falls. The tightrope walker can, as he moves out along his rope, glance over his shoulder at the riverbank from which he came. It looks very solid and secure; it was a safe place to be. He can look expectantly ahead to the bank he is approaching; it too looks solid, secure, and invitingly safe. In the meantime he is suspended

in space by an all too slender rope, and below it is the chasm. He is in a very insecure position. So the adolescent: he or she can look back, remembering the security of childhood when relatively little was expected, and identity quite easy to grasp. Ahead is the adult world, imagined as a state of establishment, promising the possibility of committed companionship, job, driver's licence, material possessions and freedom from Mom and Dad. There was security in childhood; there is the promise of some security in adult life. In the meantime there is the insecurity of feeling you don't belong in either world. Like the chasm below the tightrope walker, that is extremely threatening. No wonder sociologists and anthropologists have discovered that adolescents in our society and our age have formed a teenage subculture among themselves, with all the danger of it being a camaraderie of individuals driven together by shared feelings of insecurity and alienation.

The resolution of the adolescent identity crisis, according to Erikson, the safe passage between the two worlds of childhood and adulthood, is based on the successful resolution of all previous stages of development. Identity builds upon the trust, the autonomy, the initiative, the industry that have come out of the more or less successful resolution of previous conflicts, and the measure to which these positive shaping forces have prevailed. Erikson (1964) uses the image of a trapeze artist in the middle of his swing to illustrate the passage of adolescence. The trapeze artist has to let go of the security of the bar he has been clinging to, and reach out for the other bar which is swinging his way, trusting that its timing is right and its strength sufficient to sustain his weight. But, in that breathless moment, suspended in space between the two securities, he has nothing to depend on but himself. Trusting in what his past has made him, and what he has made of his past, he reaches for what the future promises to be. Suspended between childhood and adulthood, one grasps and evaluates what has been and what is yet to be in a way unique to this period of time. Above all, the adolescent searches for values, for that which is worthwhile, and, in some cases, for that which is worthy of ultimate concern.

Fortunately this identity crisis does not take place in a vacuum. Identity formation is not only a sense of inner continuity; it encompasses relationships—one's continuity and meaning for others. The adolescent may progress by inner struggles, but inevitably these struggles are related to the

demands of others and, fortunately, aided by the support of others in his community. This is true of the religious community. If Whitehead is right in saying that religion is what an individual does with his solitariness, adolescence is a period ripe for intense religious experience. What the adolescent can do with his solitariness is turn to his religious community, the community of his origins and the community of his aspirations, and there seek confirmation.

It is noteworthy that the word "confirmation" a word encrusted with many "churchy" connotations fits so well here as a psychological need of adolescence. Interestingly, Christian churches have often used some form of confirmation as the sacrament of young adulthood, just as the Bar Mitzvah is the religious rite of passage of the young man of the Jewish faith. If the religious community is truly aware of the adolescent predicament, and not merely going through the routine of ritual, it does truly confirm the youth, encouraging his search for identity, recognizing the fruits of that search and accepting the adolescent into the adult world.

But confirmation must go two ways; it is a mutual act of confirming. Not only does the community confirm the youth, giving him or her a role within it, but the youth must confirm the community, telling the community whether what it is saying about life has personal meaning, and, if it has, finding for oneself a role to play in that religious community, and in society at large. The virtue that Erikson associates with the successful resolution of the adolescent identity crisis is fidelity. The adolescent, searching for values worthy of dedicating a life to, must ask the question, "Who and what is worth being faithful to?" If he resolves these questions in some way, he comes to answers that encompass fidelity to himself, to others, (God included) and to values. Adolescence is the time for questioning values, and, hopefully, the time of discovering values so that one can be faithful. By deciding for oneself, with the guidance of others, what is value-able, one chooses the concerns, including the ultimate concerns, that may last a lifetime. It is clearly a faith experience. The role of the faith community is to be present to guide, but not enforce these choices. These roles of mutual concern that the faith community and the adolescent play opposite each other are delicate. The community points to what is worthy of being valued, and the adolescent chooses by his assent and subsequent fidelity. Teilhard de Chardin expressed the depths of this relationship in these words: "Faith

consecrates the world; fidelity communicates with it."

Erikson's life cycle structure goes on to describe the rest of the life span: intimacy in the young adult years, generativity and caring in later adulthood, and integrity marked by wisdom in the mature years, when one must face the ultimate prospect: "To be through having been; to face not being." The resolution of this conflict is, as we saw in the first chapter, a religious question of profound proportions.

These stages and their psychosocial dynamics have been thoroughly explored in many other contexts. Here I have attempted to highlight some of the potential within this vast schemata for the study of religious and moral development. Some emerging themes particularly important to our present study are: (1) The role of crisis in human development. Across the life span stress and crises are not obstacles but initiators, necessary for development. (2) Human development, including religious development, is a gradual unfolding, and, if we follow Erikson's ontogenetic philosophy of development, one stage builds upon the successful completion of a previous stage like a tower of blocks. Some other theories of development do not follow this ontogenetic, stage-upon-stage approach. Dabrowski's Positive Disintegration Theory, for example, takes an evolutionary approach to development, maintaining that lower levels which are more primitive, are abandoned by the developing individual in favor of higher more satisfactory levels. (3) Erikson, although Freudian in his origins, goes beyond Freud, contributing something to the Freudian tradition that broadens its scope and makes it more feasible as a mode of understanding religious and moral development. Erikson puts development in a broader, psychosocial context, depending much less on the determining powers of early childhood experiences with parents, and more on broad social forces that affect the whole of the life cycle. This interplay between the developing individual and the societal forces around him is a theme that enriches Erikson's explanation of the life cycle, making it fertile ground for understanding religious and moral development.

James Fowler

The name James Fowler, has, in recent years, become almost synonymous with faith development, and his stages of faith development have influenced religious education methods (Groome, 1980). Fowler is a professor of human development and theology in the Candler School of Theology at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. While involved in work at a Methodist summer conference center, he listened to the life stories of hundreds of people who attended interfaith seminars. Fowler began to sense common patterns in their spiritual journeys and similarities in the forces shaping them. Influenced initially by the psychology of Erik Erikson and the theology of H. Richard Niebuhr, he began to systematize his perceptions into a theory of faith development. Eventually, under the influence of Lawrence Kohlberg at Harvard, Fowler adopted the formal, structural-developmental model proposed by Piaget and elaborated by Kohlberg in the construction of his theory of moral development. Although Fowler has modeled his stages of faith development on Kohlberg, and adopted much of the structural-developmental approach, he has preserved more of an emphasis than Kohlberg on the role of emotions and imagination. This reflects perhaps the importance Fowler (1979) has assigned to the many personal, individual stories of faith journeys that Fowler has used as data for his research and evidence for his "life maps."

Central to Fowler's theory is the conviction that faith is not a static thing, but a process. In fact, he insists that we have for too long limited the word faith to the role of a noun—a thing; in reality faith is a process, and faith may be used as a verb—an action word. In the tradition of Tillich and Niebuhr, Fowler sees faith as not limited to a traditional religious context; he sees faith or "faithing" as a process of making some sense out of life, a search for meaning. Since the Enlightenment, he maintains, many have found meaning in life outside of religious traditions and religious communities. (Victor Frankl, as we have seen, insists that the search for meaning is not necessarily "religious" but "spiritual.") Faith can be religious, Fowler maintains, but it can also center on such mundane factors as a job, an institution, money, power, even on oneself: it can also center on relationships to other people and to nature. One is reminded here of the kind of life meaning a person like Thoreau found at Walden, or the deeply reflective faithing that was done by Ralph Waldo Emerson who resigned his Unitarian

ministry because he felt that the rituals of organized religion tended to ossify the individual's direct contact with the Universe. One is reminded too of the number of contemporary individuals who have found life meaning, based on a sense of oneness with all creation, in a dedicated effort to bring mankind back from its destructive tendency to dominate and exploit the universe. Faith is broader than institutionalized religion.

If faith, as Fowler sees it, is a process, the way people make meaning of their lives, then the content of that faith, "the articles of faith" (to use an old ecclesiastical term) become much less important than the quality of the process and the success of the quest. Ultimately the search for meaning that is faith is a process of clarifying values. "What values direct my life?" "What do I think is worthwhile?" "What truly is worthwhile?" Faith is a process of bringing into consciousness the values that direct one's life and making a judgment about whether they are worthy of being kept or not. Faith is the process of rising above the blind following of values not reflected upon, and moving in directions not really chosen, in favor of choice of values and a sense of perspective and direction.

This sort of movement is precipitated by some critical incident leading to reflection and disembedding of old values, replacing them with better ones. When Fowler speaks of critical incidents as the catalyst of movement from one stage to another he draws this from a philosophical and psychological tradition. Piaget maintains that cognitive development comes about through the creation of disequilibrium in the learner. Erikson, as we have seen, holds that individuals progress through the stages of development as the result of conflict resolution. Kohlberg found that moral development comes about through the conflict created by exposure to higher level reasoning. The idea that crisis, far from hindering, is actually necessary for development is emerging more and more in contemporary psychology. It is, as we will see, the major theme of Positive Disintegration Theory, and integral to our concept of religious and moral development.

Stages of Faith Development

Fowler has presented his stages of faith development in several places, but perhaps most thoroughly in his 1981 book, *Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for Meaning*. In this book he has not only explained his stages at length but drawn parallels between

them and the stages proposed by Piaget, Kohlberg and Erikson. A summary should suffice here:

First there is, in the infant period, a pre-stage of undifferentiated faith where the seeds of trust, hope and love are fused primarily in relationship to parents. Following Erikson's description of the first year of life, Fowler hypothesizes a theme of trust versus mistrust as the basic conflict of this period. The child who emerges from this crisis successfully has built up a fund of basic trust and the relational experience of mutuality with those who love and care for him. Faith encompasses and builds upon this kind of trust.

Intuitive-projective faith. Based on the previous pre-stage of trust and undifferentiated faith, the young child builds a bank of images that represent both the protective and the threatening powers around him. These images come from imagination, stimulated by stories and symbols not yet controlled by logic, but shot through with powerful feelings.

Mythic-literal faith. Stage two occurs in late childhood when the individual begins to take on beliefs, observances and stories that symbolize belonging to one's community. Beliefs and moral rules are appropriated with literal interpretation. The developing ability to think logically helps one to order the world around into categories of space and time and causality. One can now begin to take the perspective of others and identify with them. Life meanings begin to emerge from faith traditions, particularly stories.

Synthetic-conventional faith. Adolescence brings with it new cognitive abilities. Mutual perspective-taking becomes possible, and the adolescent searches for mirrors to reflect self back to self in order to integrate diverse self images into a coherent identity. Values take on new importance, but at this stage they are largely a synthesis of beliefs and values of others, put together to support an identity and to unite one in emotional solidarity with others; they are not reflected upon at the depth that comes with further development.

Individuative-reflective faith. Young adulthood offers the possibility (but not the guarantee) of moving on to critical reflection upon one's beliefs and values. One can now choose to become part of a social system and to take on the responsibilities for making choices of ideology and lifestyle. Now one can commit oneself to the fidelity of relationships and to life vocation.

Conjunctive faith. If the adult in mid-life and beyond can move past the former stages of faith, a time comes when faith resolves seeming contradictions, when paradox becomes an accepted element of life, when one can embrace the polarities of life (life-death, joy-pain, love-hate) and see life not as monolithic, but multifaceted, or, better still, organic. Fowler (1981, p. 185) says, "Conjunctive faith suspects that things are organically related to each other; it attends to the pattern of interrelatedness in things, trying to avoid force-fitting to its own prior mind set." There is at this stage an enriched appreciation of symbol and story, metaphor and myth as vehicles for grasping truth.

Universalizing faith. Fowler's ultimate stage is an integration. Beyond polarities that divide and paradoxes that help explain, persons in this stage, that may have its beginnings in mid-life, are grounded in a oneness with being. Fowler (1981) describes the highest levels of faith development in these terms:

> Persons best described by Stage 6 typically exhibit qualities that shake our usual criteria for normalcy. Their heedlessness of self preservation and the vividness of their taste and feel for transcendent moral and religious actuality give their actions and words an extraordinary and often unpredictable quality. In their devotion to universalizing compassion they may offend our parochial perceptions of justice. In their penetration through the obsession with survival, security and significance they threaten our measured standards of righteousness, goodness and prudence. Their enlarged visions of universal community disclose the partialness of our tribes and pseudo-species. And their leadership initiatives, often involving strategies of nonviolent suffering and ultimate respect for being, constitute affronts to our usual notions of relevance. It is little wonder that persons best described by Stage 6 so frequently become martyrs for the visions they incarnate. (p. 200)

Stage 6 people have generated a faith which is inclusive of all being. They incarnate and actualize the spirit of a truly fulfilled human community. They are not numerous. Asked to name representatives of Conjunctive Faith, Fowler (1981, p. 201) lists Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., Mother Teresa of Calcutta, Dag Hammarskjold, Dietrich Bonfoeffer, Abraham Heschel and Thomas Merton. Their highly-developed vision, faith and commitment free them for a passionate yet detached spending of self in love. They have penetrated to the elusive inner core of being, and

found there a unity and meaning which they feel morally compelled to share with mankind even at great loss to themselves. Loss *to* themselves, but not loss *of* themselves.

Fowler's approach to faith as process clearly puts faith or "faithing" in a developmental context. It is a process. Faith, as he understands it, is broader than conventional religion; it is a search for meaning, and at heart a search for values, some of them ultimate values. Each person has an "ultimate environment," the farthest horizons of one's personal world within which and in relation to which one makes meaning out of life. But life, reflected upon, is of vast circumference, and could for many be empty and confusing like the horizon viewed by a lone sailor in the middle of the ocean, if it were not marked by certain islands. These islands are centers of value, guides in navigation through life. Islands of value set in a landscape of ultimate horizons guide one in the faith process. This process seems, according to Fowler, to go through a set of stages. Faith, then, is not monolithic but multilevel. Religion whether solitary or communal, is likewise a process of multilevel development with its search of ultimate horizons for islands of value that may give direction perspective and ultimate meaning to life.

Conclusion

The thoughtful reader of the foregoing chapter will have noted that our review of developmental psychology has, far from covering the whole gamut of theories, restricted itself to those theories which could best be described as organic, or Third Force, almost completely neglecting the Freudian and behavioristic approaches. This is not denial of the value of these approaches to understanding religious psychology, but it is an acknowledgment that the foundational psychologies most promising for a psychology of religious development do lie in what we call broadly the humanistic tradition with its roots in existential philosophy. Psychologists in the humanistic tradition are comfortable with words like "faith," "love," "religion" and "values." In fact, values, as we have seen, are at the heart of humanistic psychology even when dealing with that which is usually considered secular or non-religious. It is obvious too that several contemporary theories of human development feel quite comfortable with acknowledging the fact that humans are religious animals, and that religion can be present at varying levels in varying stages of the life cycle.

The thoughtful reader of this chapter will also have noted that it is not unprejudiced. It is not an "objective" view of all sorts of psychologists who have something to say about human development. The psychologists presented in it have been chosen carefully to illustrate the underlying themes of this book. Indeed, ideas have been plucked out of their theories to support our themes—without, I hope, destroying the meanings of the original authors. The whole work is, I trust, still true to its sources, presenting them for what they are. Otherwise our principal theme of the convergence of religion and psychology would not be adequately served.

Lest we conclude this chapter leaving the impression that stages of development are something psychologists in our own day have originated, let it be known that the very concept of stages is an ancient religious tradition. It is at least as old as the mystics who saw the development of the soul's relationship to God in terms of stages. Perhaps most famous among these stages, at least in the Western, Christian tradition, are the "Seven Mansions" of Teresa of Avila (1515-1582) and "The Ascent of Mt. Carmel" described by John of the Cross. Somehow it seems natural to see human development and religious development unfolding in a series of stages. The stages described by the classical religious mystics exemplify a tradition of religion as developing; it is a tradition older and more universal than any concept of faith as some static thing that one "gets" almost instantaneously, "clings to" blindly or "loses" by a single act. The mystics have told us that faith is not something to be "had" like a marble statue but, like a rose, to be allowed to unfold.

Fowler (1984) puts the role of developmental psychology in an even broader context, reaching back beyond the mysticism of the last few centuries into deeper and more primitive levels of human nature as a whole. He says:

> Theorists of adult development have begun to play the role in our society that storytellers and mythmakers once played in primitive and classical cultures. They have taken on many of the functions that philosophers and theologians performed in the twelfth through the nineteenth centuries. In our time of fractured images of the human vocation and of fragmented experiences of connectedness to religious and cultural symbols of wholeness, a group of philosophical psychologists are helping us to gain a holistic grasp on the course of human life. Using the organic root metaphor of development in a variety of

> ways, their research and theories aim to provide empirically grounded chartings of predictable patterns and turnings in human life cycles. (p. 15)

Fowler goes on to suggest that it may not be an exaggeration to say that philosophical theorists of developmental psychology are offering in formalistic and mainly secular terms a "way of salvation" as described by earlier theologians. This parallel, he reminds us, is not so extraordinary if we remember that the Latin root word of "salvation," *salus* means "healthiness," "wholeness." We are back, it seems to our familiar concept "integration" and our old theme of human development as a process of movement toward integration or wholeness. "Holiness is wholeness" is an old religious dictum, and St. Irenaeus has been often quoted for his saying: "The glory of God is man fully alive."

Process has been the main theme of our survey of religious development. The psychologists we have studied have not been so concerned with content as with process. They do not ask the question, "What does faith know?" so much as "How does faith know it." This psychology does not exclude the matter of religious content, whether it be the beliefs of an individual or the dogmas of a religious sect, but focuses on how content is apprehended. That process, as we have seen, is one of movement from relative simplicity to greater complexity, from almost monolithic integration to the complex system of integration that is necessary to retain the identity and continuity of a human being in the process of becoming much more complex.

I have used the image of the spiral and touted it as the best symbolic representation of the process of development since it incorporates the elements of ascending by regressing back over old pathways, but at a higher level. I also touted it as the best image of the highest levels of human development since the spiral, like the human in process, has no set limits, going off instead into an infinity of risings. This is poetically beautiful and poetically and psychologically true. But, "all analogies limp" says an old philosophical dictum which, interestingly, is an analogy in itself. All analogies are true in some sense, and not true in another. The analogy, the image of the spiral, is true of human development, and I still stand by it, but as an image of process it may imply an ongoing of continuous differentiation alone as the coils of the spiral grow wider and wider apart. The description we have seen of human development at its highest levels tells us that something

besides (not "in place of" but "besides") differentiation is taking place. It is a process of integration, and, at the highest levels, it is a process of integration in universality. Fowler's stage six is certainly an integration in universality, a very special coming together; Erikson's mature adult has integrated values that yield peace; Maslow's self-actualizers at the highest levels feel and act upon a oneness with the whole of the cosmos; Allport says that the mature person has an integrating philosophy of life. Whitehead, as we have seen, points toward a perfection, not static of course but leading to a peace which calls the individual beyond himself without denying himself toward the integration of order and love. There must be something in this idea that the highest levels of human development offer a new coming together.

The human developmental process seems to begin and end with integration. The child is integrated in his simplicity; the developing adult loses that childish simplicity, and, with luck and good management, achieves an appreciation of his increasing complexity (while still preserving his sense of identity); those few who pass on to the heights of human development seem capable of incorporating an expansive sense of universality which becomes blended with in their own personal integration. It is as though the spiral of development ever expands to greater and greater circumferences, but ever swirls inward too, toward greater integration and the peace which, they say, always dwells at the eye of the cyclone. We are into paradoxes, and maybe that is where we should leave it. The spiral diverges and the spiral converges at the same time. Maybe it is we who have the problem and not spirals or life (or even psychology). Maybe our long years of dichotomizing, of opposing love and hate, suffering and joy, life and death have made us create too many contradictions which are not really there. Maybe spirals can diverge and converge at the same time, and human beings can go from the integration of simplicity, the placid child, to the integration of complexity, the person of peace, through a process of development which is itself disintegration. We have found religion there, vital to all levels of the spiral—at the very eye of conscrescence.

Chapter IV

Dabrowski and Positive Disintegration Theory

"Maybe relieving the pain will prevent the formation of a pearl"
—Carl Whitaker

Up to this point we have examined the ideas and shared the experiences of eminent philosophers, psychologists and scientists as they explored the development of religion and morality within the individual. Some have been philosophical speculations with implications for developmental psychology; some have been psychological theories with developmental aspects; some have been theories of developmental psychology with implications for religious and moral development. It is this latter category we return to now: a developmental psychology theory, which although not explicitly a theory of religious and moral development, has profound and far-reaching implications for the development of persons insofar as they are "religious" and "moral."

The theory we turn to now is the theory known as "Positive Disintegration." Its scope is so vast, its depths so profound, its implications so telling for our present topic that we will spend considerable time in exploring it in depth, looking first at the theory in general as proposed by its author, Kazimierz Dabrowski, and then at the specific implications of the theory for religious and moral development and ultimately for religious and moral education.

Kazimierz Dabrowski and His Developmental Theory

Kazimierz Dabrowski was born in Poland in 1902, studied in Europe and suffered through the atrocities of two World Wars. It was this combination of high academic scholarship and deep personal participation in the real world at some of its ugliest moments that brought him the understanding

and sensibilities to build a profound and meaningful theory of human development.

Professor Dabrowski studied both medicine and education before receiving his MD at the University of Geneva. In 1931 he received his PhD in psychology at Poznan University, a certificate of psychoanalytic studies at Vienna (under Wilhelm Stekel) and a certificate of the School of Public Health at Harvard in 1934. He studied under Claparede and Jean Piaget and established an institute of mental hygiene at Warsaw in 1935. After World War II and his imprisonment during the Nazi occupation of Poland, he was awarded a "habilitation in psychiatry" at the University of Wroclaw. He was professor of experimental psychology at Warsaw in 1956 and at the Polish Academy of Sciences until 1958. From 1964 until 1979 he was a Professor and Director of Clinical Research and Internship at the University of Alberta in Canada, and from 1968 a visiting professor at Laval University, Quebec. In 1979 he returned to Poland, and died there in 1980. In his lifetime he wrote more than 38 books and 253 other publications, in English, Polish and French. Centers for the study of his theory are located throughout Canada and the United States, South America and Europe. Those of us who were fortunate enough to encounter Dr. Dabrowski, first as his students and then as his colleagues in developing the theory were impressed by the quiet humility of the man, his scholarship and hard work, and above all the depths of feeling which made possible a theory of psychological development which speaks so well to the human condition.

First we should begin with the title of the theory—Positive Disintegration. Even though the concept it expresses is not unique to Dabrowski nor is it his most important contribution, it is perhaps the best key to use to unlock the doors to the theory. Like so many terms Dabrowski used, it contains within it a whimsical little contradiction—Positive Disintegration. How can one have disintegration that is positive? Disintegration is a negative thing, it seems, a falling apart, a breakdown as in a mental breakdown. How can a breakdown, especially a mental breakdown, be something positive? It can be positive Dabrowski says, because disintegration is not always the opposite of growth; it is not something we grow in spite of; it is something we grow because of; in other words disintegration of some kind is necessary before there can be any growth. Growth comes about not despite

disintegration but because of it. Life is not despite death, but because of it. A pervading theme of mankind in its philosophy, myth, literature and religion has been the birth of life from death, of growth from decay, of joy from pain. Man saw this in nature as winter yielded to spring in the cycle of the seasons, as children were born in pain, as food was consumed to give life, as saplings sprang from the rotting trunks of dead trees. It seemed that life and death were not opposite poles, miles apart at the extremes of some dichotomy, but rather partners, dancing an eternal cyclical dance together in a dance called the process of the world, the ongoingness of the universe. Man had celebrated this cycle in his mysteries and his legends, symbolized by the phoenix arising from its ashes. Religions had expressed it in their mysteries of death and resurrection, and a few individuals had come to see this overwhelming paradox in their own lives. Most of these were themselves "sick souls" in James's sense of the word, not satisfied with trite or reassuring explanations of the world around them that eliminated the pain or wiped it away in a rationalization. Some labored with the mystery of suffering and found it something not to be fled from but embraced because it was the stuff of creativity and growth and life itself. One of these suffering souls was Kazimierz Dabrowski, surveying the dead and maimed and dying on the battlefields of Europe, experiencing the inhumanity of man to man in concentration camps and, sensitive to his own inner hurts, but conscious of the need of others. He translated his life experience and learning into a theory which has profound implications for understanding the human condition and drawing from it an optimum of growth, and an optimum of human consciousness.

Dabrowski was well aware that not all disintegrations are positive, not all breakdowns act in the service of increased psychological development. In contrast to positive disintegration where one can observe the presence of developmental dynamisms (which we shall look at later) negative disintegration is characterized by the lack of developmental dynamisms. In other words some people have within themselves the potential to turn a disintegration into a positive growth experience; other people do not have such a potential and may well be slow or even static in their development. Drawing upon his own personal experiences and his practice as a clinician over many years, Dabrowski noted that there seemed to be striking differences in the way individuals reacted to the various events of their lives.

Some, he noted, experienced the death of someone close in a bland, concrete and literal way; others tended to take the experience of the death of a loved one and transform it, deepening the experience, plumbing its depths, developing it into a complex significant, intense and yet enhancing experience. Some people just seemed to be more sensitive to their experiences and more able and willing to have them get to the depths of their psyche and stir them up. Out of these observations grew the concept of "overexcitability"—another Dabrowskian concept we shall see more of later on.

Conflict and the Role it Plays

The moving force behind this positive disintegration, the fire within the furnace, is conflict—conflict between the individual and his environment or conflict within the individual himself (intrapsychic conflict). Intense inner conflict, disequilibrium, anxiety and depression are inherent in the developmental process. That some sort of breakdown of lower level structures in the personality must take place before they can be replaced by higher level structures and functions is a basic principle of Dabrowski's psychology, as it is with the psychology of Jean Piaget (but in a largely cognitive context).

We have seen in chapter III how Werner expressed this concept as the orthogenetic principle.

Intense inner conflict, dissatisifaction with oneself, disintegration of what we are, to make room for what we might be—these are the themes of Positive Disintegration which builds on the idea that lower level functions have to disintegrate when challenged by higher level functions, then disappear to make room for the higher. This is the process of growth, the dynamic of movement from lower to higher, which has been propounded by psychologists such as Piaget as the driving force behind development.

Often these challenges of that which is higher to that which is lower take place in a crisis situation. A crisis must be understood as a developmental situation. It is true that crisis often means a catastrophe ending in disaster, but Dabrowski's view is much broader, seeing a crisis as a turning point, a life passage great or small, where the person is vulnerable it is true, where the risk of catastrophe is there to some degree, but above all where the psychic structures of the person are loosened, pulled apart, with the potential for putting them back together again at a higher level. These crises may be of two main kinds: developmental and accidental. By "developmental" I

mean crises that occur as part of the human process of growing up and are tied largely to biological development. These, Dabrowski points out, are for example the crisis of the age of opposition of the two year old, the crisis of adolescence and of menopause. About the age of two the child begins to assert his autonomy in a special way. It usually comes out in using the word "No" over and over again. By saying "No" the child asserts that he can go a direction, other than that asked of him. By doing this he asserts his independence and develops his budding autonomy. It is a "crisis" period because the child must find his autonomy, his self in relationship to someone who will at one and the same time offer a stable platform against which to react negatively. It is also a crisis for adults who are called upon to give a warm, loving acceptance to the little person who tests their patience by rebelling in this way.

Adolescence is a crisis period brought on by biological and social maturation, and, as Erik Erikson points out, it is a crisis of identity—discovering who I am now that my body has changed so much, where have I come from and where am I going. Menopause is also a biologically induced crisis brought on by aging. It again is a crisis of generativity, not just in the sexual sense but in the whole sense of where do I belong in a world where I have for so long been able to keep pace as a producer, and in a world which idolizes youth and demands productivity in a very materialistic sense?

The second major category of crises that Dabrowski includes as opportunities for positive disintegration are not necessarily connected with biological turning points in life. They are crises which occur to some and not to others—the death of a loved one, personal illness, moving to a new city, going into a new job, falling in love, getting married, having a baby, failing an exam. I have deliberately mixed together positive and negative examples of crisis, to bring out the point that a crisis is not just a negative affair. It is any turning point in life that stimulates a pulling apart of what we have been and opens the door to being something new and better. A crisis need not be of major proportions either. The death of a child may shatter one's world and bring one into questions of the meaning of life that run deep and hurt bitterly. But being asked by a hobo on the street for a dollar "for a cup of coffee" can also be a mild challenge to one's principles and how you relate to people and their needs. Even a small moment that interrupts the way we have put our lives or our day together and demands some sort of

restructuring is a challenge to reintegrate on a higher level.

It should be clear from what has been said thus far that Positive Disintegration is a theory that proposes development as a continuous evolution, a process ever going onward. It is not a theory that proposes some sort of state of "perfection" as the ultimate goal of development, nor does it strive for an ultimate maturity. "Maturity" is a term borrowed from physiology. A person grows to his "mature height" and then stops growing. But Dabrowski does not use the word maturity; instead he talks of integration of which we will see more later on.

At its roots, then, Dabrowski's theory is in sharp contrast to those theories of motivation and development that are based on the principle that mankind is motivated by a desire for homeostatis or equilibrium, that the optimum state of well-being is to exist in some sort of quiescent, conflict-free situation where one can be at rest. Instead, it says that life both from outside the psyche and from intrapsychic dynamics, forces conflicts upon individuals which can be disintegrative of lower level functioning and offer the opportunity of rising to higher levels of development.

The last sentence contained the words "can be" and "offer the opportunity." What makes the difference between a possible positive disintegration and it actually happening? The difference is something Dabrowski calls Developmental Potential, and we shall look at it in more detail later. First we should look at an important theme running through the theory, a theme which is probably the most central and most important contribution the theory has to make to our understanding of human development in general and religious and moral development in particular.

Multilevelness

Many theories of development are "stage" theories; they propose a certain way of understanding the process of development as an unfolding series of stages or levels of development that proceed in an orderly sequence more or less the same for all people. Dabrowski too has levels of development and later we will see what these are exactly. Right now it is important to look at their foundation in the whole broad concept of multilevelness that Dabrowski proposed, a concept that includes levels of development in the traditional sense but goes beyond to look at levels of functioning too. Dabrowski was greatly influenced by John Hughlings Jackson who in

1884 delivered three lectures on the Evolution and Dissolution of the Nervous System. In these lectures, Jackson demonstrated a biological hierarchy in the nervous system and proposed that evolution is a passage from the most simple to the more complex, from the most automatic to the more voluntary. Piechowski calls multilevelness "the central concept of the theory" and indicates that with it we are using a new key or paradigm with which to approach human behavior. In other words:

> It now becomes less meaningful to consider for instance aggression, inferiority, empathy, or sexual behavior as unitary phenomena, but it becomes more meaningful to examine different levels of these behaviors. Through this approach, we may discover that there is less difference between the phenomenon of love and the phenomenon of aggression at the lowest level of development than there is between the lowest and the highest levels of love or the lowest and the highest level of aggression. (1977, p. 12)

By pointing out that the actions we perform, the attitudes we have within ourselves and the words we use to describe them have many levels, Dabrowski has opened up a whole new way of looking at the psychology of human development.

Levels of Concepts

Dabrowski's clinical and experimental research have led to the clarification of many levels in emotional and instinctive functions that up until now we have tended to consider as monolithic. When we used words like "sex," "joy," and "sadness" we tended to use them each in a unilevel sense. Dabrowski, on the other hand, points out that there are levels of sexual behavior and lower and higher levels of the sexual instinct can be distinguished. At lower levels sexual energy is given outlet by one person without consideration for the other person involved. As sexuality rises to higher levels, concern and relationship with other persons become more apparent, involving a responsible choice of a sexual partner, mutual psychic interaction and mutual empathy.

Likewise, "sadness" in Dabrowski's vocabulary moves away from being a simple unilevel concept to being a multilevel entity characterized at its lower levels by an unreflective disappointment that often converts into aggression and anger. Sadness at higher levels takes on an existential

character. Sadness is evoked by the distance we feel from other people, or the distance we feel from our own ideals. Dabrowski says: "One of the deepest sources of sorrow is a position of not being able to help others especially because of their lack of response or absence of awareness of the need for change" (1977, p. 131). At its highest levels, sadness results from solitary thought about transcendence and the absolute in relationship to death. Sadness comes from a recognition of the unavoidability of separation in the face of a deep need for perpetual relationships. Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) describe a number of functions, outlining in great detail the many levels that the theory of positive disintegration brings out in them. It is not only psychologically enriching but enriching to our vocabulary to read multilevel descriptions of functions such as "laughter," "anger," "crying," "justice," "the religious attitude," "daydreaming," "magic," "inferiority," "selfishness," and even "suicide." Each of these functions and many more are described using Dabrowski's five levels of development.

Levels of Development

Many theories of development include some sort of description of stages or levels whether they be the very simple stages of childhood, adolescence, adulthood or more complex theories such as Piaget's which describe stages of cognitive development. Erikson, as we have seen, has contributed his outline of the stages of human development and with it made a great contribution to our understanding of the process. Any stage theory is "true" insofar as it describes some theoretical way of dividing up the process of individual (ontogenetic) movement across the life span according to the viewpoint of a particular author. Once we accept the author's premises of what is important and what moves individuals from one stage to another then the theory "fits." It makes sense and really does contribute to our understanding of human development.

Dabrowski's description of the levels of human development is not just another stage theory; it has some characteristics that make it quite distinct and single it out as a unique contribution to developmental psychology:

1. It expresses a philosophy of emergence. It postulates and demonstrates a series of levels, each characterized by a specific structure and mode of functioning. Each new structure is not just more than the former structure (quantitative difference) but each structure is qualitatively

different from the preceding, more complex yet more integrated, following Jackson's description of the nervous system's development and in keeping with the principles of development expressed by Werner (1948). Gradually forces of self-direction and self-determination emerge, permitting transcendence of the biological life cycle. The theory is primarily concerned with a transformation from inner experience determined by behavior and external forces to behavior determined by inner experience. Self-direction, inner direction, autonomy are the forces that emerge to give each new stage a higher qualitative level than the former.

2. It is evolutionary. In many stage theories, a new stage builds on the foundation established by the old stage. The accomplishments of the previous stage remain to form the foundation or the core allowing one to face the crisis or reform the concepts, or raise the thinking level to that which is required for the higher stage. In Dabrowski's theory the lower levels must, by the very nature of the disintegration process, be dissolved, disbanded and relinquished for that which is more integrated and, consequently, "higher."
3. It is "other-centered." We have seen that higher levels of development are characterized by greater autonomy and self-directedness, yet in what seems a paradox (and it only *seems* a paradox) the movement of development is away from egocentrism to care, concern, responsibility, respect and empathy. The newborn infant is a very egocentric individual, so egocentric that he cannot be truly selfish. He is so centered on himself, so unaware that others even exist that he sees no opposition between himself and the world around him because he does not even have an awareness of a world around him. For the newborn, he *is* the universe. Gradually as his senses improve and as he learns to distinguish objects outside himself, the world becomes separated into two categories—myself and other things. "Other things" in time becomes divided into things and people and this permits the possibility of coming to the concept "other people" in the sense of "other people besides myself." In discovering others he discovers himself, and, conversely, in finding himself he finds others since he cannot be himself except in relationships.

This movement from primary low egocentrism toward higher level, more complex yet more integrated intrapsychic and interpsychic

relationships characterized by greater empathy is, in my estimation, one of the main themes of the process of positive disintegration through levels of development.

The theory of Positive Disintegration defines five levels of development. The levels and their defining characteristics, the dynamisms operative in them, are shown in Figure 1 (page 143). It should be noted that these levels begin with an integration and end with an integration; between are three levels of disintegration. The differences between primary integration and secondary integration are vast. Feelings of well being, contentment and absence of conflict are states which characterize both primitive and advanced levels of integration; in a sense individuals "have it all together" at both levels, but at the primitive level it is lacking in developmental dynamisms, simplistic, and subordinated to primitive drives (Dabrowski, 1972, p. 156), whereas at the secondary level integration means "wholeness" including active developmental dynamisms, the integration of complex personality structures, and the service of higher level values such as empathy and relatedness to the universe.

Let us look at each of these levels in detail:

Level I—Primary integration. The structure of Level I is narrow and rigid, and the least differentiated of all the levels. One is narrowly concerned with the self in terms of one's biological functioning. Michael Piechowski (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 20) makes it clear that there are at least two forms of primary integration, one extreme, the other more "normal." The extreme form is exemplified by the psychopath; he has no consideration for others; he tends to exploit, humiliate and take advantage of others. He can experience temperamental syntony, an undifferentiated feeling of commonality with others engendered by group activities that are more of a gang type. One of the strongest bond-forming activities in his life is aggression against a common enemy. The inevitable fights express a gang camaraderie rather than true emotional relationships. The bond is largely external—race, color, blood relationship, living in the same part of town. One gets the image here of black leather jackets being more of a bond than any real relationship. Reality, for the extreme case of primary integration is looked at in immediate, tangible, sensory terms with no room for any deep appreciation. Moral thinking is on the level of Kohlberg's first stage—avoidance of punishment. A thing is moral if you don't get caught doing it.

Traumatic experiences, crises don't "get to" this kind of person. He has little or no sensitivity to experience their emotional content or to appreciate the broader dimensions of what is going on immediately before or within him. When things go wrong, far from searching for any meaning in the situation, he places blame squarely where it belongs—on someone else!

Less dramatic perhaps than the psychopathic personality, yet much more ominous because of their quiet presence in large numbers is the milder form of primary integration we are describing as "normal." These are the Archie Bunker type personalities. They have a narrow range of interest, limited thinking, myopic philosophical vision, limited aspirations and limited affect. They are not totally without feeling. They may acquire enough skills to meet the demands of the job market but they tend to stagnate in a stereotyped role they have adopted for themselves. Problems can be solved by largely physical means such as moving to another house, another city, another job as long as the new job does not make any great demands for change. Since problems appear to them to be "out there," their solution it seems is also "out there" in a change of environment, a change of friends, a change of job. Primary integrated persons are not feelingless, but, like Archie Bunker, the range of their feelings is limited and the crises that tend to cause the greater upset are not the larger issues of life, and certainly not those involving the well-being of others, but physical, immediate problems that affect one's own sense of well being or the stereotyped patterns one clings to for comfort.

The Archie Bunker type is most disturbed when his beer isn't cold, his "Twinkies" aren't in his lunchpail, or someone takes "his" chair. The death of a friend cannot touch as deeply as these immediate and physical issues.

Regarding the level of moral reasoning, Piechowski (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 22) points out that the person at the level of primary integration corresponds most closely to Kohlberg's good boy, good girl and law and order orientations. In both Dabrowski's and Kohlberg's schemata, individuals at these levels follow externally established rules. Piechowski also points out the similarity of this type with the authoritarian personality as described by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson and Sanford, (1950) finding the correspondence in personality structures governed by stereotypes and social prescriptions.

Level I, then is characterized by absence of developmental dynamisms, such as appropriate feelings of guilt, reflectiveness, intimate emotional relationships and absence of internal conflict, with an awareness only of the external environment. A Level I person may appear stable and "adjusted," but this adjustment is rigidly maintained and very vulnerable to negative disintegration when stress or change come from that external environment. The film *The Deerhunter* is a fine illustration of level one. Many of its characters are superficial good buddies who remain unchanged by the horrors of Viet Nam.

Level II—Unilevel disintegration. Unilevel disintegration is a sharp contrast to the rigidity of Level I. Instability characterizes the Level II person. The rigid organization of Level I is broken down, and yet there is no pre-existing hierarchical organization to give the individual a sense of direction; hence the risk of developing the most severe forms of psychopathology. Loosened structures tend to come apart under the impact of emotion and stress. Self-insight is still weak as is the capacity for inner psychic transformation of conflicts. Rather than being transformed into higher levels, tensions must be released or converted. If they are transposed to the body, psychosomatic disorders arise. If they are externalized, they appear as projections, reality distortions or hallucinations. Guilt feelings do not yet have a creative dynamic, but are passive, founded on lack of self acceptance which one may trace back to lack of love in childhood. Guilt at this level is not the key to higher levels of moral thinking. Instead it is debilitating, a dead end. Because from this passive position values are seen as arbitrary, relative and externally determined, one takes the moral view that what is good is what works (utilitarianism) and that the majority rules in determining morals.

Piechowski says:

> The degree of instability varies in level II and as a result this level has the most multiform structure of all the levels. It encompasses total mental fragmentation as in psychosis and drug-induced states, a middle range of more stereotyped forms of behavior—inferiority toward others, dependency, need to conform, seeking approval and admiration—and at the other extreme partially integrated forms that convey a certain degree of stability, even maturity. Because of the lack of direction, inner organization, incapacity for inner psychic transformation, blindness to a larger sense of order, especially in regard to human experience, and blindness to universal values and their hierarchy, we

> can justify depicting this type of structure as having one plane only; this structure is called—unilevel. (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 26)

Level III—Spontaneous multilevel disintegration. Dabrowski's contention that "Psychoneurosis is not an illness" (1972) begins to be most clearly evidenced at this level, for it is the Level III person who exhibits symptoms that society (psychologists included) are only too ready to label as neurotic and sick but which Dabrowski maintains may be the instigators of higher level development.

At this third level the wavering and fluctuations of Level II are replaced by the onward thrust of a growing sense of direction. Behaviour is guided by an emerging autonomous, emotionally discovered hierarchy of values. The individual no longer merely reacts to "what is" in the outside world, trying to conform to it, but there emerges a sense of "what ought to be"—a sense of what is worthwhile, what is of vaiue. And this emergent hierarchy of values is not just an abstract hierarchy, it is also a hierarchy of aims. In other words, the values, being more than mere velleities, actually influence action, so that the rising clamor of various needs and values and purposes and goals that tore him apart before, now converge within the individual according to the ordering of a hierarchy of values that is consciously chosen. The moral conflicts and moral concerns that come to the fore in this period do so in a contest of inner reflectiveness, not outward blaming, of productive guilt and not merely neurotic guilt.

Part of the neurotic burden of this period comes from the heavy realization that one is responsible for oneself. This is a two-edged sword, liberating on the one side because one realizes he is (or can be) free from blind subservience to external determination, but burdening on the other side because now the individual is challenged to find the locus of control within himself. Fear, dread, and anxiety may result but not as the alternation of fear and short-lived courage (ambitendencies) that marked the former level. Now the neurotic burdens at Level III tend to express themselves in existential fears, including the fear of death, and one must work through reflectively the responsibilities of the healthy neurotic. Dynamisms of development at work particularly at this level are (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 87):

Astonishment--One is astonished with oneself. At one time I say, "How could I have been afraid?" At another time I rightfully conclude: "That is worth fearing." This dynamism has a distinct intellectual component. It is a reflection on the fact that some of one's own mental qualities and activities catch one by surprise.

Disquietude—One's behavior becomes subject to self-awareness, self-criticism and ultimately to self-control. The egocentric component of one's anxiety is reflected upon and replaced by a higher level anxiety so that one may paralyze one's development by wallowing in the fear. The allocentric and altruistic anxieties that mark this period also contribute the disquietude that moves one to say, "There are people out there who need me and for whom I can do some good; I am wasting my time and shirking my responsibility by sitting here navel gazing, concentrating on my own fears." This kind of discontent with primitive behaviors in ourselves leads to transcendence of them and movement toward higher, existential and transcendent levels of concern.

Feelings of inferiority—Feelings of inferiority which previously were directed toward others whom we envied or judged better than ourselves now become directed toward oneself. We begin to see what *we* "ought" to be with our own particular configuration of talents and our own opportunities that our time and place give us. We feel inferior now to what we can and should be, rather than merely inferior to others.

Feelings of shame and guilt—"Neurotic" guilt in this context shakes off its aimlessness and rids itself of its ability to frustrate every worthwhile action. Instead guilt, remaining an active dynamic in the process, leads us to discover the more altruistic elements in our neurosis; for example: fear for others and the need to help others in their fears and anxieties, in their neurotic conflicts, is much stronger.

Dissatisfaction with oneself—Dissatisfaction with oneself leads to constant readiness to counteract the pressure of primitive tendencies. It is not the dead end street of lower levels; it is a motivating dynamic, and actively involved in goading us on to what ought to be.

Positive maladjustment—"Adjustment" and "maladjustment" have been overworked words in the history of psychology. Dabrowski makes some typically refreshing distinctions which throw new light on them.

Dabrowski sees social adjustment as the ability to live in harmony with social norms and act successfully in one's society; this may amount to mere conformity to social standards which prevail at the time (1970, p. 162). This kind of adjustment is usually considered by many psychologists and educators as a sign of mental health, while social maladjustment is a clear symptom of mental disturbance.

R.D. Laing, after many years of dealing with emotionally disturbed people, has proposed a revolutionary concept of adjustment. Basically his approach is to say that those symptoms that mental hospitals label as neurotic and psychotic are often only the apt reaction of sensitive people responding appropriately to the society around them which is itself sick. The novel *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest* and the movie that came from it graphically illustrated in its incidents rich with humor, but tinged with tragedy, what happens when a person with brilliance, sensitivity and imagination is "treated" by lesser human beings who, "well adjusted" as they may be, represent a system which is itself sick.

Kazimierz Dabrowski himself had great empathy for persons diagnosed as "mentally ill" because they often showed the dynamisms of advanced development and he wrote a poem to salute and admire them:

> Be greeted psychoneurotics!
>
> For you see sensitivity in the insensitivity of the world,
> uncertainty among the world's certainties
>
> For you often feel others as you feel yourselves.
>
> For you feel the anxiety of the world, and its bottomless
> narrowness and self-assurance.
>
> For your phobia of washing your hands from the dirt of the world,
> for your fear of being locked in the world's limitations,
> for your fear of the absurdity of existence.
>
> For your subtlety in not telling others what you see in them.
>
> For your awkwardness in dealing with practical things, and
> for your practicalness in dealing with unknown things,
> for your transcendental realism and lack of
> everyday realism,
> for your exclusiveness and fear of losing close friends,
> for your creativity and ecstasy,
> for your maladjustment to that "which is" and
> adjustment to that which "ought to be,"

for your great but unutilized abilities
For the belated appreciation of the real value of your
greatness which never allows the appreciation of the
greatness of those who will come after you.
For your being treated instead of treating others,
for your heavenly power being forever pushed down
by brutal force,
for that which is prescient, unsaid, infinite in you.
For the loneliness and strangeness of your ways,
Be greeted!

To help us understand "adjustment" and his attitude toward it, Dabrowski makes the following distinctions.

Adjustment:

Negative—Conformity to the prevailing norms, customs and mores without any critical evaluation of them. It is not autonomous and is inauthentic. It is adjustment to "what is."

Positive—Correspondence to a new hierarchy of values which are consciously developed and expressive of the individual's personality ideal—what he would like to be. This is adjustment to "what ought to be."

Maladjustment:

Negative—Denial and rejection of social norms, not for the sake of higher values, but because lower level primitive urges and pathological structures are in control. In its extremes negative maladjustment is represented by psychosis, psychopathy and criminal activity.

Positive—Partial adjustment to what is, accompanied by increasing adjustment to higher levels of development. It is expressed in conflict with and rejection of standards, patterns and attitudes in the environment which are incompatible with one's growing awareness of and loyalty to a higher scale of values. This is the route to authenticity.

In summary, Level III, spontaneous multilevel disintegration is a kind of "turning point" level where the individual's own forces *begin* to take hold and *begin* to direct the disintegrative process toward higher levels. We have explored in a fair bit of detail some particular dynamisms because they are

the forces that are particularly operative at the third level of development (see Figure 1).

Level IV—Organized multilevel disintegration. There is some overlap of Level III and Level IV with Level IV being distinguished by a greater degree of consciousness which leads to a directed and self-determined organization of development. The individual knows much more clearly not only what he should be, but arising from this, what he will be. Tensions and conflicts are not as strong as in Level III. Autonomy, authenticity and an enhanced sense of responsibility are the predominant dynamisms of this period. The advancement of this period involves, besides responsibility, the operation of the "lode star" dynamism—personality ideal. The "ought to be" quality of some of the previous levels, having moved far beyond any "tyranny of the shoulds" as Karen Horney expressed them in her study of the neurotic personality becomes a "lure" as Whitehead would say, and the strength increases at Level IV of this dynamism of the personality ideal. It is an image of the ideal self that is not neurotically unrealistic, nor a mere velleity that one would like to strive for "sometimes but not now." Instead it is an active and powerful dynamism that will play an increasingly important role in the next level—secondary integration. Behavior at Level IV tends toward the two different but mutually reinforcing goals of self perfection and the service of others.

Using the example of Antoine de Saint-Exupery, author of *The Little Prince*, Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977, Vol. II) demonstrate that the characteristics of Level IV correspond to the traits of the self actualized person as described by Maslow (1950).

Dabrowski and Piechowski sum up this level in these words:

> In the overall process of multilevel restructuring, subjection to governance of lower levels yields to the supreme harmony an autonomy of the highest levels. The lower levels are disassembled and are excluded from the structure of secondary integration; with their disappearance, regression to a lower level of functioning is not possible. (1977, p. 29)

Level V—Secondary integration. Dabrowski's schemata of developmental levels begins with integration (primary) and ends with integration (secondary) but what a vast difference between them! Both are characterized by lack of conflict but the lower level integration is more like the lack of

conflict one would find in a stone. Without sensitivity, without conflict that can "get to" a person there is no disturbance. It is the kind of lack of disturbance Simon and Garfunkel seem to yearn for in their song, "I am a Rock, I am an Island."

I am a Rock

A winter's day
In a deep and dark December
I am alone
Gazing from my window
To the streets below
On a freshly fallen silent shroud of snow
I am a rock
I am an island
I built walls
A fortress deep and mighty
That none may penetrate
I have no need of friendship
Friendship causes pain
Its laughter and its loving I disdain
I am a rock
I am an island

Don't talk of love
Well, I've heard the word before
It's sleeping in my memory
I won't disturb the slumber
Of feelings that have died
If I'd never loved I never would have cried
I am a rock
I am an island

I have my books
And my poetry to protect me
I am shielded in armor
Hiding in my room
Safe within my womb
I touch no one and no one touches me
I am a rock
I am an island

And a rock feels no pain
And an island never cries.

Paul Simon and Art Garfunkel

Secondary integration, on the other hand, while not being a state of perfection with all the notions of homeostasis and a static way of being, is a state of peace or centeredness. It is dynamic, active and seeking, but now the seeking has come full circle. The "what is" of the lowest levels, replaced by "what ought to be" at more advanced levels, now returns as a new and ultimate "what is." What is, *is* what ought to be."

The story is told of Gandhi that a mother brought her child to him, asking Gandhi to tell the child not to eat so much sugar. Gandhi told the mother to bring the child back in two weeks. She did so, and when she returned, Gandhi simply said to the child, "Stop eating sugar." The mother retorted, "Why didn't you tell him that two weeks ago?" Gandhi's reply was: "Two weeks ago I was eating sugar myself . . ." This kind of authentism is one of the hallmarks of secondary integration. But the principal and strongest dynamism of secondary integration is the personality ideal. When we discussed the increasing role of the personality ideal at level IV we showed how far it had come even then from any semblance of neurotic shoulds that tyrannize the individual, how, at these higher levels it is not some kind of unrealistic image one has of oneself, nor is it a mere wish of what someone would like to be sometime. Personality ideal is the active driving, "luring" force of the secondarily integrated person, or as Dag Hammerskjold expressed it in *Markings:* "Through me there flashes this vision of a magnetic field in the soul."

In the theory of Positive Disintegration the level of secondary integration is conceived as being entirely discontinuous with the lower levels of development. Secondary integration is so stable that regression to lower levels of functioning is not possible even under extreme stress.

Gerald Borofsky in his paper delivered to the Third International Congress of Positive Disintegration (Duda, 1981) makes this important concluding comment on the levels Dabrowski proposes:

> In summary, it should be noted that this developmental sequence is not ontogenetic. These levels are unlike the Freudian oral, anal and phallic stages

> through which *all* individuals pass more or less successfully. During the course of his or her lifetime, a given individual may cover none or only part of the Positive Disintegration's developmental sequence. The degree of psychological development which does occur within an individual's life span is a direct function of his or her developmental potential. (p. 13)

Developmental Potential

With the mention of developmental potential we reach a pivotal word in our discussion of Positive Disintegration theory. As you are becoming more familiar with the theory you may have begun to see a picture of great masses of people at low levels of development, many of them stagnated at levels of primary integration with only a few moving on to higher levels and an even smaller number of elite breathing the rarefied atmosphere of secondary integration. You will have perhaps come to the conclusion that Positive Disintegration theory presents us with an image of hierarchical organization of the human race with great masses at the bottom and only a few at higher levels of development. You will perhaps have labeled it an "elitist" theory. And if you did so, you are correct—not in the sense that it is concerned only with an elite but in the sense that very, very few people do actually attain the higher levels of development it describes. Perhaps this hierarchical approach flows from Dabrowski's European background and conflicts with our North American concept, developed from an ideal basic to American democracy that "all men are created equal." I do not for a moment deny that all men are of equal worth before the law; no one by virtue of his ancestry, race, color, sex, creed, IQ, or any other criterion is a more valuable entity than another. But the fact that this principle of equality before the law tends to obscure is that all men and women are not equal in talents, abilities, levels of development because they differ in this important entity—developmental potential. Abraham Maslow recognized this when, as an American psychologist educated in the behaviorist tradition, he freed himself from the principles of behaviorism and began to take an interest in what made some of his acquaintances "special." He tried to distinguish those qualities which made these special people more eminently human and distinguished them from the others. As he catalogued these qualities he found himself describing what he came to call the self-actualized person. He referred to these self-actualized people as the "growing tip" of the

human race. Just as a spruce tree has one central tip that grows skyward with the rest of the tree following its lead, so Maslow saw that some human individuals exemplify humanity in an eminent degree and lead others on to growth. The spruce tree with its growing tip is certainly a hierarchical image of how human beings are. Although the history of the United States and Canada is full of stories of penniless immigrants who built up great financial empires through hard work, shrewd planning and good luck, the parallel cannot be drawn (tempting as it is) that the pathways to the highest levels of psychological development are open to anyone. Salesmen of hip psychologies, miracle weekend encounters, self-development cassettes, self-fulfillment courses, and even drugs that promise fantastic personal development are merchants of deception.

What Dabrowski is saying with his concept of developmental potential is that some people have potential for high levels of development and some people do not. Developmental potential is an individual endowment which determines a person's level of development, given genetic, physical and environmental conditions are optimal. Dabrowski is not a fatalist; he is not ruling out free will, individual choice and determination to advance. What he is saying is that these factors, these dynamics are more operative in some people than in others and three factors make the difference. Traditional psychology has dealt with the two classical influences on human development—heredity and environment. All discussions aside as to which is more important, psychology has usually limited itself to considering these two factors as shapers of personality development. Dabrowski, with his insight and his flair for novel ideas, has introduced what he calls the "Third Factor" which is the dynamism of choice and decision in following internal standards. It is a dynamism of valuation that guides in consciously developing a hierarchy of values. The element of choice is more or less present at lower levels of development but it does not blossom into the third factor, autonomous valuation, until the third level of development. Again Dabrowski's concept of multilevelness opens up a new vista: choice is a multilevel thing; people at all levels of development make choices with more or less freedom, but those with developmental potential to move on to higher levels make more authentic, autonomous choices that are directive toward further development. Thus Dabrowski's theory is not a fatalistic, deterministic theory of development that denies human choice, but rather it

glorifies free will and self determination in a way typical of Dabrowski—by displaying the richness of choosing when we see it as multilevel.

Developmental potential is defined operationally as the sum of the psychic overexcitabilities and the developmental dynamisms present in an individual. It would help in our understanding of developmental potential to examine what Dabrowski means by "psychic overexcitabilities" and "dynamisms," giving some examples of the different kinds he distinguishes.

Types of Overexcitability

I still have trouble with the "over" part of this word that Dabrowski has coined. It has the inferential meaning in the English language of "too much" and that is a pejorative meaning. What Dabrowski means is "more than the ordinary"—something that the prefix "super" implies in a positive sense. Dabrowski's overexcitable people are more than ordinarily sensitive to certain stimuli and, although this is commonly looked upon as a desirable quality in hi-fi stereos it is too often looked upon as a nagging problem when we find it in the people around us. Again perhaps this is one of the recurring paradoxes of Positive Disintegration theory: along with the notion that disintegration leads to growth; along with the notion that a crisis is an opportunity; along with the notion that psychoneurosis is not an illness comes the idea that to be "overexcitable" is not bad, but ultimately productive of great humanness.

Dabrowski's distinction of five kinds of mental functioning is based on his clinical observation of "types of overexcitability." He observed that some children, some adolescents and some adults consistently overreacted to both external and intrapsychic stimuli. Their overreacting expressed certain dimensions of their personality: (1) psychomotor, (2) sensual, (3) imaginational, (4) intellectual, or (5) emotional. Some individuals seemed to be more sensitive to one kind of stimulus, some to a broad range of stimuli. Some showed sensitivity at lower, psychomotor levels, others at higher levels more closely connected with cortical functioning. Dabrowski was thus able to arrange them into a hierarchy rising in the order in which I have listed them above. These overexcitabilities are like channels or radar receptors bringing stimuli into the individual and sensing those stimuli which the individual produces intrapsychically. The openness of these channels and the number of them operating determine the amount of

psychic stimuli the individual is receiving. More importantly, the level of the channels which are operative determines the process of dissolution of lower level activity and organization and growth toward higher levels. Messages from the higher level channels bring about the dissolution of lower level responses and open up the possibility of reorganization at a higher level. Less automatic, more voluntary responses that come later in development conflict with earlier, more automatic modes of functioning. Higher level processes disorganize and inhibit more automatic ones. The disequilibrium these overexcitabilities produces brings on the emergence and organization of higher levels of control.

In brief, psychic overexcitability refers to an especially heightened reaction of some individuals when exposed to certain classes of stimuli. The experiences and responses of such individuals are above average in terms of their intensity, frequency and duration.

It would serve us well to look at each of these types of overexcitabilities individually, beginning at what I see as the lower end of Dabrowski's ranking.

Psychomotor

Psychomotor overexcitability is a result of an organic excess of energy expressing itself in the neuro-muscular system. Emotional tension may come out in psychomotor forms of expression such as restlessness, drumming fingers on a table, rapid talk, chain smoking. This overexcitability finds release too in violent games and dances, intense athletic activities, and, perhaps in a sublimated form, in a heavy foot on the gas pedal of a car, or motorcycle.

Sensual

Sensual excitability, a function of heightened experiencing of sensory pleasure shows itself as a need for comfort, fashion and beauty in a stereotyped sense, varied sexual experiences and numerous relationships which may not extend to any depth. Overeating and obsession with food and sex and physical stimulation are examples of the transfer of emotional tension into sensual forms. Sexuality at this level is appreciated merely as a sensation with little thought given to personal relationships. This is the playboy mentality, demonstrated often as voyeurism in males without

emotional involvement and as a sensual exhibitionism in females.

Lest the descriptions of these first two levels seem to be totally pejorative and even moralistic, I think it is good to remember that psychomotor and sensual excitabilities, although low in Dabrowski's hierarchy, do have a legitimate place and are often expressed in the "fun" things of life from water skiing to stroking a cat to liking a velvet painting for its texture. The important thing is that if the appreciation stops there, as with the velvet painting, and no higher intellectual and emotional sensitivies are active, these overexcitabilities remain truncated as does the individual.

Imaginational

A further rung up the ladder of overexcitabilities is imagination. Imaginational overexcitability in its negative sense manifests itself in dreams, nightmares, mixing of truth and fiction and fears of the unknown. In a more positive sense imaginational overexcitability shows itself in imagery, metaphor, inventiveness, and vivid visualization. Life may move into a world of fantasy full of magic and rich with poetry. A fictional person with active imaginational overexcitability was Anne of Green Gables.

Lucy Maud Montgomery has in her classic *Anne of Green Gables* created a little human creature who exemplifies all that is best in sensual and imaginational overexcitability. In the following passage, the author contrasts Anne with the unimaginative but kindly Matthew as he brings her in his horse-drawn buggy to Green Gables for the first time:

> The "Avenue" so called by the Newbridge people, was a stretch of road four or five hundred yards long, completely arched over with huge, wide-spreading apple trees, planted years ago by an eccentric old farmer. Overhead was one long canopy of snowy fragrant bloom. Below the boughs the air was full of purple twilight and far ahead a glimpse of painted sunset sky shone like a great rose window at the end of a cathedral aisle.
>
> Its beauty seemed to strike the child dumb. She leaned back in the buggy, her thin hands clasped before her, her face lifted rapturously to the white splendor above. Even when they had passed out and were driving down the long slope to Newbridge she never moved or spoke. Still with rapt face she gazed afar into the sunset west, with eyes that saw visions trooping splendidly across that glowing background . . . Through Newbridge, bustling little village where dogs barked at them and small boys hooted and curious faces peered from the window, they drove, still in silence. When three more miles had dropped away

behind them the child had not spoken. She could keep silence, it was evident, as energetically as she could talk.

"I guess you're feeling pretty tired and hungry," Matthew ventured at last, accounting for her long visitation of dumbness with the only reason he could think of. "But we haven't far to go now—only another mile."

She came out of her reverie with a deep sigh and looked at him with the dreamy gaze of a soul that had been wondering afar, star-led.

"Oh Mr. Cuthbert," she whispered, "that place we came through—that white place—what was it?"

"Well now, you must mean the Avenue," said Matthew after a few moments profound reflection. "It is a kind of pretty place."

"Pretty?" Oh pretty doesn't seem the right word to use. Nor beautiful either. They don't go far enough. Oh it was wonderful—wonderful. It's the first thing I ever saw that couldn't be improved on by imagination. It just satisfies me here—she put one hand on her breast—"it made a queer funny ache and yet it was a pleasant ache. Did you ever have an ache like that, Mr. Cuthbert?"

"Well now, I just can't recollect that I ever had."

"I've had it lots of times—whenever I see anything royally beautiful. But they shouldn't call that place the Avenue. There is no meaning in a name like that. They should call it—let me see—the White Way of Delight. Isn't that a nice imaginative name?" (pp. 19-20)

Perhaps Lucy Maud Montgomery betrays her own emotional and imaginational overexcitability when in *Anne of the Island* (p. 11), she makes these comments on the adolescent Anne, locked in reverie beside a shining brook: "And she was richer in those dreams than in realities; for things seen pass away, but the things that are unseen are eternal."

Intellectual

Intellectual overexcitability is shown in the avid search for knowledge, persistent question asking, the search for a theoretical framework and the love of logic.

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, to whom we have referred from time to time, drawing on the resources of his intellectual development, was, even in childhood, an example of intellectual overexcitability. His mother was cutting his hair one day when he was a child of four or five. To his horror he

watched some of his tresses fall into the fireplace and become consumed in the flames. He saw something of himself perishing and, grasping the perishableness of his world, he began to search for things with permanence. First, he found pieces of iron, and clung to his collection of iron objects to reassure himself that some things do endure. Then one day he noticed streaks of rust on a farm plow, and came to the conclusion that even iron was slowly perishing. His quest for the enduring sent him off in search of rocks in the hills of his native Auvergne countryside. Fortunately for him (and ultimately for us) the rocks around his home were a rich source of quartz and amethyst. He started a collection which was the beginnings of lifelong interest in paleontology. Freud might have had other interpretations of this childish passage in the life of a young boy, but such interpretations fade into foolishness. I see the dynamisms in action here as those of a budding intellectual overexcitability, for they combine the intelligence, curiosity and intensity of emotional grasp which comprise intellectual overexcitability.

To combine the concepts "intellectual" and "excitability" seems at first look impossible if we are to maintain the classical distinction between cognitive and affective, between intellect and emotion. How can we have an "excited intellect"? R.S. Peters (1974), shows the congruency of this idea when, in reacting to Hume's equating reason with the sort of reason that goes on in logic and mathematics or in science, illustrates a broader view of "reason." Peters points out that there is a cluster of "passions" closely connected with reason without which its operations would be unintelligible. He is referring to "the passion for truth," "abhorrence of the arbitrary," "hatred of inconsistency and irrelevance," "love of clarity and order" and "the determination to look at facts" (p. 329). Both Dabrowski and Peters remind us that, though we have separated them for our own convenience in understanding, intellect and emotion are inseparable companions in real life. To speak of intellectual overexcitability is not only possible but an exciting idea in itself!

Emotional

Emotional overexcitability is a heightened mode of experiencing and responding to emotional relationships. The relationships can be with persons, objects, living things or even places (remember Anne and her intense relationship with the "White Way of Delight"). From the point of view of

Positive Disintegration theory, mere intensity of emotions or great displays of emotions are not enough. There must be a relationship. Piechowski gives an example: When a child is refused a candy, he may throw a temper tantrum to show his anger. Or he may go away sad, thinking he is not loved. In the first place we have only a display of emotion and, perhaps an object relationship, in the second, a human relationship (1977, pp. 34-35).

Emotional overexcitability may show itself either in direct, positive expression such as enthusiasm or in inhibition such as timidity and shyness. Emotions may center around fears, anxieties, loneliness, depression, feelings of insecurity, concern with death. They may delve into the past in the form of affective memory ("They're playing our song"). Feelings that are connected with interpersonal relationships, if they are intense may express themselves in a widespread concern for others (Mother Teresa of Calcutta), or in deep exclusive relationships with only a few or only one person. For some, one of the most profound of emotional relationships will be with God, who for them is a very real person.

Children display emotional overexcitability when an infant looks perplexed and worried at the sound of another child crying, when the child itself cries at the sight of a dead animal, when he shows compassion for an injured friend, when he is moved to be generous and acts accordingly without looking for a reward.

My own son Daniel at the age of three surprised us with his response to a scene in a movie, in which an exasperated father poured milk over the head of one of his children while his brothers and sisters laughed uproariously. Daniel in a serious mood and stern language said: "That is not funny *at all*! I would get a cloth and wipe the boy's face." Injustice toward a child from an adult was too much for him to accept.

It should be noted in conclusion that each type of overexcitability does not usually exist in isolation from the others; usually there is a dominant form accompanied by others in varying degrees. Overexcitabilities may be absent altogether or present only at the psychomotor or sensual level, but this is the case only when development is limited to primary integration.

The hierarchical ordering in which I have placed the overexcitabilities is significant for the process of development. The two lowest forms—psychomotor and sensual—characterized by restlessness and an extraverted pleasure-seeking cannot engage psychic processes, nor are they by

themselves productive of the reflective attitude and enriching human relationships Dabrowski sees as essential for positive disintegration.

But the story is quite different with the three overexcitabilities at higher levels—imaginational, intellectual and emotional. They enrich personal development, giving insight into the many levels and dimensions of the world and our relationships with it. They enhance retrospection, introspection and prospection. With these important channels open and sensitive, there is possible a deeper appreciation of the past, a more vivid appreciation of what is going on within and without a person, and a glimpse (more than passing), of what might be.

Dynamisms—Shapers of Development

In our continuing exp ition of what Dabrowski means by developmental potential, we should now go on to look at those forces that shape development which he calls dynamisms. Dynamisms are defined as "intrapsychic dispositional traits which shape development" (Piechowski, 1977, p. 37). They determine tendencies or predispositions to respond. Kawczak (1970) called dynamisms "psychological compounds which unite, and intuitive insights with affective involvement and commitment." Dynamisms form the network of the inner psychic milieu, the internal environment in which one lives. Because different dynamisms are active at various levels of development, they form a pattern by their presence, a pattern which relates to and is indicative of the individual's level of development. The presence or absence of certain dynamisms is the empirical basis for (a) determining an individual's current level of development, (b) ascertaining the presence of developmental potential, and (c) distinguishing positive from negative disintegration.

Figure 1 depicts the dynamisms and shows how they characterize each level of development. The Roman numerals refer to the level of dynamisms, C denoting that group of dynamism which operates over several levels of development. The spindle shapes indicate the emergence and gradual disappearance of each dynamism. Shaded areas indicate tension in the operation of a dynamism. This tension tends to abate toward higher levels of development with the exception of personality ideal which increases in significance and power as development advances. Note that at each level of development (indicated by the Roman numerals I-V across the top) there is a



A Theoretical Pattern of the Constellations of Dynamisms at Each Level of Development Through Positive Disintegration
Roman numerals designate levels of development.

Figure 1
(Piechowski, 1975, p. 261)

different constellation of dynamisms. For example ambivalences and ambitendencies characterize the unrest of level II, whereas dynamisms such as dissatisfaction with oneself, inferiority toward oneself and astonishment with oneself together with feelings of guilt and shame mark level III development where the direction toward self development begins to take hold.

A feature of Positive Disintegration theory which, as we have indicated, makes it outstanding among many developmental theories appears graphically in this diagram. At the interface between levels you can see that disappearing dynamisms from the lower level coexist for some time with the emerging dynamisms of the higher level. This emphasizes the point that dynamisms at a higher level are not simply transformations of lower level dynamisms but are discontinuous with lower level dynamisms. They are not derived from the transformation of lower level dynamisms. This illustrates Werner's developmental principle of differentiation and discontinuity referred to earlier, because the new structures emerge not *from* as simply modified extensions but emerge *next to* the old ones, to *replace*, in time, the old structures.

We have already discussed some of the dynamisms in detail when examining Dabrowski's levels of development, and it would be superfluous to explore in detail the nature of each dynamism as Dabrowski conceived it since Piechowski (1977, p. 39ff.) has described the dynamisms individually, lucidly and in the context of their role in the developmental process. It should be sufficient here to pick out some main themes relevant to our present topic and discuss the dynamisms particularly active in them.

We have seen that the theory of Positive Disintegration eminently expresses the developmental theme of movement away from egocentrism to empathy and caring. It also shows a movement through development from external control toward autonomy and authenticity and inner directedness. It also demonstrates a movement away from tyrannical forces out of control, from subjection to whim and caprice toward greater personal choice, directed it is true by what is learned from outside oneself, but guided ultimately by a contemplative, reflective approach toward a personality ideal. Let us take each of these themes in turn, examining them from the point of view of the "high-end" dynamisms.

Empathy

Empathy achieves its highest expression in the readiness to sacrifice oneself, even one's life, for the sake of others. Empathy is directed toward others but always in the context of oneself, one's unrepeatability, one's unique opportunities springing from one's gifts and place in space and time. Empathy extends beyond the circle of those nearby to all who are hurt and humiliated, to all living creatures and ultimately to all things. This is that kind of sense of one's wholeness with the universe, a sense of the organic which Whitehead championed.

Autonomy

Autonomy means freedom from lower level drives and behavior and from the influence, blindly accepted, of the external environment. Autonomy comes from identification with one's personality ideal.

Authenticity

Authenticity moves the person to appreciate and retain and cherish that which makes him unique and unrepeatable. Responsibility to oneself, fidelity to oneself are characteristics of this quality which at this level realizes that responsibility to oneself and fidelity to self are not in conflict with being responsible for and faithful to others, but, rather, one and the same.

Personality Ideal and Self Perfection

Personality ideal is first perceived in broad outlines and intuitively, evolving gradually into a model after which personality is shaped. With development the picture of what one "ought to be" and "will be" becomes more and more distinct through meditation and contemplation "in which the individual realizes the existence of a superior hierarchy of personality as the highest self-chosen, self-affirmed, and self-aware structure attainable in human development" (p. 54). The light of this discovery moves one to become one with that which to him is the highest level of his experience. He may call this "God." The process is "self perfection." The program of self perfection is taken up quietly, without excitement, inhibition or resistance. Conflicts and inner tensions have ended, and the only tension, more a lure, comes from a hierarchy of values that have created the personality ideal.

Moral differentiation of others is based on the deepest empathy. This empathy is the fruit of insights gained in contemplation. "The feeling that it is possible to step over from empirical experiences into the borderline of transcendence is based on an understanding of the differences and closeness of "I" and "Thou" in a harmonic duality of existence and essence. The individual reaches his own ideal and the ideals of others through mystical experiences and identification, thus achieving full harmony in perfecting himself and others" (p. 55).

Before concluding our discussion of specific dynamisms, I would like to put emphasis on a dynamism which is of particular importance I think for the present study since, as we shall see in a later chapter, it is especially active in moral judgment making. It is the dynamism Dabrowski called "Subject-object in oneself" and it has important implications for the question of objectivity in values.

In the line of themes we have pointed out, subject-object in oneself would fit best into the theme of movement away from egocentrism to empathy and identification with others. It is what I have called a "high-end" dynamism insofar as it is particularly operative at the fourth level of development, organized multilevel disintegration and is still active with those few who reach secondary integration. What is it, and why is it so important as to be singled out here?

Subject-Object in Oneself

This dynamism is a process of looking at oneself as if from outside, that is, seeing oneself as an object for examination, while at the same time perceiving the individuality of others, that is, experiencing in some way the subjectivity of the other person. By virtue of this dynamism, I no longer am bound up by subjectivity but can step outside myself and view myself as an object of observation; at the same time, the other cannot slip into the category of being merely an object to be viewed from a distance, but in some way I compenetrate into him, stand in his shoes and view things from his perspective. Figure emerges from background and both take on perspective in this process.

This dynamism is especially part of the process of movement away from infantile egocentrism since its main activity is to observe oneself in an attempt to understand oneself better, and this leads to critical self evaluation

which in turn leads to further development.

Piechowski (p. 49) points out that there is a strong cognitive component in the subject-object process, comparing it at its elementary levels with Piaget's concept of decentration. A follower of Piaget who has furthered his theory of cognitive moral development is Lawrence Kohlberg. We shall see more of Kohlberg later in the section of theories of moral development, but it is sufficient to say now that central to Kohlberg's system of moral education (and the moral education system of many others such as McPhail) is the emphasis on role-taking. If we wish, they say, to raise the level of moral thinking of any individual we must expose him to situations, dilemmas, where he is drawn in to see the situation from another person's point of view. Thus the process of subject-object is a two-sided coin; one side is the movement outside one's subjective perspective to view oneself objectively; the obverse side of the coin is the movement into the other's perspective to "see" (that is, to know and feel) things as he does. The two sides go together.

This self evaluation that is typical of the level IV person is not present so much with individuals at lower levels. At levels II and III, Piechowski notes, it is only a process of introspection and self observation, requiring the self evaluation component coupled with a conscious need to develop oneself before becoming the mature dynamism, subject-object in oneself (p. 49).

Moving on to the next level of development, this dynamism is joined by authenticity, and objective judgments become possible, for, as Lonergan points out, "Objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity." A fuller development of this theme is presented in a section on objective moral judgment.

In concluding our discussion of developmental potential on this high note of secondary integration, it is interesting to note that Dabrowski holds a very special meaning for the word "personality" which is used much more broadly by other psychologists. Secondary integration as the highest level of development is also called the level of personality. "Personality" here means a self-aware, self-chosen and self-affirmed structure whose one dominant dynamism is personality ideal.

Values

Before concluding our discussion of the theory of Positive Disintegration we should examine explicitly a major theme of the theory which we have touched on from time to time but have not considered as a whole. It is the theme of values. The concept of values and valuation plays an important role in this theory. It must. Positive Disintegration is a theory built upon the concept of multilevelness of growth from lower to higher, from poorer to better. Once we start using these terms we are talking of values. If one level is "better" than another, we are saying that it has more value. The whole theory is full of value judgments. For example: empathy is better than selfishness; directing one's own development is better than being directed by other people; a higher stage is a better stage. These are presuppositions of the theory. One can question them, one can dispute them, one can deny them but they are presuppositions based on the consensus of not only a large number of people but, more importantly, on the consensus of eminent persons. Dabrowski found that there is a remarkable consensus among those individuals recognized as expressing the best of what it is to be human. This was a consensus about ideals of how one should live, a consensus about values and sometimes about morals. So there is in the theory an important theme about values insofar as it makes judgments about what is valuable in human nature.

There is another way in which value is an important theme of this theory and that is the role of value in individual development. Again the trend is from lack of values or consciousness of them, from disorganized and disparate values to an organized hierarchy of values, from values that have as their source external dictates to values that are internally chosen and internally directive, from values that are purely subjective to objective values.

At the lower levels of development, values are internalized from external sources: parents, church, government, propaganda, the media. The acceptance of these values and the stereotyped ideas that accompany them is a function of the need to conform since there is no internal structure to generate and support nonconformity. Values at these primitive levels are purely relative.

It is at level III, spontaneous multilevel disintegration, that value issues reach an intense confrontation, for it is then that "what ought to be" comes into conflict with what is. One of the dynamisms that is especially active in

this period is the dynamism of "hierarchization." With the recognition by the individual that there are lower and higher levels of things and behavior, one begins to sort out one's life and the groundwork is laid for the emergence of an autonomous hierarchy of values. This hierarchization of values at level III is restricted largely to an ordering of one's own individual values.

It is not until level IV, that the individual deals competently with a hierarchy of universal values that lie beyond the boundaries of self. At this level the dynamism named by Dabrowski as the "third factor" plays an important role in forming a hierarchy of universal values. Traditional psychology has emphasized heredity and environment as the two classical factors that influence the development of the person, and theoreticians have long discussed the "nature-nurture" controversy. But Dabrowski reminds us there is a third factor influencing development. The Third Factor is a dynamism of conscious choice by which one distinguishes in self and in environment those elements which are positive and those which are negative. This is the basis for the higher and lower ordering of elements which is the essence of forming hierarchies. That which is lower can be rejected; that which is higher can be sought. One sees for example that higher levels of consciousness are what make up the essence of one's humanness, rather than feeling a sense of identity that is limited to one's body.

The third factor is the dynamism of valuation. With it one becomes consciously involved in developing an autonomous hierarchy of values. The third factor judges what subject-object in oneself has uncovered.

The value theme of Positive Disintegration theory is one of moving away from values dictated by one's own physiology or the need to meet social expectations to consciously chosen values, from a disorganized set of values to a more complex yet better organized hierarchy of values.

Since, as we shall see, morals are a form of expression of values, Dabrowski's schemata of how valuing develops in the individual has important implications for moral development and subsequently for moral education. In our section on moral development we will look at various approaches to moral education and how they have built upon varying philosophies of what it is to be a person, how one develops and how one "learns" morality. We will see that none of these approaches is totally satisfying and that each leaves unanswered some important questions such as whether

there can be an objective order of morality. Without saying that the theory of Positive Disintegration has all the answers, we will see how it addresses these problems with creative new insights into what it is to be a moral person, and we shall build in that section on the foundations we have laid in this general survey of Positive Disintegration.

Positive Disintegration Theory and Religious Development

Positive Disintegration theory is a general theory of development and, as such, would not be considered a specialized theory of religious development. However, its themes are those of religious development, and the insight it gives are creative, profound and unique, offering a synthesis that no other theory seems to have either the depth or the breadth to encompass. The source of this can be traced directly to its founder, Kazimierz Dabrowski, who was himself deeply religious with a great respect for his fellow man and for God.

The best way to begin our discussions of the implications of Positive Disintegration for religious development is to approach the topic as Dabrowski himself would—looking at religion as a *multilevel* concept. Dabrowski did this in two ways in the first volume of his *Theory of Levels of Emotional Development* (1977) considering the Religious Attitude first as an emotional-cognitive function (pp. 142-144), and then going on to consider the levels of religion looked at as a discipline (pp. 215-217). These two major expositions of religion as a multilevel phenomenon are worthy of full repetition here:

The Religious Attitude

Level I. The primitive anthropomorphic conception of forces of "good" and "evil" is based partly on a magical approach and partly on unreflective tendencies of approach and avoidance. One appeals to higher forces primarily to obtain support and protection in the realization of primitive endeavors and satisfaction of biological needs. Success in such undertakings brings about a sense of power and a magic attitude toward oneself such as conviction of possessing superhuman heroic attributes or even of being a demigod. Such attitudes are easily produced by self-suggestion, that one is in favor with the gods because one or another of one's undertakings has

succeeded. Such a religious attitude is characteristic of primitive tribes and psychopathic individuals who believe themselves to possess superhuman powers. Outstanding examples are Nero, Ivan the Terrible, Pope Alexander VI, Hitler, Stalin, Charles Manson.

Level II. Ambivalences and ambitendencies manifested as belief and disbelief, as "spiritualization" of one's approach to a divinity, as periods of fear or disregard of a divinity. Symbolization of personal fears and inner conflicting impulses in the guise of different gods is characteristic here as a personification of human opposites. Or there may be a feeling of an exclusive contact with the divinity symbolized by a ritual of betrothal to a divine personage, often followed by a feeling of letdown or a lack of favor (grace). Also characteristic at this level are periodic attitudes of atheism alternating with search for contact with a deity and its protective power.

Level III. Under the influence of multilevel dynamisms develops a hierarchy of religious values. This is followed by a need to spiritualize and differentiate the conception of divinity. The image and a conception of divinity grow out of one's developmental tendencies and strivings. The concreteness of immanence is linked with the concreteness of transcendence. In religious immanence, one creates an idea of God through one's subjective needs; in transcendence, one sees God independently of one's subjectivity. Concrete transcendental realities correspond with strong emotional realities of a high level of development. Immanence and transcendence may appear as an antimony, yet at the same time, they constitute a two-part harmony. In the search for grace, it is experienced as coming from two directions at once: from the subject and from higher reality. Sometimes, one observes deviant, more unilevel, forms of devotion to the divinity characterized by artificiality, excessive self-criticism and self-abasement, or spiritual narcissism.

Level IV. With the development of a high level of allocentrism, one observes gradual development of existential attitudes, of delving into the essence of valuing divinity as an embodiment of love together with a deepening need of faith in the uniqueness of God and his personal attributes. As a result of experiences gained through systematic meditation, and contemplation, and the effort at self-perfection, a tendency develops toward making one's subjective religious needs more objective and toward making transcendence a concrete reality. Religious attitude is manifested as a

search in transcendence for objective supernatural realms.

Level V. Development of the relationship "I" and "Thou" in the sense of development of absolute religious values of faith together with all-encompassing empathy and universal love. The search for a transcendental hierarchy in [the] religious attitude finds expression in authentism and in idealization of personality. Such an attitude develops through an intuitive synthesis of one's personal relationship with the divinity. In this level, religious attitude is marked by clarity and simplicity which is nourished by great depth of religious experience. It also characterized by an effort to make the relation between immanence and transcendence understandable, to make God a concrete experience, to carry on with Him a dialogue in place of one's monologue. There may occur breaks and interruptions in such a dialogue leading to the "dark night of the soul," but the need and the search for the dialogue remain intact and unassailable. The search is calm though intense (pp. 142-144).

Religion

Level I. Primitive naturalism, frequently as a function of self-preservation. Fear and "humbleness" before "higher forces," expectation of punishment. Primitive symbolization of gods. Praising the gods and bribing them with gifts and offerings. Brutality and cruelty in making live sacrifices. Instances of deification of oneself.

Level II. Beginnings of experiencing and adopting an immanent attitude. Some degree of respect for divinity. Fluctuation of feelings toward gods or toward one god, manifested in fluctuation of atheistic and personalistic attitudes. Variable attitudes of fear, self-abasement, and subordination alternating with periods of self-confidence. Emotional attitude toward a god of good and a god of evil is not elaborated and is, therefore, inconsistent and unstable. The conceptions of immanence and transcendence are vague because a superficial external attitude toward a god prevails, hence attraction toward religious ceremony and ritual.

Level III. Attitude of respect toward the divine is distinct. Gradual hierarchization of values and of divinity. Prevalence of monotheism. Development of religion based on respect and conscious, freely accepted dependence. Immanence combined with a tendency to see transcendence as a concrete possibility. Development of inner religion with diminishing needs of

external expression, more of inner worship and less of external worship.

Humility which grows out of a sense of personal relationship with God increases while authoritarian attitudes grow weaker. Religious attitudes and feelings undergo distinct differentiation into many levels due to dissatisfaction with oneself, feelings of inferiority toward oneself, feelings of shame and guilt. Development of sincerity. Religious attitude based on that "which ought to be" rather than on that "which is," that is, a growing need to be consistent in one's religious beliefs and one's actions. Objection to a formal and abstract conception of God grows stronger because one's religious attitude becomes experiential, mystical, and, also, empirical. God is perceived less as a God of power and more as a God of love and justice.

Level IV. Organization of an autonomous hierarchy of religious values. Projection of religious ideals and the personality ideal onto other functions and values. Appearance and development of the "instinct of partial death," that is, the aim, in striving for self-perfection, to destroy all that is undesirable, negative, and an obstacle in development. This can be accomplished through deliberate frustration of one's basic needs. Turning away from excessive institutionalism and dogmatism of religious organizations. Distinct action of developmental dynamisms causes separation of higher from the lower religious levels. A strong need to feel and realize love in relationship with others. Consistency between religious convictions and one's actions. The balance between an intellectual and an emotional attitude toward God grows stronger because, at this level, emotional and intellectual functions begin to operate in unity and harmony. Concrete transcendentalism also increases as does the distinct need for dialogue with God.

Level V. Fully developed attitude of love stemming from the highest values, which personify divinity and people in their unrepeatable and individual relationships. Active love resulting from experiences gained in meditation and contemplation. Total readiness for sacrifice for the sake of others and for one one's faith. Union with God is experienced in meditation or in strong intuitive projections, leading to an inner understanding of God, the so-called infused knowledge. The deepest respect and love of God do not obliterate the awareness of one's individuality. This means that the sense of affinity and union with God exist together with preservation of distinct and permanent individual essence. At times, when it becomes difficult to obtain a response from God, one's relationship to Him is built through continuing

work of inner perfection and through creating and discovering ever higher values (pp. 215-217).

Religion, the Best of Human Development

The great priest, paleontologist, philosopher, theologian and mystic, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, saw in his vast perspective on the evolution of the universe a coming together of all things as they emerge from lower to higher. He enunciated this in a principle that, loosely expressed, says, "All that rises must converge." Teilhard de Chardin (1969, 1973) saw in the rising of the universe from inanimate to animate, from lower forms of life to higher, a coming together of a new integrity, wholeness and organicity. In doing this he acknowledged two things: that reality is multilevel with a rising from lower to higher levels, and that, at its highest levels, something not found at lower levels which are marked by disparity and confusion, creation finds a remarkable unanimity, a sharing, a oneness. It is like the voices of a great choral group who have practised painfully and separately over long weeks; when they come together they discover the miracle that "it all fits" to form one work of art. No one is lost, no one diminished, no one the less because they have become part of the whole; each individual makes his or her contribution; each one has value, and the miracle is that "it all fits." It all makes something more than each individual; it all makes something which transcends all individuals. Together they have individually risen to new heights, and in that rising they have converged, and in that converging they have transcended.

Dabrowski shared and enhanced de Chardin's multilevel image of the universe, and just as these two great men ascended that multilevel staircase of understanding what it is to be human, so too they converged in their thoughts. And it is here that I see the best doorway to understanding the theory of Positive Disintegration as a theory of religious development.

Dabrowski recognized in his own lifetime the remarkable similarity of ideas, values and goals that the eminent men and women of history had discovered for themselves and taught others. Eminent persons like Christ, Gandhi, Schweitzer, Jean Vanier and Mother Teresa of Calcutta share ideas and principles not by chance, but because by the rising process of their own personality development, by their high levels of emotional development and sensitivity, they have converged together with one voice, or rather

with one song which sings of what is best in being human. And that is where I would like to enter into this thing we call religion—with the idea of "what is best in being human." Paradoxically it transcends what we typically regard as "merely human" and touches the divine. (By now we are used to finding paradoxes whenever we get to a really important idea.) For it is in religion that the human and the divine touch, like God's hand reaching out to give life to Adam's in the creation scene on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel.

So, at this important point, I would like to come back to one of the principal themes of this book—that religion is the best of humanness; that the best humans are truly religious and it is, therefore, with the highest level human beings that we will get the clearest, sharpest focus on the picture of religion. And this is fitting since we have said that religion is best found at the highest levels of human consciousness. Dabrowski's eminent human beings are religious in the sense that their consciousness is profound, their peace is deep and lasting, their perspective on life is vast and their relationships with the universe, with their fellow man and with God are real and deeply personal. This is to say that those who have reached the highest of Dabrowski's levels are religious, thoughtful, reflective, prayerful, mystical. I think this is what he is saying, and the examples he uses, like Dag Hammarskjold, even though they are not always canonized saints and holy men, have all these qualities which make religion an integral part of their being. All that rises must converge.

Positive Disintegration theory best tells us what is religion when it tells us what is the best religion. We saw in the initial chapters of this book numerous attempts at defining religion that began from the low end of religiosity as neurotic needs, conformity needs, need of reassurance, alleviation of guilt and so on. We saw that it is true that much of what passes for religion is just that, satisfaction of low level needs—man sometimes at his dependent or exploitive worst. Regrettably that is the content of much of the emotional baggage we bring with us when we approach the topic of religion. But what a distorted negative approach! Dabrowski gives us a new way of understanding the great religious people who exemplify all that is best about religion and who show us something of the process of developing to those religious heights.

Death and Resurrection

Perhaps the first gift the theory offers is a new psychological insight into the great religious mystery of death and resurrection. Christ told us that "Unless the grain of wheat, falling into the ground dies it remains alone, but if it dies, it yields a hundredfold." He was referring to his own death and resurrection, but that was part of the whole natural mystery that his simple disciples knew and felt in themselves and the world around them—the cyles of life and death, pain and joy, endings and beginnings. Dabrowski has sensed this great mystery of nature which theology, philosophy and art have so often and so beautifully expressed, and has himself expressed it for the first time in a psychological theory of human development that reveals the intertwining circles and the ascending spirals of the world's process.

By reminding us that religion is a many-leveled reality, and especially by describing from a psychological viewpoint what religion is at its highest levels, Dabrowski has set up goals for religious development and thereby some norms for religious education. The kind of person he describes at the upper levels of development bears a remarkable similarity to the higher reaches of human nature described by Maslow and Jung and is very unlike the "religious" person described by Freud. Again there is a remarkable consensus between Dabrowski's higher level individuals and the twice born described by James. In contrast to the once-born or "healthy minded" individuals who bear much resemblance to people at Dabrowski's lower levels, the sick soul is searching, agonizing, hungering after truth and justice, dying and being born again in a process of positive disintegration. "The religious attitude is manifested as a search in transcendence for objective supernatural realms" (Dabrowski 1977, p. 143) at Dabrowski's fourth level of development. There is in Dabrowski's theory a fifth and higher level of development, secondary integration, and in describing this Dabrowski goes beyond James's "sick soul" and even his twice born and paints a more realistic picture of the higher levels of religious development. It is a picture more in keeping with the traditional concept of the religious mystic who has found peace and integration with other persons, especially with God as a person, and there "rests" in a union with divinity which is special and ultimately ineffable. The search at this level is "calm though intense" (p. 144).

Kohlberg (1974, 1977, 1981), experiencing the inadequacy of six stages of moral reasoning to express all that goes on at the higher levels of moralizing, launches out into a description of "Stage 7" which he insisted was not a stage really since Stage 6 represents the perfection of moral reasoning according to him. "Stage 7" for Kohlberg is a metaphor meant to express the level of moral (and religious) questioning that goes on over and above moral reasoning.

Kohlberg realized in his own life that there are moral questions that go beyond the limits of reason to solve—the ultimate, transcendent moral questions like "why be moral?" "Can we expect justice in a world where we see so much injustice?" Is there meaning in suffering, death and perishing?" Kohlberg, as we shall see later, is a psychologist of morality, but in his Stage 7 explorations he has been struck with religious questions and religious experiences. The description he draws of the Stage 7 man looks very much to me like James's sick soul agonizing over the transcendent questions of life.

Jung, as we have said, and not Freud, most closely coincides with Dabrowski, for Jungian psychology is basically mystical and the religious experience is consummatory, probing the depths of what is to be human and drawing one up to the heights of what humanness can be in the transcendent. For Jung, the developmental process is a process toward "individuation," a stage beyond mere health when new meaning is sought and one strives to live up to one's potentialities. We see here a similarity with Dabrowski's probing, searching levels, as the individual moves from what is to what ought to be and is guided by the personality ideal as the ultimate expression of one's unique possibilities.

The Paradox of Religion—Communal and Solitary

I don't know how much Dabrowski was directly influenced by the philosophy of Whitehead, but it is in Dabrowski and Whitehead that I see the most perfect convergence in their rising together. As we have seen in our introduction to the nature of religion there are two classical points from which to view religion: one can see it from the aspect of the communal—that religion is a social organization, or one can see it from the aspect of the individual. Maslow, in his introduction to a revised edition of *Religions, Values and Peak Experiences* (1977), acknowledges his tendency in the previous

edition to downplay the communal aspects of religion in favor of seeing it as an individual experience. Whitehead has been accused of the same overemphasis by those who have latched onto his "definition" of religion as "what the individual does with his own solitariness," interpreting it out of context. Whitehead's real view is a balanced one. Individuals, he maintains, are constituted by their experience of one another. Whitehead sees solitariness as especially important for certain aspects of religion:

> The great religious conceptions which haunt the imaginations of civilized mankind are scenes of solitariness Prometheus chained to his rock, Mahomet brooding in the desert, the meditations of the Buddha, the solitary Man on the Cross. It belongs to the depth of religious spirit to have felt forsaken even by God. (1973, p. 19)

Whitehead is here emphasizing the aloneness one feels when faced with ultimates, an aloneness that Tennessee Williams expressed so beautifully in his plays and more directly when he said, "We are all prisoners inside our own skin," an aloneness which Christ felt in those hours of profound hesitation in Gethsemane and which he expressed on the cross in the ultimate religious experience of death for others, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" And, although this theme of solitariness picks up the theme of James's sick soul or Kohlberg's seventh stage, or Dabrowski's level IV, it doesn't, without its context, represent the full view of either Whitehead or Dabrowski. For Whitehead, a person is always an individual in community, a self emerging from his or her relationships. Bernard Lonergan (1973) recalls this theme, emphasizing that the love which is involved in religious experience breaks through the isolation of the individual, causing him to act not just for the self but for others (p. 289). This theme of developmental movement away from egocentrism to allocentrism is, as we have seen, one of the mainstreams of Positive Disintegration. It helps to make a theory which at first blush is just another secular psychological theory, at its heart essentially a religious theory. Whitehead's philosophy and theology remind us that this relatedness moves beyond the human community to the structure of all the relationships of the individual to the cosmos—God included (1938, p. 164). In this religious context the solitariness of the coming to be of a person is also the condition of that person's freedom and responsible choosing—the Third Factor in

Dabrowski's terms. The following quote from Whitehead's *Religion in the Making* (1973) might just as well have appeared in one of Dabrowski's works:

> The moment of religious consciousness starts from self-valuation, but it broadens into the concept of the world as a realm of adjusted values, mutually intensifying or mutually destructive. (pp. 58-59)

Whitehead and Dabrowski converge too with their emphasis on consciousness. For both, the process is one of evolving to higher levels of consciousness so that one may be more participant in the unfolding of oneself and in the building of the universe. The higher the level of consciousness, the more one can choose and fully assent to the values one holds.

With the emphasis on consciousness in both Whitehead and Dabrowski, a larger picture of the process of the universe emerges especially in Whitehead's writings. Here is an area where the theory of Positive Disintegration can be enriched by putting it in a cosmic context that makes more explicit the grand vision which Dabrowski held.

Whitehead, as we have seen, envisioned levels of consciousness as running through all of the cosmos and not just humanity. We know that atomic particles are "conscious" of each other in the view of some physicists, and it would seem that a stone in some sense is "conscious" of its environs and thereby participant in the process of the universe, even if it is the long process of the Rocky Mountains being slowly eroded and washed down to the sea. But consciousness at the human level has the special quality of choice and freedom to participate in the process, choice at the degree to which one will participate, the level at which one participates, and consequently the amount of value one adds to the enduring nature of God. This is ultimate religion.

We have in this discussion emphasized the "high end" of religious development, looking at the highest levels of human development since that seemed the best doorway to understanding what religion is all about. This does not mean that the theory of Positive Disintegration neglects the ordinary man or woman who has no real possibilities of reaching the lofty mystical levels of religion. In fact it is one of the beauties of Dabrowski's theory that he takes such pains and goes to such lengths to describe the lower levels of development and the lower levels of structures and

functions—religion included. By giving a detailed description of the many levels of religion and the religious attitude, Dabrowski has thoroughly described those levels of religion which are most real to most people. It is regrettable that, for many, religion is a rationalization for power or an excuse to persecute one's neighbor; it is regrettable that, for many, religion does stop at the level of belonging to an organization because it overcomes feelings of loneliness, or that having a set of dogmas or moral rules given by others takes away the threat of having to choose for oneself. It is regrettable that for many this is the reality of religion. But it is a reality that Positive Disintegration theory presents bluntly and honestly by reminding us that religion is not spared from being a multilevel thing. On the positive side, it is a challenge to individuals to rise to higher levels of religious development themselves; it is a guideline to religious educators of the kind of religious people they want to produce and themselves *become*.

CONCLUSION

This first section on the psychology of religious development has been long and complex; without adding to its length, perhaps we can sort out some of the threads that run through the knots of its complexity.

You were asked in the beginning to examine the psychological baggage you brought to the whole idea of what religion is. You were asked to suspend any definition, and encouraged instead to glance from many perspectives at the multifaceted crystal that religion is. You were initially barraged with ideas about religion, incomplete and undeveloped as they were. Then we explored some of the sources of these ideas—religion as process, religion as a multileveled thing, religion as human beings have experienced it at its highest levels, setting thereby the criteria of what religion might be.

We saw religion as that which gives perspective to life and how faith complements it as the guide to proper perspective and the shared meaning (particularly ultimate meaning) of the community. We saw that, through it all, ran a paradox—that religion, though solitary, is interpersonal, communal, giving meaning to life in a way no mere philosophy does, by having it flow through relationships with other people and ultimately with a deity.

Another paradox illustrated our developmental theme—simultaneous convergence and divergence. We saw divergence within the developmental life cycles as the human person became more and more complex while inwardly converging in a process of integration.

And if the image is one of spirals diverging and converging within themselves, it is also one of individual spirals converging with others. We have seen this exemplified in the remarkable convergence of the scholars whom we have studied; we have seen it in the convergence of science and religion; we have seen it in the convergence of people who have reached the highest levels of development. Hopefully, we, reader and writer, have experienced some measure of this concrescence in ourselves.

PART TWO

MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Chapter V

What is Morality?

"When you prevent me from doing anything I want to do, that is persecution, but when I prevent you from doing anything you want to do, that is law, order and morals."

—George Bernard Shaw

In the first half of this work I have outlined something of what we mean by developmental psychology in general and then gone on to look at the narrower field we call religious development, considering it still from a psychological perspective, but with the help of philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists. It is now our task to look at what we know of morality from the viewpoint of developmental psychology. Again, we are emphasizing the developmental aspects of moral judgment making, although, as we shall see, there are other psychological approaches to the study of morals.

Moralizing versus Moral Philosophizing

First, though, a note about two major ways of approaching this whole topic of morals. Politics, religion, sports and sex are popular topics for heated discussions. Almost anyone will argue some point of view. Almost anyone has his own opinions, often quite heavily loaded with emotion. The same is true of morals. Mention the fact that you are interested in morality and someone will have a "case" to discuss whether it be to weigh ponderously the pros and cons of nuclear war, or just to cluck their tongues over the latest scandal. Mention of the word "morality" almost automatically leads to a discussion of specific, concrete actions and a debate about whether these actions are "good" or "bad." Mention that you are interested in "moral education" and people will nod affirmatively and say, "That's good; I hope you can get those young people straightened out." Try to teach a class in moral

development and you will find that you must constantly fight the powerful attraction of a class discussion on specifics of "explosive" moral issues ranging from the nuclear bomb to women's necklines. That's why a distinction is important at the very beginning. It is the distinction between "moralizing" and "moral philosophizing." What we have been talking about so far is moralizing—offering judgments about specific principles, values and behaviors in a particular setting. The aim of moralizing is both evaluative and educational; usually to pass practical judgments on a moral issue and try to convert someone to our view. It is often marked with considerable fervor.

On the other hand, moral philosophizing is more general, a more rational study (abstract if you wish) of moral concepts, problems and issues. It includes the analysis of problems in moral philosophy and moral education, for example what is the role of reason in ethics; should we let our emotions guide us; how should morals be taught (if at all they can be) or are morals only "caught" by example? Moral philosophy seeks to synthesize systematic answers to problems such as, "What is good?" and "Why should we be good?"

At first look, moral philosophizing seems much colder, more abstract and less fun than moralizing. And in many ways that might be true, but morals is eminently a practical science (or art) and a good theory, particularly a theory of morality is never very far from its practical application. And ultimately it is a much more satisfying human experience to work through from the depths of moral philosophy to the practical problems than to start with practical problems and find one has no depth of understanding of principles to give satisfying solutions.

That is why we will be doing more moral philosophizing than getting involved in the specifics of moral cases. Chazan and Soltis (1973, p. 5) put it well: "Programs in moral education have often been devoid of critical thinking and clarification. The result is that while moral education has been rich in fervor it has often lacked conceptual depth." It is our purpose here to achieve some degree of conceptual depth, without losing the fervor.

What is this Thing Called Morality?

First of all, what is this thing we call morality? What makes it different from arithmetic, geography, baseball, driving a car or fishing? Or better, what is it that makes it different but still gives morality a special relationship to all these things—in fact a special relationship to all of life? The first step in answering this question is to say that morality gives a valence to things—a positive or negative loading. Fishing is just fishing until we ask the question, "Is the fishing good here in this lake?" Then we are asking a question, not yet a moral question, but a value question. Is this lake good for fishing? Does it have that value? Values are valence-laden concepts expressing worthwhileness and as such are much broader than moral questions. In other words, only *some* values are moral values. With moral values the valence takes on an aspect of "oughtness" and the value expressed in terms of "good" and "bad" now tells me how I ought to behave. The lake may be good for fishing in the sense that it is a desirable place to fish, but it may be a place I ought not to fish because it is on private property and to take fish from it would be a form of stealing. Thus morals are a special kind of values which contain a message of "oughtness" within them. It looks, then, like the first logical thing to consider in depth is the idea of values, because values, broader than morality, are inclusive of morality.

What are Values?

It is with considerable trepidation that one approaches the task of "defining" values. The word "value" like the word "religion" is monstrous in the challenges it poses to definition. If centuries of thinking, arguing and writing have not come up with a satisfactory answer, it is not presumed that we shall get one here. What we can hope for is a clarification of the concept, and as clear an explanation as possible of how the term is used in this book, proceeding from there with at least mutual understanding if not agreement.

What Values are Not

First, it is important to say what value is *not*. Value is one of those words that seems so clear at the beginning of a discussion, but when you come to the end of the discussion or the end of a class in values, you find you have been talking about different things. Perhaps one of the most common errors is to confuse values with rules, regulations, laws, customs, mores. This is

particularly true of the classroom when what goes as a value discussion actually amounts to a discussion about rules and laws. It is easy to spend much time discussing the relative merits of a school's rules about smoking and even come to a value conclusion pro or con without really getting at the values that underlie such things as school rules—in this case values like care of one's health, concern for other people. It is values such as these that dictate specific rules, and until we get down to the bases of the specific rules, the values they express, we are really only having a rule discussion and the danger is that values behind them will not be clarified at all.

Values are the bases of rules and laws. Values are generally enduring, relatively unchanging. Rules, on the other hand, are specific, adaptable to the occasion, changing. The key, if the rules are to be good rules, is that they reflect true values. The image that comes to mind is that of bedrock versus surface. It is up on the surface of the earth that all the activity takes place when human beings are searching for oil. But what a seismic crew does is send down soundings into the depths of the earth and then "listen" or be sensitive to the message that comes back from those soundings. The message back from the bedrock tells them something about its depth and configuration, giving them some rules to guide their decisions about where to drill for oil. The activity on the surface is guided by specific rules that come from sounding out the bedrock. So it is with values and rules of behavior. When we want some specific guidelines, some laws, we sound out the bedrock of values and we interpret our values in specific rules.

Now interpretation of what lies below is both fallible and variable according to the circumstances of what is going on on the surface. People make mistakes in making up their rules even though they are presumably sounding out the same bedrock values. Moslem and Christian crusaders have charged at each other across the sands of the Holy Land and slaughtered each other with the cry that "God Wills It." The row on row of crosses in Flanders Fields are, after all, Christian crosses on both sides of the fence that divides the "allies" from the "enemies." Somehow the Christian symbol seemed a suitable marker for the dead on both sides of the war.

There are gross errors in interpreting values into rules of living, but there are also variations of interpretations from time to time and from place to place that make rules and laws flexible and changeable although the values they are meant to translate into action remain the same. Take for

example a value like "modesty." The eighteenth and nineteenth century explorers and missionaries who discovered the naked primitive people of Africa sent back to Europe for suitable clothing so that these people might be "modestly" dressed, according to European standards. It was clear to them that the European interpretation of modesty was the right one. Interestingly, by contrast, it was not so clear to the Europeans that the "primitive" people had often a much more sensitive interpretation of the value "justice" than did their powerful conquerors. The value "modesty" is also a good example of how rules change not only from place to place but from time to time. We smile at the faded photographs of our parents in swimming suits that were considered daring for their time. They would have been shocked if they knew how we interpret the value "modesty" today. Whether the interpretation of people in a particular time or place is an accurate and true interpretation of a value is the point that is up for grabs. The fact of whether something is valuable is up for grabs. The fact that there are values, ideas of what is truly desirable and ultimately humanizing is beyond discussion. The challenge is to make the rules that truly respond to the values. That is why, at the beginning, it is so important to know whether we are talking about rules and customs, laws and regulations and mores or whether we are talking about values.

Rules, attitudes and beliefs. Since a value is a concept of the desirable, it is a very broad term, broader not only than a law or rule, but broader even than a very popular psychological term "attitude." An attitude is usually pointed at something specific; we have an attitude toward work, an attitude toward a minority group, but we value industriousness; we value brotherhood and equality. Values transcend specific objects and are expressed in broader, more abstract terms than attitudes. Values must be distinguished from beliefs. Beliefs are ideas we have about the world around us; they may even, like a value, carry a valence, a positive or negative weighting. We may believe for example that all men should be treated equally. But a belief may stop there at simply believing in this abstract principle without ever acting on it. A belief is something we may publicly affirm, talk about, proclaim but, unlike value, it does not necessarily flow into action. A belief may be a purely theoretical expression of a judgment of worthwhileness, but a value, if it is to be a value in the full sense, must flow into action, must actually influence our way of behaving, not just our mind set or the way we talk. A value is a concept of the desirable that flows into action.

Toward a Definition of Values

We are now ready to "define" value at least to the extent of clarifying how the term is used here. The definition reads like this: A value is a conception of the desirable which actually influences the selection from among various modes, means and ends of action. The definition can best be understood by breaking it down into its three main parts. A value is: a conception—it is a concept in the intellectual, cognitive sense of the term; not a passing fancy, a whim, a wisp of emotion but an understanding in the full cognitive sense of the term; of the desirable—here is where the positive-negative loading of value concepts is acknowledged. Values are not mere abstract or factual concepts like $2 + 2 = 4$. They are, as we have said, concepts to which the understanding attaches a valence, a judgment about the desirability or undesirability of something or some action, including a judgment about the degree of desirability or undesirability. Value judgments are judgments of attractiveness. This is where the affective, the emotional component comes in. Emotions make value judgments; we feel attracted or repulsed by something. It is the heart that deals with attractiveness, but as Bruno Bettelheim reminds us, it is the "Informed Heart" that gives sound guidance—the emotions acting, as Dabrowski says, in equipotential collaboration with the intellect.

We can now see that values are judgments of desirability made by the whole person, not just "cool intellect" or "hot emotion" but the whole warm, living vital person. In fact the tendency we have to break the person down into two systems, one cognitive the other affective is one based more on our own conscience than on the biological makeup of the nervous system. We have one nervous system that thinks and feels. We have distinguished thinking and feeling for our own convenience of understanding these two aspects of our mental activity and the distinction has been so convenient and so engrained in our vocabulary that there is a real temptation to view them as two quite discrete systems, granting them at most some sort of relationship, such as intellect controlling emotion.

Knowing, prizing and choosing, acting upon. Our definition here acknowledges the involvement of the whole person, emphasizing the crucial role of feeling in making value judgments since we are dealing with

attractiveness, the domain in which we see emotion especially involved. Our definition then has acknowledged two aspects of valuing, cognitive and affective. It goes on to acknowledge the third, the conative—the aspect of striving for, of acting, of actually doing something about that which we find attractive or unattractive. The third part of the definition says "Which actually influences the selection from among various modes means and ends of action"—this is the aspect of value which lifts it above mere ideas, beliefs, attractions and velleities. A value by this definition moves us to select and actually move toward certain goals by choosing and acting upon the means toward those goals. I realize that by saying a value must be something acted upon or it is not value sets rather strict limits upon the concept. It goes against the ideas of many value theorists such as Milton Rokeach whose research and writings are based on the premise that a value is truly a value if it is expressed as such, even though it is not necessarily acted upon. But the present definition which is more in keeping with the ideas of Clyde Kluckhohn (1951) and Raths, Harmin and Simon (1966) is more rigorous. It means that we will find we have fewer values if they are something we must actually live by and not just enunciate. By keeping this third, conative requirement we elevate value to a higher level, making it more precious and special in our lives and also opening up the way to a reminder about valuing and value teaching—the importance of authenticity in proclaiming a value and the consequent demand for higher levels of consciousness when clarifying what we actually do value.

Seven Criteria for a Value

Our working definition of values has delineated three processes of valuing: (1) knowing, (2) prizing and choosing, (3) acting upon. Raths, Harmin and Simon in their influential book *Values and Teaching* (1966) outlined seven criteria for a true value which flow quite naturally from these three processes. Although they have not given explicit attention to the distinction between cognition and affect, these two components are there, for these authors require that values be chosen after thoughtful consideration and with knowledge of the alternatives. Raths, Harmin and Simon's criteria for a value are the following:

1. Choosing freely—Values must be selected freely, without coercion.
2. Choosing from among alternatives—There must be alternative choices;

there can be no choice if there are no alternatives from which to choose. There can be no choice also, if the alternatives are not understood, or if we don't know what they are. A child who does not know what the words "chocolate" and "vanilla" mean cannot really choose a chocolate or vanilla ice cream cone. The alternatives might be present, but if we don't understand them, we do not really make a choice.

3. Choosing after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative—The understanding of the alternatives described in criterion 2 means understanding not only of what they are but of the consequences of choosing them. For something intelligently and meaningfully to guide one's life it must emerge from an understanding, a comparing, and a weighing—a comparing of the valences of each alternative, positive or negative, and if positive to what degree is each positive? This is the important cognitive factor involved in knowing what the alternatives are and collaborating with a sense of weighting each alternative for its relative value.
4. Prizing—When we value something it has a positive tone. We cherish it, esteem it, respect it, hold it dear. In other words we must be happy with our values or they are no values at all. A soldier may choose freely to go to war for his country and be proud of the value he holds dear the defense of his homeland. He may at the same time choose freely and after thoughtful consideration to do all he can to kill as many of the enemy as he can, but unless he is happy with this choice, killing people is not a value for him; it is only a reluctantly chosen means to an end.
5. Affirming—The soldier we have used as an example for criterion 4, must also be willing to affirm his choice publicly. A choice which you will not affirm in public is, according to Raths, Harmin and Simon, not a value. We must, they say, be proud of our values.
6. Acting upon choices—According to this way of defining value, a value cannot be something chosen in secret or even just verbally affirmed. It must in fact give direction to our actual living.
7. Repeating—This criterion flows naturally from the last because something which is a value tends to reappear on a number of occasions in the life of a person, giving some sort of direction to that life. We would not think of something that appeared rarely in a life as a value. Values are

persistent; they tend to create a pattern. They are the stars by which we steer our lives.

Where Do We Find Value?

Before going on to explore some distinctions we must make in talking about values, an important premise on which this chapter is built needs to be made explicit. Philosophers have long argued about the location of values. Where do they exist? In things, or in people? In objects that have value or in persons who hold values? Is value some kind of quality that exists in objects of and by itself, or does it take some sort of valuing entity to recognize and thereby create that value. It is something like the discussion of whether a tree falling in the forest makes a noise if there is no one there to hear it. Of course the answer all depends on what our definition of value is, but once one makes a choice of one or the other of these approaches—value in the object itself or value in the perceiver—a series of important ramifications follows. It is a watershed decision. It is probably clear by now that our definition of value is on the side of value as a perception and attribution of the valuer, whether the "valuer" is as lowly as an earthworm which shows a preference for a good, moldy leaf to munch on or a human being who selects a volume of Shakespeare for his weekend reading. Both objects are valuable because a valuer has discovered some sort of attractiveness in them.

This premise, though not traditional and contrary to much of ancient Greek philosophy, is much more satisfying psychologically and it gets us away from the problems pursuant to seeing value in *things* awaiting discovery by psyches whose main tool in discovering that value is intellect or pure reason unhindered by passion or feeling. The "value in objects" approach leads to all sorts of problems when we look at that specialized area of values we call morals, for there is the peril of the "naturalistic fallacy," a swaying bridge that attempts to take the moral philosopher across the gap from "is" to "ought." Morals, as we shall see, are characterized by "oughtness," a demand they place on us to follow them. This oughtness, a naturalistic philosopher claims, comes purely from the nature of things. Because things are of a particular nature, we ought to behave in a certain way toward them. But these philosophers have been hard pressed to prove "oughtness." Perceiving value in the valuer puts it in its proper dynamic place where the action of attraction, especially emotional attraction, takes place.

Various Kinds of Values

Some further distinctions must be made when considering the various ways we look at values.

Explicit-Implicit

Values may be explicit or implicit. That is they may be something we have reflected upon and thus brought them more fully into consciousness. This consciousness is, hopefully, the end result of any value reflection or value clarification exercise. The opposite are values which we may live by but are not conscious of because we have not reflected upon them and consciously affirmed them. The point I am trying to get at here is that people do not come into a value education class without values. We all have values in the very broadest sense of the term from birth, where we value comfort over pain, food over hunger and so on, and we go on making "value" choices, preferences for one thing over another all through a lifetime until we come up against a question of values, perhaps in the form of a crisis or conflict in our lives, perhaps in the form of a dilemma posed by a teacher, and then the choices must be consciously made, not just automatically made. Mature, explicit value choices are made with reflection and awareness of what we are doing, as opposed to more automatic choices that are the consequence of decisions made perhaps a long time ago that still implicitly and without reflection affect our actions. For example someone with a nine-to-five job who can't resist pushing the snooze alarm on his bedside clock "just one more time" for an extra ten minutes of sleep each morning and often comes just a little late to work as a result, is implicitly expressing a value: sleep is more important than the value of "punctuality." Now punctuality may be something he maintains meticulously during the rest of the day, but when it is placed in competition with personal comfort it usually loses out. In other words, he may value both punctuality and comfort, but on reflection he will find that comfort takes a higher place in his hierarchy. And that is one of the main benefits of making this distinction between explicit and implicit values. By bringing values out into explicit conscious expression there is all the more likelihood that their importance relative to other values will become clearer—their places in our own personal value hierarchy will be clarified. That is why much of value education is not "teaching" values at all; it is really just bringing values into consciousness and asking whether we want

to keep them or not, and if we do want to keep them what place they will take in relationship to other values. That is why value education to a large extent amounts to building a value hierarchy, not only, as we have seen, of what we express verbally or have put down on paper but what we live by.

Subjective-Objective

This is a distinction that is highly contentious, but extremely important. The question is: Do I see values as something personally chosen based on my own preference for those things and ways of acting that help me to relate to my world of people, things and ideas? Instrumentalists and philosophers in the tradition of John Dewey (1909) would see values as such; not as something stable and universal and a guide to mankind, but as something purely personal and subjective. John Dewey in his effort to create citizens for a democracy strove mightily to keep out any kind of indoctrination, any kind of force from the outside that would impose regimentation on value choices. That indoctrination coming from social pressure of institutions, such as schools or churches would, according to Dewey, diminish an individual's inalienable right as a citizen in a democracy to choose for himself. John Gardner (quoted in Raths, Harmin & Simon, 1966) reflected this idea when he said that "the task of young people is not to stand dreary watch over ancient values but to recreate those values continuously in their own time" (p. 10). Raths, Harmin and Simon followed in the same tradition when they wrote *Values and Teaching* and it has influenced, as we shall see, the Values Clarification approach ever since. Values, according to this stance are subjective. Values are of necessity my own choice, not something imposed on me either consciously or unconsciously. But, what is more, and this is the essence of the subjective approach, I need not answer for my value to any outside criteria. It is enough that I choose them freely from among alternatives, am proud of them and live by them. This is the essence of the subjectivist view.

Objectivists, on the other hand, maintain that there are enduring, lasting stable criteria that tell us that some values are better than others, that some things are objectively preferable whether or not they are in fact sensed or conceived of as desirable by an individual or a group, that some actions are objectively good or bad. In essence, there are objective criteria for the desirability of certain values over others and we do have some common

ground to appeal to in comparing values, some measuring sticks to see if our values measure up objectively. Objectivists come in a variety of colors and present a whole spectrum of views on what is the origin of value objectivity, starting, as we shall see, with dogmatic traditionalists who tell us that values have a supernatural source in God who has revealed them to us clearly and in great and unchanging detail in revelation. The spectrum of value objectivists continues with those who say that value resides in the nature of things and if only we can logically get at the objective nature of things we will know what is valuable and what is not. At the other end of the value spectrum are those who say we know objectively what is good and bad by pure feeling. If it feels good, it is good and is objectively valuable. If it feels bad, it is bad and we can be just as objectively certain about lack of value because personal pleasure, hedonism is our guiding norm. The particular stance that I am taking on the objectivity of values will be presented later. For now, continuing our introduction, let us go on to another value distinction.

Religious-Human

Another distinction that is frequently made and is really a pseudo-distinction, based more on the ways people have come to express themselves than upon facts, needs clarification. It is the distinction between "religious" and "human" values often expressed as "merely human" values. It is based on a dichotomy we have imposed on human beings that flows from body-soul distinctions, spiritual-material distinctions, natural-supernatural distinctions. That there is a clear hierarchy between these pairs is perhaps less harmful (and nearer the truth since there are levels in man) than the wall we tend to build between them, the rigid line that says these are two separate entities. From this it seems to follow logically for some that if one side is to prosper, the other side must diminish. Like arms of a balance scale, emphasis on one side must mean de-emphasis on the other. If the human thrives, it is only at the expense of the religious. If the religious prospers, it is because the human has in some way diminished. This exclusivity, this competition between the human and the religious is something we have built into our conception of the world.

It is the heart and essence of this book that the contrary is true. If something is to be truly religious it must be truly humanizing; that which is fully

human brings man to his fullest heights which are religious. The two are not in competition; they are one. Religion is not diminished by being human, nor is the human being something less when we find he is a religious animal. "The glory of God is man fully alive" (St. Irenaeus) and the glory of a good psychology of values is that religious values have the greatest potency for humanizing.

Chapter VI

What Does Religion Have to do With Morality?

"To know that what is impenetrable to us really exists, manifesting itself as the highest wisdom and the most radiant beauty which our dull faculties can comprehend only in their most primitive forms—this knowledge, this feeling, is at the center of true religiousness."

—Albert Einstein

What does religion have to do with morality? For many the answer to this question is "Everything." Religion is the one source of morality. God is the source of rightness and wrongness. He knows what is right and wrong and tells us through his prophets, priests, ministers, and above all, for Christians and Jews, the Bible. Religion has always included morality and taught moral laws, promising rewards for those who were good, damnation for those who were not. Religion seems to have a source of knowledge of right and wrong, and the moral clout to enforce it. But is the fact that religions have always taught and enforced morality, and the argument that religious people have a direct line to the will of God enough to make this a sufficient proof that religion *should* be involved in morality? The answer is "No." The theme of this chapter, however, is not to throw out religion's claim to a place in moral education, but to place it on firmer ground, ground which is acceptable not only for logical reasons but for the psychological reasons that it acknowledges higher levels of development in both religion and morality and sees the vital link between the two most perfectly accomplished at those higher levels. The main thrust here is to reinforce religion's place in the moral order, but not merely from arguments of long tradition, or claims of moral authority to be blindly accepted. To do this we will consider several alternative answers to the question "What does religion have to do with morality?"

Four Answers

1. Everything: Religion is the Authoritative and Punitive Source of Morality

To see religion as the source of morality because it has authority and threatens punishments harks all too clearly back to the psychology of Freud who saw God as a dictatorial, punishing father in the nineteenth century Germanic image. We know from studies done in the primitive moral thinking of children that they do not see goodness and badness as based in any objective order of things or any rules for social living with which their parents also must comply. Instead they tend to see adults, particularly parents, as above the moral order, in fact as the source of the moral order. It is Mom and Dad, who arbitrarily decide what is right and wrong and make rules for children based perhaps on nothing more than their whims. Parents are the source of the moral order just as they are the source of punishment for infringement of that order, "He who bears the rod, makes the rules for its use." The very young child has a very pragmatic, "keep out of trouble," "try to get rewards" approach to right and wrong. It is a very immature approach. Too often it is, as Freud elaborated, carried over into one's relationship with God and continues on through adulthood as an immature conception of religion's involvement with morality.

Even if we do not accept Freud's conception of the Father as a stern, distant, demanding person who gives us our image of God, but, rather, see our God image as coming from remembrances of a warm, loving father figure, the problem remains; one can be fixated on a concept of God who, though warm and accepting, is still an arbitrary source of morality. The fact that he is kindly, though it makes the scene more pleasant, may not diminish the childishness of the image nor take away from the danger of an immature rationalization of why God should be involved in morals.

Let me make it clear; the problem is not in the image of God as Father. Christ himself used the imagery in a most mature way and taught us explicitly to call God "Our Father." The problem is in *leaving* the image at a very immature level with all the following difficulties:

a. It keeps a person passive as a child, dependent for his worth on the whims and acceptance of others in positions of power. Those "others" may be God as the individual sees him, or any social or ecclesiastical

hierarchy which he perceives to be above him and in control.

b. The element of free choice in morality is diminished. One is not truly free to conform or not to conform to rules which carry with them the unconscious loadings of motives acquired in childhood—including neurotic guilt.

c. Morals seem objective (God-given) but are really very subjective (Father-given)—whether the "Father" is parent, family, church or society in general.

d. Stagnation of moral growth takes place because morality is so deeply engrained in the infantile personality, one cannot get a deeper, more integrated view of it.

e. If morality is a personal relationship between "me and God" based on personal feelings and a subjective conception of God, one may fail to see other sources of obligation, for example: one's relationship with one's neighbor. Christ's first commandment, "Love God and love your neighbor" often becomes the "last," buried deep under subconscious motivations to maintain the childish relationship one has established with God.

f. Immediate recourse to authority often means blind recourse to external rules, not to a personal hierarchy of values and self-chosen rules to live by.

g. When one is convinced of having such a direct connection to God, close-mindedness follows with all the bigotry, narrow-mindedness and prejudice which religion has been famous for over the centuries.

2. Nothing: Religion has Nothing to do with Morality

An answer to the question of what religion has to do with morality that is opposite to our first answer "Everything" is the answer "Nothing." For some, this is the most authentic solution to the problem. In some cases it is a reaction to the popular theistic view outlined in the previous section. Some see religious people as not being especially moral, and in some cases even less moral than those who claim there is no God, or, if there is one, then that he has no concern with morality. Sometimes this reaction to a morality dominated by an immature kind of religiosity is: "If that's religion, who wants it? It's immature, working on extrinsic rewards and punishment. I

think I can be a good person without religion, thank you."

At a more scientific level, some social scientists see religion as useless or even harmful in giving us moral norms. At the most, some social scientists would say that religion is just one more manifestation of social consensus: what people in general believe to be moral. Religious organizations have about as much validity in setting moral direction as any other organization that gives guidelines for behavior, gathering together and expressing people's opinions of what is right and wrong. If utilitarianism is the norm for moral rightness, then if what religion proposes as guides to good living actually do help us to live together better, religion is merely another channel by which we can know society's expectations. The social scientists also come up with evidence that seems to support the popular rejection of religion as something that is not helpful for encouraging good moral behavior and is perhaps even harmful. Research has indicated a positive correlation between religiosity and prejudice, between religiosity and lack of social concern. Rokeach (1960, 1969), for example, has found a positive relationship between orthodoxy of religious beliefs and lack of social concern in the content of Sunday sermons. However, it should be remembered that, as true sociologists, these researchers are often measuring religiosity largely in terms of amount of church attendance, frequency of Bible reading, and so on. These quantitative measures do not always express true religion. Religion is a much more profound concept than one that can be measured in quantity of church attendance (cf. our section on social scientists' definitions of religion).

3. Religion is "Nothing But" Morality

A third way of answering the question, "What does religion have to do with morality?" is what we might call the "nothing but" approach. This is the approach that says religion and morality are the same thing. Proponents claim that religion is morality, and this approach begins with an interpretation of what religion is in terms closely akin to Tillich's definition of faith as, "The state of being ultimately concerned." Whatever, according to Tillich, your ultimate concern is, that is your religion, whether it be the service of God, making as much money as possible or having as much personal pleasure as possible. Any ultimate concern is the final goal of living and even though it might be something as low-level as personal wealth

or power, this doesn't make it any less possessive of the person's energies and the ultimate in his life than the place religion holds.

Those who maintain that religion is morality would pride themselves on not stooping to lower-level ultimate concerns. Their concerns are social justice, equality for all, universal brotherhood, and ridding the world of injustice, none of which we can quarrel with as good and highly moral aims. But the proponents of this concept of religion would say that the battle against social problems and the moral crusade or revolution they mount to overcome them is itself the essence of religion. While often commendable in itself, this view narrows the concept of religion too much and thereby produces an all too tenuous link between religion and morality.

4. Religion and Morality are Complementary

The fourth and most satisfactory answer to our question is that religion does have much to do with morality because, even though the two may be considered separate entities, they are complementary; they complete each other.

It is true that one may get at ethical truths without resorting to formal religion or revelation; the Ten Commandments were the Hebrews' version of the code of Hamurrabi, a secular set of laws which the Jewish people claimed divine authority for by giving them a theistic source. But even though moral values and moral laws could be attained by a rational inquiry into what is needed for man to live with his fellow man, the ordinary person, the man in the street is not so intelligent, not so exquisitely emotionally attuned to the needs of his neighbor that he can attain a fine sense or moral "oughtness" on his own. Thus some authority is needed to teach morality. This authority is the enlightened religious teacher.

This phrase "enlightened religious teacher" is an important one and deserves a word-by-word explanation:

a. "Enlightened"—by this I do not mean merely converted, "born again," or even the recipient of visions or mystical experiences. By this I mean the person who has reached the highest levels of consciousness including not only learning but authenticity, autonomy, empathy—in other words, Secondary Integration, as Dabrowski describes it.

b. "Religious"—Why religious? Precisely for the reason that is the essence of this book and one of its major themes: that the fully developed

human person is of necessity a religious person. That the high levels of human development he has attained give him fuller consciousness, insight into himself and others, perspective, wisdom, hierarchies of values—which, as we have seen, are the essence of religion.

c. "Teacher"—Somehow this eminent person must convey his insights, his perspective to the ordinary person in terms intellectually understandable, emotionally moving and intensely motivational. Attempts through the abstractions of philosophy or more statements of rules most often fail. The great religious teachers have been those who have used the language of poetry, metaphors and parables to teach. They have underlined these words with the lives they have lived, and in some cases with the death they have gone to because of the words.

Religion and morality, then, come together best and complement each other at the highest levels of human development. Their complementarity comes from the mystical speculative contemplative, interior qualities of religion that readily merge with its opposites, the concrete, practical, social active qualities of morality. Religion has very much to do with morality, as these qualities flow from one to the other in individuals at high levels of development, and flow within a religiously moral society, guided by these eminent individuals.

It might seem at first glance that with this fourth answer to the question, "What does religion have to do with morality?" we are back full circle to our first answer which was "everything." But our first answer relied heavily upon authority; this answer is saying in effect that for the majority of people the source of their moral principles is authority outside of themselves—a teacher who has reached higher levels of development. There are vast differences between answer 4 and answer 1. Answer 1, when we take it in the sense of religion as a theistic institution, rests all its authority on God who determines the rightness and wrongness of things. It is the task of theologians, priests, ministers, witch doctors to know the mind of God or the gods and convey this to their disciples. The sources of these rules are found in holy writings, personal revelations, omens and the traditions of the people. The authority, the source of oughtness clearly rests somewhere outside the teacher. He is merely the conveyor of laws revealed to him by some divine source. Answer 4, that morality flows from human individuals who have reached high levels of development, is no less religious even

though it has a human source, nor need it be any less theistic. The highly developed human being who, by that fact, is a profoundly religious person may well have a religion which is thoroughly theistic. There usually would be a God in his life, and that God would be a person. It is only reasonable to conclude that the more an individual develops the capacity for deep interpersonal relationships, the more likely he is to find an interpersonal relationship with God. Once again our problem is that when we talk about God as a person we begin to have images of the old man in the white robe with the long flowing beard because that is the person image most of us have been accustomed to in the Christian tradition at least. Christ came into the world to tell us something about the personhood of God His Father and how to relate to Him. It is no mere accident that the Gospel which gives the highest level account of that witness, the Gospel of John, is profoundly mystical in its concept of person. John says, by way of introduction: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." God then is the "Word" or, later, "God is love." These are dreamy, abstract, mystical words, and at first glance they do not seem to introduce us to a person. But perhaps that conclusion comes only from our limited concept of "person." We need a broader, deeper meaning of person, and that is what our most highly developed human persons have.

Chapter VII

Theories of Justification

"I could not but feel with a sympathy full of regret all the pain that I saw around me, not only that of men but that of the whole creation. From this community of suffering I have never tried to withdraw myself. It seemed to me a matter of course that we should all take our share of the burden of pain that is upon the world."

—Albert Schweitzer
My Life and Thought

How do we know something is valuable? As we have seen, the concept of value contains within itself the notion of worthwhileness, valence. But how do we know something is worthwhile? More acutely: The concept of "moral" as a subset of value contains within itself the notion of "ought"—a special kind of valence that tells us how we ought or ought not to behave. Oughtness is a special presence within an idea that points a finger of obligation at us. Facts are facts, but moral rules are imperatives to action. That our friend is drowning is a fact that, by itself we can consider quite speculatively. That we perhaps *ought* to dive into the river to save him is a moral obligation with very practical consequences. Max Scheler the moral philosopher expressed it in these terms:

> a finger pointing toward me from the depths of this value, as if it were whispering "for you." The specific content of this individual value assigns me a unique place in the ethical cosmos and it commands also the performance of actions, deeds and works, all of them crying out "I am for you" and "You are for me." (1927, p. 510)

Two questions arise when we look at the topic of moral obligation. The first one is very practical and immediate: What are our moral obligations? The second one, while less immediate is still very practical. How do we know what our moral obligations are; what means do we use for getting at

"oughtness?" Philosophers, theologians and social scientists have discussed this question for centuries and we certainly aren't going to solve it here, but perhaps we can get a little closer to the truth; and the best way of doing this is first to review some of the classical theories of justification.

Naturalism

It seems quite logical to assume that if we know the nature of things, then we can logically conclude to how we ought to behave toward them. It has often been argued, for example, that if we had a clear understanding of the nature of man, then it would be clear just how men ought to live. If, by way of a further example, we thought of man primarily as a rational animal, then those behaviors which show rationality in its highest degree would be moral. We need only make the logical conclusion. Likewise, if we conclude that man is essentially a social animal, then those things that help him get along well in society are the things which are logically moral. Because he *is* social then he *ought* to act in a way which enhances this.

The trouble with naturalism is twofold: first, there is a great deal of difficulty involved in getting to know the "true" nature of things, and still more difficulty in getting people to agree on it, particularly on such a complex thing as human nature. The second trouble with naturalism is summed up in what is called the "naturalistic fallacy." It revolves around the question of just how one makes the transition from "is" to "ought" in such a logical way; naturalism, in stressing the nature of things, makes too tight a connection with the moral conclusions that "follow" from that nature. All too easily, some philosophers note, our words slide from talking about the way things are to the way we must behave toward them; all too easily does our concept of the nature of things drift into conclusions about their goodness or badness. Critics of naturalism point out that the "ought" argument seems to slide in from nowhere and they question its validity. "Each person has life as part of his human nature; therefore we ought to preserve that life" has a real and logical appeal, and indeed this argument is probably enough for the ordinary man in the street to induce him to behave as he "ought" toward his fellow man if we are appealing to his rationality. However, if we stick with logic alone, it does not follow. Over and above the argument that "ought" does not proceed logically from "is," are the difficulties referred to earlier in determining the nature of things, and, beyond that, the difficulties

involved in interpreting the moral circumstances. How about the argument: Every rattlesnake has life as part of its nature; therefore I ought to do everything to preserve the life of this rattlesnake rearing up its head and sticking out its tongue at me?"

Naturalism makes every effort possible to preserve the objectivity of moral reasoning; it seeks a firm, objective basis for morality in the unchanging nature of things. Naturalism for example is a seemingly firm basis for denouncing war and slavery as exploitations of human beings by other humans, and it maintains that because all men have the same human nature they are to be treated in the same way no matter what their nationality, color, creed or social status. Naturalism appeals to logic and strives for objectivity; the main thing it neglects, besides its leap from "is" to "ought" is to take into account the autonomy of the moral actor.

Intuitionism

Intuitionism, on the other hand, does preserve the autonomy of ethics. Intuitionists deny that terms like "good" or "ought" do represent qualities of the actual nature of things, and they deny that moral judgments can be inferred from generalizations. These two sweeping denials which seem to knock out both legs from under the naturalistic argument, substitute something in their place. The intuitionist argument is that, in the end, the goodness of an activity or the rightness of a principle is a matter of "seeing" or grasping a quality or a relationship. Moral knowledge then is grounded on some kind of indubitable and self-evident propositions. Some intuitionists, following Plato, assume that terms like "good" stand for a special property of things which is grasped by a reflective mind. This goodness is not something discernible by the senses but rather an inner quality that can only be intuited with an inner eye. Another brand of intuitionism maintains that moral principles flow with mathemetical precision from the apprehension of basic forms composed of self-evident moral axioms. Certain moral principles could, like mathemetical theorems be logically deduced from these axioms. It was this philosophy, maintaining that certain moral axioms were evident and known intuitively, that formed the thinking behind the American Declaration of Independence which maintains that such rights as life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are self-evident and inalienable rights.

Plato was among the first major philosophers to suggest intuition as the basis for moral knowledge, and, following Socrates, he made an immediate connection between knowledge and action. He took from Socrates the conviction that virtue is knowledge and that no one does what he knows to be evil. According to Socrates, knowing what is good led to doing good. If someone did not do good it could be put down to a defect in his knowledge. It is in this way that contemporary intuitionists explain the connection between the intuitive grasp of moral principles *in theory* and the effect they have on the knower (or intuiter) *in practice*.

Intuitionism then, if you accept the immediate "seeing" of moral principles by the reflective mind, becomes a complete moral system beginning with sure moral knowledge and leading immediately to moral action. Moreover, it preserves the autonomy of the moral agent in a way that naturalism in its pursuit of objectivity could not. Unhappily, intuitionism seems to many, to let go of objectivity. By preserving the individual's autonomy, it introduces the likelihood of arbitrariness. If truth is grasped in the form of "non-natural" qualities and relations are seen by an "inner eye," immediate problems arise as to various perspectives all those inner eyes may have. Perspectives will certainly vary from person to person and, even more importantly, the ability to intuit, the sensitivity of the intuiter, will vary from person to person. Now intuitionists, Plato included, have always stressed that the fullest "seeing" is granted only to reflective people who think detachedly, clearly and logically. Their intuition is the basis beyond which further reasoning is impossible. This leaves great masses of people without any immediate contact with moral principles because they are not equipped with the reflective disposition, the emotional detachment and the cool logic required to intuit moral principles. They must then trust in the moral intuitions of an intellectual elite, with all the elite's claims to objectivity based on cool reason ultimately going back to non-demonstrable intuitions—the field is open for the "logic" of a few to lead the many astray in an arbitrariness under the guise of clear thinking.

Emotivism

Contrasted with the intuitionists' claim to moral objectivity by the strength of their intellectual grasp and logical deductions is the "Emotive" or voluntaristic school of thought. Emotivists generally make no claim to rational justification of moral principles. In fact they maintain that reason falls apart in the transition from "is" to "ought." The philosopher Hume concluded that it was emotion that bridged the gap between "is" and "ought." He argued that ". . . when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it" (*A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book III, Part I, Section I). "Good," "bad," "ought," "ought not," are words explained purely in terms of the emotions they arouse. Max Scheler (1927) has, following this tradition, educed an intriguing theory of emotive ethics that stresses moral decision making as a highly personal emotional demand made on the will of the individual. More recently, Robert C. Solomon (1977) has tried to reinstate emotion into various aspects of human life, including moral judgment making. He attempts to answer one of the most acute criticisms of emotivism, that of sheer arbitrariness, by more clearly delineating what the emotions are.

That is perhaps the most telling criticism of emotivist ethics; that it opens the doorway to sheer subjectivity not only because it seems to say "Just let your feelings be your guide," but because it fails to help us understand our feelings. Emotivism certainly preserves the autonomy of morals but, in its popular interpretations without a full understanding of emotions, it seems to relinquish objectivity, putting down reason and replacing it with what has consistently been maintained as the ultimate of subjectivity—feeling. Hume himself did this when he said: "Morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular" (*A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book III, Part I, Section I).

Such a quote out of context does not do justice to Hume's ultimately more balanced view. He associated emotional reaction with the "general view" of the disinterested spectator who sees individual actions in the context of their suitableness or usefulness to the individual himself or to the society. In classifying moral emotions as "disinterested passions" which arise when one takes this more general view of impartiality, he put into this seemingly "pure" emotivism a cognitive rational core. Hume's emotional

moralist was also expected to "give reasons" that came from his distanciated "general view" if he was to make any claims to objectivity.

In the last analysis, perhaps the emotivist view suffers most when a superficial interpretation is given the word "emotion"—when it is seen as something bereft of reason, or solely as something intense, overwhelming and despotic in the power it has to select and guide the will. As we shall see, emotion belongs in a broader context, sometimes violent it is true, but often quiet, reflective, above all perceptive. A picture begins to emerge of emotion in collaboration with cognition, the two not being so separate as we tend to see them, but often with emotion having just that leading edge that helps it delve into the vitality of things. Emotion is often in the forefront of moral judgments so that it can truly be said: "The heart has reasons the mind knows nothing of."

Revelation

Some would say that ethics does not belong in the philosophical domain at all; that it is a theological concern. Perhaps the most radical of these views on the sources of rightness or the moral order is the one that states that God is purely and simply the source of moral norms. He doesn't just tell us what is right and wrong through the scriptures and religious teachers; He is the source who decides what is right and wrong and then depends on his messengers to convey the norms of morality to human beings. In this stance God is seen as a medieval king, a dictator who makes things right or wrong by an act of His will. This view is summed up in an early American moralistic verse for children:

> God is great.
> God is good.
> Always do what He thinks you should.

A more moderate "revelation" approach is to see God and his messengers as interpreters of an objective order of things. God doesn't make it wrong to kill another human; he knows it is wrong and reveals that to us. The Ten Commandments are the reflection by God of the right order of things as He above all knows.

The question of where the source of justification is once we take a religious or theological approach was addressed by Plato in the *Euthyphro*. There Socrates asks: "Is what is holy holy because the gods approve it, or do

they approve it because it is holy?" Thomas Aquinas took the side of the more moderate revelation approach in maintaining certain actions are wrong, not because God disapproves of them, but divinely prohibited because they are wrong in themselves.

If you accept the second approach, that some things are right or wrong in themselves, then the question arises: "What need do we have of religion or of God and his revelation?" Could we not just get at morality without religion? This is a hotly debated issue. William K. Frankena addresses it clearly in his contribution to Outka and Reeder's collection of essays on the topic entitled, *Religion and Morality* (1973). Frankena gives the title "Is morality logically dependent on religion" to his essay (p. 295ff.) and stresses the word "logically" noting (p. 296) that morality's dependence on religion can be considered as a causal or historical connection, enunciating that religion has over millennia had a de facto say in what mankind has considered to be moral or immoral. Frankena also points out that morality may be motivationally or psychologically dependent on religion. But faced with the immediate question, is there a *logical* connection between religion and morality, Frankena is hard pressed to find any within the boundaries he has set for himself in his understanding of religion. And this is important. Frankena is limiting his argument to a concept of religion taken in the theistic sense—the sense that religion is a system centered on the existence of a special being known as God. If, he maintains, we take religion in a much broader sense as theologians such as Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr do, as a search for answers to questions of ultimate meaning without necessarily being theistic, then one can conclude that religion does have a logical connection with morality. Religion in this broad sense is in essence a system of values, and indeed a search for ultimate values. But, keeping to his theistic definition of religion, the only plausible logical connection he can see between religion and morality is contained in the proposition that if "God is love" then we ought to love. On this important point, Frankena's own words are:

> Suppose again that one has a sincere belief in or convincing experience of God as love and vividly realizes what this means as Bergson's mystics do. Must he not take the "law of love" as his guiding principle in life, and regard it as entirely reasonable that he should do so? (1973, p. 316)

He goes on to say that religious beliefs and experiences do suffice to justify this and perhaps other ethical principles at least for those who hold them. But he does maintain that, though these religious beliefs and experiences are sufficient to support logical moral conclusions, they are not *necessary* for these moral conclusions; one could arrive at them by an entirely non-religious, logical route.

In the preceding pages we have looked at the problem of the sources of morality, the sources of "oughtness" as a philosopher would in the domain which philosophers call "axiology"—the theory of value. Axiology is concerned with the nature, criteria and metaphysical status of value. We have merely traced an outline of axiology by considering some of the classical theories of justification which go back to Plato's "Ideas of the Good" and were expressed in Thomas Aquinas's attempt to build on Aristotle's identification of the highest value as having its cause in God as the source of all good. Clearly there is no one philosophical answer to the question "How do we know what is moral?" We have seen that religion has at least historically had much to do with morality, and since this is a study of religion and morality the connection between the two has been explored in chapter VI. Since it is also a book on the psychological development of religion and morality, we will look at another issue now from a psychological point of view, remembering that psychology has something to say not just about the teaching of morality or moral persuasion and motivation but something to say too about the sources of moral "oughtness" and moral objectivity.

Chapter VIII

Objectivity of Values

"One cannot conceive of objectivity without subjectivity. Neither can exist without the other nor can they be dichotomized . . . Neither objectivism nor subjectivism, nor yet psychologism is propounded here, but rather subjectivity and objectivity in constant relationship."

—Paulo Freire
Pedagogy of the Oppressed

The Importance of the Question of Objectivity

People from all directions and varying persuasions claim that they have a set of values, some of them moral values, that others should adhere to because they are "true" "objective" values, and it is evident to them that if only other people would accept their values, the world would be a happier place; there would be more peace, less crime, more justice or more souls saved. No wonder we are confused; sometimes these "objective" values are in opposition to each other; frequently they come to us clothed in language that is persuasive yet obscure, language this is grossly manipulative, yet subtly elusive. In our grasping for value straws often we seem to get only a handful of water.

The problem of getting hold of a set of objective values, although it is contemporary, is not a new one. Confusion has come not only from the multiplicity of conflicting values but from the very language of values. Language seems to confuse. Yet I will attempt to point out that language, paradoxically, is the source of value objectivity. Feelings run high when we talk of values, especially moral values. Yet, again, paradoxically, it is the very affect-laden quality of the individual's symbolization of value that is the foundation of value objectivity.

The Role of Affect

People have looked for objective values as something "out there," outside oneself, existing in an objective order of things, and the predominant Western philosophy of how to get to this order of things was to let reason be the guide. Not only did reason have the unerring tool of logic, it was, if properly established in the human psyche, capable of controlling that great enemy of pure reason and the source of all subjectivity, emotions. Traditional philosophy, which we have inherited from the Greeks, has dichotomized intellect and feeling. Psychology has picked up this distinction between cognition and affect and imposed it on our psyche. But the biological fact of the matter is that our human nervous system is not divided into two discrete systems—cognition and affect, intellect and emotion, thinking and feeling. We have one nervous system, yet for our own convenience in understanding what goes on in it, we have sometimes talked about it as if it were two separate systems. The dichotomy has so worked into the language of psychology that it seems to be a description of reality. We have assigned roles to these two children locked in the closet. Intellect was given the role of guiding emotion, controlling feeling, lest it lead us astray in its subjectivity. Psychology has given much greater attention to the cognitive not only because it was supposed to be much closer to "reality," but because it was much easier for a behaviorist to measure and more respectable for a scientist to be concerned with than anything so amorphous as emotions. It is the purpose of this chapter to shift this emphasis to what we have called "emotion"—feeling as a guide to value objectivity—and language as its source. Ultimately it is a more holistic approach.

Feelings, emotions, tell us what is worthwhile, and they can be trusted. Language can be the vehicle of value objectivity. A symbol is, according to Lonergan (1974, p. 220), an "affect-laden image." The heart is what's beyond the understanding, experience and judgment of mind on the level of "is this worthwhile?" "Without feelings this experience, understanding, judgment is paper-thin. The whole mass and momentum of living is in feeling." Symbols are affect-laden because they either evoke an affect or the image itself is evoked by an affect.

Symbolization and the Use of Language

Values are apprehended and symbolized before a judgment is made as to their "worthwhileness." This symbolizing process is frequently in the form of language. The apprehension and symbolization of value meanings is based on the process of distanciation—the increasing differentiation of a symbol situation. Person-object distanciation, as Werner and Kaplan (1963) have stated, represents an increasing differentiation and hierarchic integration of the world of objects and the world of self. This is done through symbolic vehicles which objectify the outside world to the subject. This representation reflects both objective and subjective meaning from the addressor's point of view. From the perspective that the symbolizing process gives—the distanciation—figure emerges from ground, self emerges from environment, yet in relationship to environment. It is the discovery of oneself through symbols. That self is in relationship; the proportions, the meanings of those relationships become clear. At one and the same time the self is not only subject, but object seen in perspective. At this point the traditional dichotomy between subject and object is transformed. Rather than simply being opposite poles of a continuum, the continuum is in a sense changed from a straight line into a circle with subject and object at the re-convergence of the circle, identified within the self.

Additional light can be thrown on the concept of subject and object in oneself through the symbolizing process of distanciation by looking at Dabrowski's theory of Positive Disintegration. Dabrowski has constructed a theory of human development setting forth five levels of development, involving in the process of movement from level to level the disintegration of functions at the lower level to be replaced by higher level functioning. At the higher levels of functioning a dynamism which Dabrowski calls "Subject-object in oneself" is operative. This dynamic force behind human development enhances one's understanding and experience of reality. Above all, it enhances one's perception of self and the world around as being multilevel. One does not see "love" only; one sees levels of love within oneself and the world. One does not see "aggression" as some kind of monolith; one sees levels of aggressiveness not only in the world but in oneself. One does not see "caring" as one simple thing but begins to appreciate the levels of caring, being able to step back from one's own life, judging at what levels of caring one is living, and feeling a self-critical urge to move on to

higher levels which a personality ideal holds out. It is the kind of "self-talk language" a person uses when he says: "There I go falling back into my old ways again; there's the old selfishness, the old pride, the old ego-centrism coming back. I really must do better." Like the self directing speech of a three year old who tells himself that this jigsaw puzzle piece doesn't fit and he must try another better one, the adult uses the symbols of language to direct his development. Language provides the distance for viewing subject and object in oneself.

One quality this distanciation gives is the opportunity to see the identification of self with other. Language bridges the gulf between individuals who see themselves as just so many isolated "islands" by giving the perspective of relationships. If I am "related," then I am "responsible." New values, new moral imperatives begin to emerge. Paradoxically, as I "step back" in distanciation, I come closer in relation. Not only do I begin to look at myself as object, but I begin to perceive and appreciate more the individuality of others, the other self as subject. A new perspective on values emerges. There is a remarkable convergence here with Lonergan's apprehension and symbolization before a value judgment is made.

But what about the role of affect? Dabrowski's psychological theory of human development and Lonergan's philosophy paint a scenario emphasizing affect in making value judgments. The fear of traditional philosophy has been that if we give a predominant place to emotions in making value judgments we will be led by mere whimsy and sentimentality; rampant subjectivity which seemed to be the necessary outcome of listening to our feelings would lead to utter chaos in the domain of values and morals. Many emotion-based approaches to values have given good reason for this fear with their slogans "If it feels good, do it!" "Listen to your heart, not your head." "Don't think, just feel!" They are over-simplifications, outcomes of the mind-heart dualisms we talked about earlier, and compensations for the heavy intellectualization of our traditional philosophy.

Dabrowski's theory puts emotions in the forefront, but in equi-potential collaboration with cognitive functioning—a holistic view, more in tune with the make-up of the nervous system. Dabrowski, like Lonergan, does see emotion as pre-eminent in value judgment making since "the whole mass and momentum of living is in feeling." Dabrowski (1977) puts the following words into the mouth of a person reaching higher levels of development:

> Thinking appears to me to be one-sided; it has lost somewhere its logical certainty. I am more uncertain and more hesitant, yet at the same time, I find myself richer in my thoughts and feelings. Perhaps loss of certainty in thinking and its closer interdependence with feelings are really tied together with a greater complexity and depth of thinking as a way of knowing . . . There was a time when I was sure of the independence of thought. I believed that when one passes the experiential sphere of emotions to the discursive sphere of thought, then the whole of human life is raised to a higher level. Today I know that these were just speculations based on unfounded presuppositions. Events and experiences in my life, especially when I felt isolated, sad, in mental pain, broken down, convinced me that my intellectual interests underwent fundamental changes. My thinking has lost its clearly delineating boundaries of thinking for its own sake. It became an instrument of something higher, something you could call a synthesis of intuition and ideal. Isolated thinking has lost its appeal for me, but such thinking which is geared to 'higher functions' gives me at times the feeling of reaching to others, to (the) ideal, and maybe to something even higher, like the reality of transcendental experience. (p. 150)

Again a convergence. Here we have an individual saying about his own personal development in terms of Positive Disintegration theory what authors such as Maturana, Capra and Zukav are saying about the physical sciences: that there is a movement away from the arrogant "certainties" of Newtonian physics with its trust in intellect and exact measurement to a more transcendent "mystical" view of the physical world in which the involvement of the subjective observer is acknowledged.

John Archibald Wheeler, coiner of the "Black Hole" concept, educed an interesting paradigm in an interview for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation program, "Quirks and Quarks." He talked about his experience of playing the game "Twenty Questions." Usually the panel in this game has a preconceived idea that the right answer exists in someone else's mind and they must get to it by asking the right, logical questions. Wheeler's friends played a trick on him; they had no preconceived answer when it was his turn to ask the questions. All they did was answer with consistency the questions he asked and he came to the "right" answer, an answer which was of his own making, a function of the kinds of questions he happened to ask. Reality was not "out there" waiting to be discovered by pure logic; reality was something he "created" by his own imagination, his own self-directed

questioning as he put the pieces of the puzzle together for himself. If the original "Twenty Questions" got to an object established by preconception, perhaps his arrival at objectivity can be called a process of "postconception." And perhaps postconception is more where it's at with our understanding of the world. The objective truth is a function largely of the questions we ask, a function of the logic of those questions it is true, but a function of the imaginational and emotional loading we give to those questions. It is a function of the language and symbols we choose to use, and much of that language, much of that symbolization goes beyond the bounds of intellect and resides more in the realm of feeling, taking us into the transcendent which is supra-rational and rich with the symbols of emotion. There is much of the subjective in every "objective" judgment. In fact the greatest objectivity is found in the highest levels of subjectivity.

Distanciation and Authentic Subjectivity

The last statement was carefully worded; it did not say, "the greatest objectivity is found in the *greatest* subjectivity" but in the "highest levels" of subjectivity. Seeing human functioning as multilevel is important here. Piechowski (1977) has pointed out that there can be greater differences between an emotion at its lowest levels and the same emotion at its highest levels than there are between two emotions going under different names. One cannot talk of "joy" for example, as a kind of monolith; there are levels of joy, ranging all the way from the lower level rejoicing of someone who triumphs cruelly over others, up through the levels of joy felt at the beauty of nature or the realization of friendship to the highest levels of an all-encompassing love transcending death. Dabrowski has taken many emotions and distinguished within each five levels of development. He talks for example of "sadness," "laughter," "anger," "fear," and clearly distinguishes levels within each of these emotions. One is impressed with the richness added to language when one begins to use these everyday words as multilevel concepts. A principal theme runs through Dabrowski's hierarchy of levels and it has major implications for our theory of valuing. It is that, as the person develops, his values become more complex, more subtle, more numerous in their nuances of meaning and feeling yet always more integrated into a hierarchy that becomes clearer with development to higher levels. The movement is away from egocentrism towards autonomy,

authenticity and above all empathy. The higher levels of development are levels of clarified relationships with others and with oneself. They are levels in which the distanciation of which we spoke earlier has had full effect. Fineness of feeling characterizes the person as he moves upward to higher levels of development and it is this emotional sensitivity that guides him in establishing a personal hierarchy of values, a hierarchy which clearly delineates to him the way things ought to be. What is and what ought to be become clearly differentiated. This approach to "oughtness" avoids the naturalistic fallacy that has bothered philosophy. It sees oughtness as clearly emerging from the emotional sensitivity of individuals at higher levels of development. And it is the higher levels of the individual's development, the autonomy—freedom from the pressures of the crowd, the authenticity—the inner coherence and integrity, the empathy—the fine feeling for others and the ability to put oneself in another's place that create the objectivity of value judgments. Lonergan (1974) sums it up in one telling sentence: "Objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity" (p. 214). The more highly developed the subjectivity, the greater the objectivity.

What is this "subjectivity," and what do we mean by highly-developed subjectivity? Stewart (1981) develops the point nicely in his explanation of Lonergan's philosophy:

> Slowly one becomes oneself. It takes time to develop from being a "subject" in a sensitive world of immediacy to a "self" in the adult world of meaning. The process is one of self-creation. One moves from empirical to intellectual consciousness to rational consciousness to rational self-consciousness. (p. 175)

The relationship here with Dabrowski's levels of development is remarkable. Lonergan (1973, p. 104) states, "Man achieves authenticity in self-transcendence." Stewart's (1981) commentary on this is the following:

> That achievement has to be the result of one's judging and deciding for oneself. It cannot be the result of a secondhand effort. It must be an original creation. Further, the self-transcendence is twofold: intentional and moral . . . Beyond judgments of fact there are judgments of value . . . Knowledge of value of the moral good . . . is one thing, performance quite another . . . It is only in performance in the actual pursuit of the moral good that one achieves self-transcendence. With decision and choice comes the realization that through these acts one makes oneself either an authentic or an unauthentic subject. One becomes conscious of personal value and personal responsibility. (p. 176)

Stewart (1981) goes on to develop the notion of authentic subjectivity in a mode that converges with Dabrowski's multilevel approach:

> Authentic subjectivity means asking questions, questions that take us beyond experience to understanding, beyond understanding to reflection, beyond reflection to judgment, beyond judgment to questions about whether this or that is worthwhile. To ask whether something is worthwhile or not means to ask more than whether it satisfies a sensitive (sensual) appetite, whether it gives pleasure or pain, whether it is good for me as an individual or good for a group, whether it is *apparently* good. My questions seek to determine whether it is *truly* good, it is of *objective* value. When I live by my answers to questions of objective value I effect in myself a moral self-transcendence. I am willing or loving the good. (p. 177)

You can see in this description of authentic subjectivity the same person that Dabrowski describes at the higher levels of development—a person who experiences the world and himself in it through a wide range of overexcitabilities, not being limited to the sensual and immediate; a person who has moved from the reactive to the proactive, from lack of reflection to reflection, from mere value words to congruent value actions. In Dabrowski's terms, the person at higher levels of development, not only has developed a hierarchy of values, but a hierarchy of aims that actually influence his behavior in all authenticity.

Thus far we have been attempting to establish that the source of values (truly "objective" values) is found in affect-laden symbols through which individuals at high levels of development have distanciated themselves from themselves and from persons and objects around them. These symbols, frequently in the form of language, create a perspective for the eminent individuals which leads them to objectivity.

If the Holy Grail of value objectivity is found in the higher levels of emotional development of a handful of eminent human beings, what is the fate of the rest of us poor mortals still struggling at lower levels?

Whitehead points out that the process of contemplative perception and symbolization are "fallible," particularly in terms of individual differences, as a result of variance in each person's situation as a being-in-the-world. The very process of distanciation creates the danger of error. Two persons

may perceive the same object or event in different ways, according to the perspective their position gives them. What one person perceives as love, another may perceive as a condescending pity. Such variance of viewpoints which, according to Whitehead, is the stuff of creativity is also the source of misunderstanding, argument and even war and mass destruction. Witness how the two sides of the cold war concurrently stockpile aggressive and dehumanizing armaments such as nerve gas. Both do it in the name of "defense," "protection" of their civilian population and ultimately "world peace."

Some sociologists such as Durkheim have placed the source of value objectivity in the consensus of society. Social consensus dictates the norms of behavior. Society is the source of objective values.

Roberts (1981) points out how the individual can be "engulfed" by his society:

> Language is paradoxical. On the one hand it represents the medium for the expression of a person's self as an authentic being-in-the world, while, on the other, it represents the medium for engulfment of the person into the background of social conventionality. That is while man has the power of language to create and re-create his symbolic universe, he is at the same time paradoxically subject to the power of the creations of himself and others expressed through language . . . while man presupposes the world which he creates and re-creates, he is also presupposed by the world which is created and re-created through the language of himself and others in society. How he acts in response to this dilemma created by language paradox is his expression of his personality, the level at which his self emerges as either authentic or conventional. (p. 78ff)

One who is under the sway of mere conventionality is not acting authentically; he is not therefore in touch with a core of objective values, "Objectivity is the fruit of *authentic* subjectivity."

Teaching Objective Morality

If social consensus is not the source of objectivity, and the lot of great masses of people is to have not reached high levels of authenticity, where is their source of objective values? It is the core of authentic, eminent persons we have talked of earlier, and language is the vehicle between the few and the masses. But, as we have seen, language is a fallible vehicle in conveying meaning. Perhaps it is for that reason that philosophers are so infrequently

listened to and even less often understood. They have in their hands the tools of logic and the vehicle of language with which to convey their logic, the fruit of their highly intellectual activity. The fact that they are not listened to is not the result of the stupidity of the people, but the fact that, for the most part they consult only the head and not the heart, and the language they use is almost exclusively the language of the head.

If we, on the other hand, look at the great teachers of values and morals, those who have had centuries of influence and whose followers number millions, men like Moses, Socrates, Christ, Mohammed, Buddha, we find that their "language" is not only the language of words but of symbols that go beyond words. The teachings of the great teachers and prophets are full of stories, metaphors, parables that have deep concrete meaning in their listeners' lives and are emotion-filled. In our attachment to rationality, we have neglected, too, the language of the mystics and poets whose emotion-filled language, rich in symbolization, conveys meanings inexpressible in words, yet, nevertheless real meanings, objective values.

The great moral teachers have "spoken" in symbols beyond language in lives lived, in dedication, responsibility, concern for others, hunger for justice and sometimes the ultimate symbol of giving up their lives for what they teach.

The language of the great moral teachers is powerful because it is living, because it is affect laden, because it is enriched with their perspective. Because these eminent persons are in contact with their world from the perspective of their own authentic subjectivity, they can convey to us in a myriad of rich symbols values that are objective in a language rich with the poetry of words and meanings of lives lived. Value objectivity is not something "out there" to be grasped by logic and reason alone nor by emotion alone. It is something within us, within, especially those who are most authentic among us. They, from the depths of their subjectivity, speak to us the language of objectivity.

Chapter IX

The Ethics of Aesthetics— the Aesthetics of Ethics

"Art is knowing where to draw the line."

—G.K. Chesterton

Let us look more at the multilevel approach to values and morals and see its necessary connection with religion. To do this we have to go back to our good friend Alfred N. Whitehead and pick up his sense of the identity of morality with beauty (which Plato before him had expressed) and then return to Dabrowski's theory of Positive Disintegration to see the multilevel development of moral man intertwined with religious man, and attempt to examine what is involved in morality at the various levels of development.

Whitehead's Ethics

Love is the major motif in Whitehead's view of ethics. Whitehead had little use for moralism, especially the coercion it so often uses to enforce authority's rules whether they be human or divine. God is no ruthless moralist, pushing man on. Man is to be lured, not driven. For Whitehead Jesus' teaching of love, empathy, kindness, a compassionate attitude (the "Galilean vision" he called it) are truer than anything else in respect of man's life and meaning because this is how the process "goes" at its deepest levels. Whitehead believed in the importance of ethics, but for him the "aesthetic" (in the special, profound sense he intended) is more important.

This special sense of the aesthetic deserves exploration if we hope to appreciate something of Whitehead's moral philosophy. Naturally, Whitehead saw morals as part of the process, and following his inclination, Whitehead saw it in grand terms. Morality is never a private affair, done in isolation from others, nor is its only concern the unity of mankind. There is an essential interrelatedness about all nature that transcends the needs of humanity alone. The concern of morality is the process of all reality, and

the survival of the universe, not just mankind, is the ultimate concern.

Whitehead (1967) maintained that the aims of a civilized society are a "fineness of feeling" and a "generality of understanding." This is what process is all about. Each individual occasion contributes its fineness of feeling, and the whole achieves a generality of understanding. For Whitehead, the individual and the totality are of equal value. Morality does not choose between the welfare of the individual or of the community. Morality if it is to be morality must be synergistic. It must strive toward individual and societal integration in a way that values both the uniqueness of individuality and the harmony of generality.

The prime task of morals is to safeguard experience and continue the process, and there are some qualities Whitehead enumerated which ought to be furthered by process—his five "eternal objects."

Whitehead saw process as the key to the nature of things. "There is" he said (1967) "the one all-embracing fact which is the advancing history of the one Universe" (p. 192). This community of the world which is "the matrix of all begetting, and whose essence is process with retention of connectedness—" this community which, according to Whitehead, was first described by Plato, is the heart of process philosophy. Whitehead takes a multilevel view of the factors of human life, with the moral element derivative from the other factors of experience. "Thus the primary factors in experience are first the animal passions such as love, sympathy, ferocity, together with analogous appetitions and satisfactions; and secondly, the more distinctly human experiences of beauty and of intellectual fineness, consciously enjoyed" (1967, p. 11).

It is appropriate that Whitehead in this brief hierarchization of the factors of human life should strike first of all upon man's "distinctly human experience of beauty" as most prominently distinctive of man operating at higher levels of development. In *Adventures of Ideas*, Whitehead lists five eternal objects: truth, beauty, adventure, art and peace. Interestingly, good and right are not part of the list, the reason being that Whitehead felt that these words were so overworked their meanings had become quite imprecise. The five objects do include in a general way all that man actually finds valuable in process. But Whitehead, coming from a Platonic background, saw truth, beauty and goodness as inextricably bound up with each other.

Whitehead defines truth much as Thomas Aquinas did, as the conformation of appearance to reality (p. 241). Since truth is a relationship constituted when the content of two connected facts participate in the same general pattern, there can be many kinds of truth ranging from mathematical truth to the truth of art. Truth is attained primarily through the senses, with the things we perceive providing consistent values. These values are incorporated into the subjective form of the prehending occasion and help form a part of the data out of which new occasions emerge in the process.

At this point Whitehead introduces one of those statements which, taken out of context, could get him into trouble. You can imagine him writing it with an impish gleam in his eye. He says, "It is more important that a proposition be interesting than that it be true" (p. 244). But then he goes on to lure the reader into the truth of what he is saying in this interesting statement: " . . . the energy of operation of a proposition in an occasion of experience is its interest and is its importance. But of course a true proposition is more apt to be interesting than a false one." A true proposition Whitehead goes on to say also has more emotional lure. "But the importance of a proposition lies in its interest." This is itself a fitting proposition for a book entitled *Adventures of Ideas*.

But Whitehead continues his pursuit of the truth of ideas by pursuing the concept, "Beauty." Beauty is the mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience (p. 265). Beauty is thus wider and more fundamental than truth; it goes beyond truth because it deals not only with the conformation of appearance to reality but with the perfection of the subjective forms that are shaped by their interrelation. The adaptations of beauty arise in the pursuit of an aim, and in this pursuit both intensity of feeling and conformity to a common pattern combine for the attainment of harmony. Beauty is "the one aim which by its very nature is self-justifying" (p. 266). Truth is in the service of Beauty and the realization of Truth becomes in itself an element promoting beauty of feeling.

> Consciousness, with its dim intuitions, welcomes a factor (Truth) so generally on the right side, so habitually necessary. The element of anticipation under the influence of Truth is in a deep sense satisfied, and thus adds a factor to the immediate Harmony. Thus Truth, in itself and apart from special reasons to the contrary becomes self-justifying. It is accompanied by a sense of rightness in the deepest Harmony. (p. 267)

One is reminded here of the characteristics of Dabrowski's high level persons, particularly those at Secondary Integration, where the appreciation of Beauty, the beauty of feeling, the search for truth, yield harmony.

Whitehead concludes: "Truth derives this self-justifying power from its services in the promotion of Beauty. Apart from Beauty, Truth is neither good, nor bad" (p. 267), and "The real world is good when it is beautiful" (p. 268).

"Art," Whitehead goes on to say (p. 267), is the "purposeful adaptation of Appearance to Reality" and the purpose of art is twofold—Truth and Beauty, so that Art has only one end—Truthful Beauty. "Truth matters because of Beauty" (p. 267).

Consciousness is the factor of experience that makes Art possible, by strengthening the artificiality of an occasion of experience, and the merit of Art lies in its artificiality and finiteness. Art exhibits for consciousness a finite human effort achieving its own perfection within its own limits. A landscape within the limiting parameters of its medium and even its frame communicates from one consciousness to another: "This is what I saw; this is what I felt. It is not the actual trees and the actual river; it is artificial. It is not *all* of what was there and it is certainly *not all* of what I experienced, for it is limited by space and time and by my communication. But it is the communication of my humanity to yours through Art and our mutual consciousness."

> The work of Art is a fragment of nature with the mark on it of a finite creative effort, so that it stands alone, an individual thing detailed from the vague infinity of its background. Thus Art heightens the sense of humanity. It gives an elation of feeling which is supernatural. A sunset is glorious, but it dwarfs humanity and belongs to the general flow of nature. A million sunsets will not spur on men towards civilization. It requires Art to evoke into consciousness the finite perfections which lie ready for human achievement. (pp. 270-271)

The achievement of Art depends upon the perfection of man as he has been shaped by beauty. But perfection for a process philosopher is not a static concept. Like civilization it must always promote novelty and originality. Whitehead says:

> It is a tribute to the strength of the sheer craving for freshness that change, whose justification lies in aim at the distant ideal should be promoted by Art

> which is the adaptation of immediate Appearance for immediate Beauty. Art neglects the safety of the future for the gain of the present . . . Its business is to render the Day of Judgment a success now. The effect of the present on the future is the business of morals. (p. 269)

Art and morals are inseparable, for the inevitable anticipation of the future adds a qualitative element to both Art and morals. Whitehead saw in morals a desperate need for that same vital drive and zest that Art needed. "Morals consists in the aim at the ideal, and at its lowest it concerns the prevention of relapse to lower levels. Thus stagnation is the deadly foe of morality" (p. 269). Whitehead adds the regret, "Yet in human society the champions of morality are on the whole the fierce opponents of new ideals." Here Whitehead is talking about the book-burners, the condemners, the censors and not the true "champions" of morality—those at higher levels of development.

Part of the zestful ongoing process of Art (and morals) is what Whitehead calls Art's "curative function. . . when it reveals in a flash intimate absolute Truth regarding the Nature of Things." This curative function, this revealing of the nature of things, is hindered by, "trivial truths of detail . . . Such petty conformations place in the foreground the superficialities of sense experience" (p. 272).

I am reminded by this passage how some "Art" fails to be great or even good by attention to "superficialities of sense experience." The black velvet paintings we see for sale on street corners are admired for the sensual glow that the velvet takes on when smeared with vivid, metallic colors. Better still, if, on the cheek of the large-eyed child, the artist has painted a three-dimensional teardrop that is "so real you want to touch it." This detail, this pseudo-reality in Art is parallel to the pseudo-realities of sentimentality that so often replace true empathy in the moral domain.

An essential part of the ongoing process is "Adventure," lest inspiration lead to mere repetition. The process is the actuality and the processes of the past, in their perishing are themselves energizing as the complex origin of each novel occasion. "The past is the reality at the base of each new actuality. The process is its absorption into a new unity with ideals and with anticipation, by the operation of the creative Eros" (p. 276). Adventure has as its goal Harmony. Our life is dominated by enduring things, individual

things experienced as a unity of many occasions. Each individual occasion collects into its unity the shifting qualities of its many occasions. Such enduring individualities "control a wealth of feeling, an amplitude of purpose and a regulative power to subdue into background the residue of things belonging to the immensity of the past" (p. 280). In other words, Harmony puts a multitude of individualities into perspective, giving one the dimensions and coming-togetherness of the whole. No individual is lost in the Harmony; in fact, in contributing to the whole each detail "receives an access of grandeur from the whole, and yet manifests an individuality claiming attention in its own right" (p. 282). Whitehead goes on to use the example of the cathedral of Chartres where the sculpture and tracery subserve the harmony. "They lead the eye upward to the vaulting above, and they lead the eye horizontally to the supreme symbolism of the altar. They claim attention by their beauty of detail. Yet they shun attention by guiding the eye to grasp the significance of the whole" (p. 282). Harmony has the religious quality of putting everything into perspective.

Finally Peace, the harmony of harmonies, is a beckoning to go beyond limitations, to transcend the self without, of course, denying the self. Peace is the integration of order and love, the essence of art and morality, bound together as they are by Beauty.

Whitehead should have the last word: "Here by the quality of Peace I am not referring to political relations. I mean a quality of mind steady in its reliance that fine action is treasured in the nature of things" (p. 274).

With this beautiful and profound statement, Whitehead does indeed have the "last word" but, as ever in the process, it is a word of transition, a word of "going on" and it leads us to new insights into the harmony of Whitehead with Dabrowski. If ever there was a psychological theory concerned with "quality of mind" it is Positive Disintegration. If ever there was a theory concerned with "fine feeling" and "fine action" it is Dabrowski's. The two great men, Whitehead and Dabrowski, come together especially in their concept of man as moralist—how man knows morality and how he is motivated to pursue it.

Following Whitehead's lead, which, we have acknowledged, goes back ultimately to Plato, I would like to pursue the topic of moral development in the theory of Positive Disintegration by paralleling the levels of aesthetic development with those of ethical development. I think we will see that Dabrowski is basically expressing process thought.

Dabrowski's Theory

What I am doing here is taking Dabrowski's description of the levels of development of the aesthetic attitude (1977, pp. 144-147) and paralleling them with his levels of development of ethics as a discipline (pp. 217-219) since he doesn't seem to have published any explicit outline of the levels of individual moral development. The parallels are clear, between aesthetic sensitivity and moral sensitivity through the five levels he describes.

Level I

Aesthetics. This is the "bread and circuses" mentality toward art. A distinct preference for loudness and bigness is evident. If a car is big it is beautiful. If a building is "the biggest in the world" it is the best and most beautiful. The *Guinness Book of World Records* becomes a manual of aesthetics. New is equated with beautiful. Beauty is often confused with utility. In art a kind of primitive realism is the criterion of goodness. Does it look exactly like what it is supposed to represent? There is a preference for sense of realism using mass production media as in the landscapes painted by an "artist" in the middle of a shopping mall, each picture just a rearrangement of the standard houses, trees and mountains found in all the other paintings that surround him. Or the "special effects" realism of the black velvet paintings with the exaggerated realism of a sentimental teardrop on a child's cheek. This is a kind of pathological form of art which Whitehead referred to. It takes a low level in Dabrowski's thinking too.

Ethics. In level one, ethics are at a very primitive animal level. The law of the jungle prevails. Might equals right and leaders are followed blindly primarily because of their ability to punish. Blame is passed on to others by the simple explanation, "I was only doing what I was told." One is reminded of Watergate and the Hitler regime where ethical reasoning stopped at the point of thinking that if the President (or Fuehrer) said it was right it must be. A very egocentric level of moral reasoning, comparable to Kohlberg's punishment avoidance level or at the most, the good boy-good girl orientation. Dabrowski says (1977, p. 218): "there is a distinct tendency to identify others with oneself, but never to identify oneself with others."

Level II

Aesthetics. Partial sensitivities to color, dance, music and art begin to appear, but aesthetic experiences are not involved in a search for new and higher levels of experience. In other words, Whitehead's "Adventure" does not yet enter into aesthetics.

Largely, the motto of this level is "Art for Art's sake" although human experiences begin to act as stimuli for aesthetic experiences, leading to the beginnings of psychological, and not merely realistic, content in art.

Ethics. Profound egocentrism begins to yield to an initial empathy and identification with others, but this is a fluctuating, off again on again affair. Feelings for others in the form of primitive syntony begin to emerge parallel to the emergence of psychological content in appreciation of art. There is little moral reflection, no clear moral principles and relativism is characteristic of morality. There is no adventure into new personal ways of moral thinking; conformity to the mores of the crowd dictates morality.

Level III

Aesthetics. Disintegration and decay enter into artistic expression showing fragmentation of faces, features and bodies. There is an obsession with pathology, perhaps the result of a restless search for Truth in art, but a truth which is still rather subjective and distorted. An understanding and appreciation for the drama of life begins to find its way into the expression of art and into its appreciation. Others and self begin to be involved in this drama. Art becomes the expression of personal, religious and moral strivings. There are, Dabrowski says (p. 145) "Unharmonized reaches into the depth of human experience." Whether he was influenced by Whitehead to use the theme of Harmony not yet achieved to describe this level I do not know, but the convergence with Whitehead is clear. The level III person does not yet have that harmony which Whitehead described as essential for art at its fullest.

One feels the need to comprehend pathology not as a source of fascination but to understand the role of suffering and illness in development—the *agonia* of the Greek athlete, straining painfully for the goal. The conflict within people and between people that is the source of great drama is appreciated and expressed. A hierarchy of values can now be expressed in art with empathy as one of the highest values. The beginnings of intuition

appear based on a hierarchy of feelings. One is reminded here of the words of Whitehead (1967, p. 271), "Art heightens the sense of humanity. It gives an elation of feeling which is supernatural."

Ethics. Egocentrism decreases with an increase of empathy. This movement away from egocentrism is the result of dynamisms of dissatisfaction with oneself, feelings of inferiority toward oneself—a sense of the lack of harmony and beauty in one's life.

Values are distinguished, lower from higher, and with this hierarchy of values and aims, one is moved into the Adventure of ascending toward the higher levels.

Moral principles begin to emerge based on compassion and helpfulness, and founded in a deep, though still partial, identification with others. Intuition takes one to the core of moral problems without trial and error.

Level IV

Aesthetics. "Nothing human is alien to me." Responsiveness to the drama and tragedy of real life gives rise to a need to express them and appreciate them in art. Religious drama and the drama of conflict of values is more appreciated. Identification with others becomes more complete and the artist toils with his sense of self identity and identity with his work of art. Art becomes a function of growing calmness and inner peace, concentration, meditation and contemplation. This is the synthesis, the Harmony and the Peace which Whitehead describes.

Meditation and contemplation contribute to the growth of intuition. The framework for intuitive appreciation is much broader because it is taken from a wider frame of reference. "Knowledge is easily applied to particular phenomena because perception is multilevel and multidimensional, having its source in the highest level which organizes in an all encompassing and yet precise manner, all the lower levels of reality" (Dabrowski, 1977, p. 152). Appreciation of the "rightness" of a work of art is objectively founded even though criteria cannot be spelled out in a catalogue of detail. It is a sense of "rightness" largely emotional, based upon overexcitabilities. One may wish to use Whitehead's term: "fineness of feeling."

Ethics. Understanding, compassion and helpfulness toward others are active, even when one cannot approve of the principles and conduct of others as conforming to one's own personality ideal. One is attracted to

authentic moral systems (those based on conscious individual responsibility) such as Christianity in the form it came from its Founder. Morality becomes an harmonious complex of individuals, each conscious of and contributing his own individuality which is not lost but enhanced in its contribution to the whole—a high synergy society in which "My good must be your good or it's no good at all." The organism is enhanced, beautified, when each individual is treasured for their unique contribution of value to the process. One is again reminded of Whitehead's concept of harmony and the example he used of the Chartres Cathedral.

Level V

Aesthetic-ethical-intuitive (At this level the three converge). A high level of empathy is expressed in art which becomes a synthesis of science and philosophy, goodness and wisdom. Beauty dances hand in hand with morality because religion, art and morality are now united in a harmony that sees them as inseparable. A man like St. Francis of Assisi exemplifies this (Dabrowski, 1977, p. 147). Moral principles are explained on the basis of personality and its ideal. Intuition is given an important role in discriminating levels of reality, and this intuition is, in turn, based upon the personality ideal. Such intuition is contemplative and mystical, and comes from contemplation, even ecstasy. It comes from reaching the absolute "I" and the absolute "Thou" in relationship. In reaching moral principles and in moving one to act morally, importance is given to a highly developed empathy and the ability to treat others as subjective beings. Transcendental moral ideas are given weight and validity. Objectivity of value judgments is achieved in the fine feeling, intuition, harmony and peace which mark this highest level of development.

The image of this section is one of spirals, interlocking, merging spirals. If, following Teilhard de Chardin, we believe that "all that rises must converge," then we see in the rising of Whitehead and Dabrowski to greater levels of human understanding a remarkable convergence of thought.

1. First they are both concerned very much with man at his best—what man might be. They are idealists in the best sense of the word.
2. But, secondly, they are realists too and they, each in their own way, see humans at various levels of development, various levels of contributing to value in the process. Each individual is valued for his or her unique

contribution to the process, but the contribution of each is in proportion to their developmental potential, especially to the level of consciousness and willing involvement in contributing value to the process of human development.

3. Thirdly, both men valued beauty and the search for truth. To me Dabrowski was a man who exuded, even in his old age, the adventure of which Whitehead wrote. Where other psychologies grow from the cold ground of "objective" experimentation, Dabrowski's grew from the warmth of his own fineness of feeling. Dabrowski's theory, his art, was always sensitive and empathic but never sentimental.
4. A fourth characteristic that unites the two is a concern with man as member of the community. Each sought to preserve the integrity of the individual as he gave himself to the building of the universe. Whitehead did it with his concept of harmony by which the individual with his self perfection contributed to the whole without losing himself. Dabrowski did it with his concept of higher level individuals who combine within themselves autonomy, authenticity and fidelity to oneself, with altruism, empathy and involvement in the real world.

It is obvious that the preceding as a theory of moral justification does not fit neatly into any of the classical categories. It is definitely not naturalistic or cognitive, although it does not exclude real contact with things as they are. It is not intuitionism in the Platonic sense although it leans heavily on the importance of intuition in the broad psychological sense. Although it stresses the role of emotions in moral judgment making, it is not the one-sided emotivism of Hume or Scheler, placing as it does more emphasis on the psychological processes of the whole person. It is a religious approach but not in the narrowly theistic sense of God as an arbitrary source of morality revealed to us through human sources. The emphasis on individual conscious responsibility for moral judgments and moral behavior is too strong for that overly simplistic low level view of mankind. The question arises, How then do we explain the relationship of religion and morality without being simplistic but without watering down either religion or morality into something so frequently labeled as being "merely humanistic?" It is popular in many religious circles to label whatever is not according to the individual's conception of traditional religion as being "mere secular humanism." We have struck this nerve before and it brings us back again to

the main theme of this book: that true religion is found in the highest levels of human development; that humanness is not something "mere" but glorious in its transcendence and participatory in all that we call God. It remains to explain how all of this comes about. And if ideas are to be "Adventures" then that is the task to which we should next set ourselves.

Religious Experience and Morals

The Canadian theologian Bernard Lonergan together with Whitehead are our guides here. Lonergan, throughout his writing, tells us that religious experience involves consciousness rather than only knowledge. In dealing with religious experience one is in a realm in which love precedes knowledge, for Lonergan uses the term religious experience to refer to an individual's awareness of being in love with transcendent mystery. It is love which first takes hold of our lives and transforms them; from this the knowledge of God emerges. Lonergan is using the word "conscious" in a special sense. One can be conscious of being in love without restriction and not know it. Once you know the love and know that it is unrestricted, you can infer that it refers to an absolute being—that you have a love relationship with an absolute being, God.

> What finally is religion but complete self-transcendence? It is the love of God poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit that is given to us (Rom. 5:5) . . . That love is not this or that act of loving, but a radical being-in-love . . . a principle that keeps us out of sin, that moves us to prayer and to penance, that can become that ever so quiet yet passionate center of all our living . . . it is otherworldly, a being-in-love that occurs within this world but heads beyond it, for no finite object or person can be the object of unqualified, unconditional loving. Such unconditional being-in-love actuates to the full the dynamic potentiality of the human spirit with its unrestricted reach and, as a full actuation, it is fulfilment, deep-set peace, the peace the world cannot give, abiding joy, the joy that remains despite humiliation and failure and privation and pain. (1974, p. 129)

Our themes are reemerging—the discovery in love of a deep relationship this time with God, bringing with it the harmony and peace that are the fruit of development, finding joy after failure, privation and pain.

Lonergan says that this complete being-in-love, the gift of Grace is the reason of the heart that reason does not know. It is religious experience by

which we enter into a subject-to-subject relation with God.

Religious experience is at a level which Lonergan calls Intentional Consciousness—the existential level of evaluation and love. Lonergan can therefore describe reigious experience as the transvaluation of all values.

> Like all being in love, as distinct from particular acts of loving, it is a first principle. So far from resulting from our knowledge and choice, it dismantles and abolishes the horizon within which our knowing and choosing went on, and it sets up a new horizon within which the love of God transvalues our values and the eyes of that love transform our knowing. (p. 172)

Kathleen Fischer points out in her paper, "Religious Experience in Lonergan and Whitehead," (1980, pp. 69-79) that, "it is in his emphasis on value and on the extensiveness of love that Lonergan's description of the core religious experience bears most resemblance to Whitehead's." Whitehead in *Religion in the Making* describes religious experience as the intuition of immediate occasions as failing or succeeding in reference to a relevant ideal: so far as the conformity is incomplete, there is evil in the world. Whitehead goes to great pains to make it clear that there is no direct intuition of a definite person or individual, but rather a rightness in things which the individual may choose to conform to or not is intuited. Deity accounts for importance, value, and a sense of worth beyond ourselves. This is the realm of transcendent values. Kathleen Fischer points out that just as Lonergan has his grace in the form of being in love in an unqualified way, so does the Peace which Whitehead speaks of in *Adventures of Ideas* come as a gift—a grace.

> God is the source both of the values which move individuals and civilizations, and of their movement toward those values. Both life and thought are sustained by a dim apprehension of the beyond. Whenever and however peace comes, it is the result of an intuition into the final beauty of the universe, and a trust in its efficacy beyond the power of reason to discern the details. (p. 73)

Cognitive beliefs as such are not enough for religion or morality. For Lonergan the trivialities of limited love are overcome by religious experience; for Whitehead Peace or the experience of God, comes with an enlargement of one's powers, an expansion of consciousness and the calmness that comes from this harmony. For Dabrowski, the love of God found in

reflection and prayer leads to the highest levels of empathy and love for mankind. For all three, it is religion as a powerful consciousness that overcomes trivialities, brings figure out of ground giving that perspective on life and one's relationships with it that is the essence of religious experience. All that rises must converge.

Chapter X

The Ways of Moral Education

"Teach us to care . . ."
—T.S. Eliot

We turn our attention now to the practical domain of how moral education is carried out, or, more conclusively, how people change their moral ideas and behavior or have them changed by others. I have chosen the word "Ways" rather than the more abstract term "theories" or "systems" because we are talking here about the practical ways in which moral education can be carried out, and we include some "ways" which really could not be considered well thought out systems or theories formulated by any explicit school of education. There are many ways in which moral education takes place and authors have described unique and sometimes elaborate systems of moral education. But I have chosen six ways which I think represent the mainstreams of moral education: Traditional Character Education, Psychoanalytic, Behavioristic, Values Clarification, Cognitive-Developmental and Emotional-Rational. They form the colors of a spectrum. Each one I have approached from the point of view of Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and Education. Each is concluded with a discussion of the expected outcome of that way in terms of the kind of person we expect to come out of the particular method of moral education. This includes at least implicitly a certain view of the nature of man and what the "desirable kind of person is like, bringing us back again to the underlying philosophy of the system or method of moral education. For each of the disciplines, philosophy, sociology, and so on I have posed a summarizing question. It does not, of course, encompass all the questions each discipline asks about moral education, but serves to pinpoint the approach of each discipline. Let us look at each "way" in turn.

Traditional Character Education—Indoctrination

Traditional character education, which is the most ancient of all the ways of moral education, encompasses the traditional approach of teacher and student, master and novice, guru and disciple. In many cases, probably the majority, with the exception of some Eastern approaches in which the master induces the disciple to find enlightenment for himself, this way of moral education depends heavily upon indoctrination. Tradition (the same tradition they sing about in "Fiddler on the Roof") passes on the wisdom of one's forefathers to neophytes. Specific rules of behavior and values that have served well in the past are to be passed on, and the task of the teacher is to make sure they are passed on *unchanged*. Following a static world view, the traditionalist thinks it is essential that what was good for centuries before must be good now. One must keep watch over ancient values.

Philosophy: What is Moral?

Philosophy asks the question, "What is moral?" And the answer is that that which we have traditionally done and found to work is moral and good and to be preserved. Society at large, but institutions (in particular the *religious* institutions) have the largest role in determining what is moral and the punishments involved in transgressing these norms. Morality in this system is usually expressed in terms of specific rules and laws of behavior coupled with canonical norms for handling the transgressor. Values may sometimes be fostered directly, but more often are inferred from the rules. Values, when they are taught, are expressed in terms of specific virtues (a "bag of virtues" as Kohlberg calls them) such as honesty, hard work, bravery, cleanliness, purity, loyalty, friendliness, helpfulness—the kind of thing the Boy Scout and Girl Guide system is built upon: inculcating specific virtues. Another physical embodiment of this approach can be found in the stained glass windows of the legislative buildings in Victoria, British Columbia There one sees the virtues of the protestant ethic such as industriousness, initiative, and integrity, glorified in the stained glass windows dedicated to each virtue.

What is moral? What the old reliable institutions of society have "always" told us is moral. In an unchanging world there's certainly no need to change anything, least of all morality! The task is to pass it on unchanged.

Sociology: What is the State of Society?

Sociology in our paradigm asks the central question: What is the state of society? From the moral point of view, society's moral norms are like a medieval castle under siege from the forces of change. Traditional values are always under threat and need guarding to preserve good order. This good order can be passed on to future generations if the forces of change are held back. Change is at least suspect if not downright corrupting. The salvation of wayward citizens is to return to traditional values.

Psychology: How do People Change Their Moral Behavior?

What are the psychological dynamics by which one becomes more moral, or, more generally, how does one change one's moral ideas, inclinations and behavior? The process is largely one of direct teaching of virtues by word of mouth or good example. The direct teaching may include learning to name certain virtues and recognize them. Reward and punishment play a predominant role; they may be in this life in the form of merit points, gold stars or the esteem of important people like parents, Sunday school teachers or religious leaders or the chastisement these same people can hand out whether in the form of physical punishment or feelings of shame and guilt and rejection. Religion has the extra punishing power and rewarding power of "the next life" with the threat of eternal fires or an "eternal crown of glory."

Association with good people, those who protect and encourage the traditional values, is important. This has the twofold function of shielding the individual from corrupting ideas and encouraging him to learn virtue by the good example of others. Good example in turn comes from two sources; those immediately present to the child in the roles of parents, teachers and so on, and those who are examples from afar—heroes and heroines of virtue, often recognized by a church as saints.

The psychological process of modeling and identification (Bandura & Walters, 1963) is used as a powerful means of affecting moral behavior. Since the traditional indoctrination approach has much to do with the processes of socialization, it shares with the behavioristic approach a strong tendency to use identification with models. But the traditional approach does not openly stress that the model be powerful so much as exemplary, nor is it always important that the model be warm and loving—only exemplary.

Education

How do teachers teach morals? Basically the answer to this question is that teachers expound specific virtues, clarifying their meaning of "honesty," "loyalty," "kindness" by going to examples from the lives of holy people, or to encourage identification, from catechetical stories involving children who practice virtue. Reward and punishment are powerful tools in the hands of the teacher as is the good example of the teacher's own behavior. Thus teachers are to be selected carefully as models of virtue, and as part of the over-all concern of this kind of moral education to protect the child from corrupting influences and ideas that would lead him away from the accepted norms.

How do students learn morals? The process is largely a passive one. The child's role is not to oppose or argue or even think for himself, it is to accept and learn the rules of behavior, memorizing them if necessary, receiving punishment for any infringement on them and correcting his peers when they show weakness.

Outcome: What Kind of Person Results?

What kind of a person do we have as a result of this education? Built upon a rigidly structured and unchanging concept of both society and the make-up of the human person, the traditional indoctrination approach is content with a passively accepting person who does not question but obediently keeps rules and passes them on to others faithfully, thus protecting the unchanging standards of society. This approach does not see the individual as particularly directive of his own life nor does it give a high place to consciousness or individual freedom. Will is not something to be encouraged but tamed. Feelings are seen largely as motivating forces in the sense that they are used to influence behavior in the form of fear, shame and guilt. The stress is on intellect—right understanding of what society expects of you and conformity to those expectations. Autonomy and self-direction are not only neglected but deliberately avoided since they may lead to non-conformity. The individual is not seen as being self directive or particularly responsible for anything except holding fast, obediently to tradition.

Psychoanalytic (Freudian) Tradition—Identification

I have used the word "tradition" here in an effort to encompass the vast varieties of psychologies that may be called Psychoanalytic. To say that there is *one* psychoanalytic view of moral education would be a gross oversimplification. We have already seen that some of Freud's immediate disciples such as Jung differed from him vastly, and neo-Freudian psychologists like Erich Fromm and Erik Erikson have played such variations on the psychoanalytic theme that it is impossible to neatly categorize it as *an* approach to moral education. Perhaps it is best at this moment to look at the psychoanalytic view as a "tradition" traced back to Freud, and, to understand the roots of that family tree, go back to its founding father, Freud himself.

Philosophy: What is Moral?

In the Psychoanalytic or Freudian tradition, morality is defined in terms of the cultural superego, the collective body of experience and tradition maintained within society. This cultural superego has its genesis in the "impressions left behind them by great leading personalities, men of outstanding force of mind, or men in whom some one human tendency has developed in unusual strength and purity" (Freud, 1952a, p. 800). These impressions become the values, the moral expectations, the guidelines for the present zeitgeist and future evolution of society. Society's standards, moral expectations and ideals which derive from these societal values are in turn transmitted to the individual members of society by its institutions of authority, and in the case of children, by their parents and those who represent parental authority.

Sociology: What is the State of Society?

Society, according to Freud, serves one primary function: it protects its members from nature—human nature (1973, p. 11). All men have an innate instinctual predisposition to aggression such that,

> men are not gentle, friendly creatures wishing for love, who simply defend themselves if they are attacked, but . . . a powerful measure of desire for aggression has to be reckoned with as a part of their instinctual endowment. (1952a, p. 787)

Society's role, then, is to impose limits and constraints which will regulate human interaction and control the expression of aggression; in sum, protect man from himself. The development of culture which accompanies the establishment of ethical systems, ideal standards and moral values is intended to curb the instinctual nature of man sufficiently for society or civilization to be possible. Whether or not this process will be successful remains to be seen. As Freud somberly reminds his readers:

> The fateful question of the human species seems to me to be whether and to what extent the cultural process developed in it will succeed in mastering the derangements of communal life caused by the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction. (p. 802)

Yet precisely because society seeks to impose bounds upon man's instinctual predispositions, the future of society hangs in an uneasy balance. The threat of societal collapse looms imminent should the civilizing forces lose their influence even momentarily. By the same token, the very presence of human instincts makes any cultural gain the result of a difficult struggle.

> For the masses are lazy and unintelligent, they have no love for instinctual renunciation, and they are not to be convinced by argument of its inevitability; and the individuals composing them support one another in giving free rein to their indiscipline. (1973, pp. 3-4)

Not surprisingly, then, order is maintained through coercion, and it is this imposed regulation that accounts for the major problems of society.

Society exerts its moral authority on two levels, the most evident being that of the rules and regulations by which everyday life abides; and the second, residing in the psychological responses of shame and guilt which are manifestations of the superego function. These two levels upon which societal authority is exercised represent the distinction between, and transition from external to internal coercion. External authority, the laws and regulations of society gradually become internalized to form the superego. Since the internalization of societal demands does not eradicate instinctual nature, but rather, calls for an every increasing "neglect of instinctual realities" (Rieff, 1979, p. 312), man becomes increasingly

miserable and inwardly hostile as civilization progresses. The general malaise reaches a point where neurosis develops as a means of dealing with society's continued denial of the instinctual nature of man. As Freud observed,

> It was found that men become neurotic because they cannot tolerate the degree of privation that society imposes on them in virtue of its cultural ideas, and it was supposed that a return to greater possibilities of happiness would ensue if these standards were abolished or greatly relaxed. (1952a, p. 777)

As a result of this paradoxical situation, this double bind, Freud pronounced that "every individual is virtually an enemy of civilization, though civilization is supposed to be an object of universal human interest" (1973, p. 2). It is the resentment engendered by the unrelenting promotion of culture and cultural ideas at the expense of man's instinctual nature that results in outbreaks of violence, war and revolution. War becomes a "massive balancing of the psychic budget, bringing ethically bankrupt humans back to living within their means" (Rieff, 1979, p. 313). In conclusion, the price of civilization and society is neurosis and periodic violence and bloodshed. What is the state of society? Tragic: man cannot live without civilization, nor can he abide within it; no amount or quality of man's moral values or standards can ameliorate the situation, only exacerbate it.

Psychology: How do People Change Their Moral Behavior?

Individual moral development is a two stage process in psychoanalytic thought. The first of these stages belongs to the pre-superego period of life, early childhood; and the second—characterized by the emergence of superego influence upon behavior—in later childhood. Only with the development of the superego does the child become a moral and social being (1973, p. 7).

As described above, the community superego, society's ensemble of moral expectations, rules and regulations, ideal standards, is transmitted to its individual members through its institutions. In this manner the contents of the societal superego are internalized by the individual to constitute the personal superego. Thus every man becomes a guardian of the community's past, its traditions and culture.

Parents, and those who share their role in the care and upbringing of children, embody the moral authority of society; they are responsible for transmitting society's expectations to the child. In the early years of a child's life parental dominance and coercion regulate the child's behavior. Gradually, however, these demands are internalized by the child and the personal superego begins to crystallize and function. When the superego assumes the role of external authority and leads the child to live by society's standards, the child is considered to be socialized (Hall & Lindzey, 1954, p. 165).

In demanding conformity to society's demands, the child's newly formed superego perpetuates his parents' superego and its characteristics almost *in toto:*

> It takes over the same content, it becomes the vehicle of tradition and of all the age-long values which have been handed down in this way from generation to generation. (Freud, 1952b, p. 834)

The superego forms in opposition to the ego, it regulates the actions of the ego just as the parents controlled the child early in life (p. 832). Shame and guilt result from the tension between the superego's moral demands and the desires of the ego. The controlling power of guilt arises from two sources: the dread of parental authority and, later, the dread of the superego (Freud, 1952a, p. 793). Since the superego knows even the innermost desires and inclinations of the ego, it acts as an even harsher judge than did the parents in early childhood. All the ego's secrets are laid bare before the scrutiny of the superego; the guilty ego stands accused and fit for punishment. The due punishment is administered by the superego through the voice of conscience which is essentially no more than man's aggressive instinct assumed by the superego and redirected inwardly against the ego. Freud noted,

> The aggressiveness is introjected, *internalized*; in fact, it is sent back where it came from, i.e., directed against the ego. It is there taken over by a part of the ego that distinguishes itself from the rest as a superego, and now, in the form of *conscience*, exercises the same propensity to harsh aggressiveness against the ego that the ego would have liked to enjoy against others. The tension between the strict superego and the subordinate ego we call the *sense of guilt*; it manifests itself as the need for punishment. (p. 792)

Freud characterized the superego as the heir to the Oedipus complex (1952b, p. 833). Indeed, proper superego formation can occur only when the Oedipus complex is adequately resolved and overcome. Briefly, the Oedipus complex represents the child's intense desire to sexually possess one or both parents as love objects. However, fear of parental reprisals induces the child to deny and repress his desire for the love object and the mode of possessing it. But although the child may give up his sexual attachment to one or both parents, through identification he can compensate for the loss of the coveted parent. Identification with the desired parent serves to recreate the foresaken love object in the child's ego and restore it to his possession.

> If one has lost a love-object or has had to give it up, one often compensates oneself by identifying oneself with it; one sets it up again inside one's ego, so that in this case object-choice regresses, as it were, to identification. (p. 833)

Identification with the parents following in the wake of the Oedipal complex is clearly essential to the proper development of the child's superego: for only through identification do the parental values, and the expectations of society they represent, become the moral and cultural property of the child. In other words, only with identification does socialization occur and can moral ideas change.

Education

How do teachers teach morals? In view of the influence of parents and parental figures on the development of the superego in children, it follows that the single most effective way for teachers to transmit society's moral values is to actively model them in their daily interactions with pupils. In this way teachers, who, after the parents, are the most significant authority figures in a child's life, offer their ideal model to the identification process and the formation of the superego. Demonstrating warmth and acceptance of the child facilitates identification with the teacher. Additionally, since identification is dependent upon the resolution of the Oedipus complex, it is useful for the teacher to understand the workings of the complex in order to assist the child in dealing with it.

As a man of his time, Freud believed that the answer to many of the world's woes would be furnished through man's rational faculties; morality

being no exception. In Freud's view, a new chapter in mankind's moral history will begin to unfold when the instincts, for whose control moral teachings exist, are submitted to the reshaping influence of rational tutelage (Rieff, 1979, p. 313). Society's malaise will diminish as increased emphasis upon rationality in education produces:

> New generations, who have been brought up in kindness and taught to have a high opinion of reason, and who have experienced the benefits of civilization at an early age, will have a different attitude to it. (Freud, 1973, p. 4)

Only through reason can man's profound resentment at the degree of instinctual privation imposed upon him be disarmed; and this, as he comes to understand and accept the necessity of instinctual sacrifice for society's sake. On the other hand, much of the violence in society can be traced as a reaction to civilization's exaggerated moral aspirations. Society demands of its members a standard of behavior and moral conformity which is well beyond the capacities of many. Frustrated by this state of affairs, some individuals respond with aggression. Part of the solution to the dilemma of morality may naturally be education in the use of reason; the other may necessitate an inevitable lowering of society's moral expectations (Rieff, 1979, p. 274).

How do students learn morals? From the Psychoanalytic perspective, the single most important factor in moral development is the child's social context and, more specifically, his relationship with his parents and significant others. Through modeling and identification, parental and societal values are incorporated into the child's superego. Whereas previous to the emergence of the superego, the child was controlled by means of parental coercion, the superego embodies and perpetuates the parents' authority and regulates the child's behavior through the use of shame, guilt and conscience.

In order to learn moral behavior the child must be presented with an ideal model, usually one or both of the parents, whose values the child will adopt as part of the identification process following upon the Oedipus complex. Secondary ideal models, teachers, heroes, etc., also have a certain impact upon the child's growing moral character, but in general these models only supplement the parental influence. The teacher can only hope that the values presented in the classroom will correspond to those modeled in the

home. If these conditions prevail in a context of warmth and caring, Psychoanalytic theory would expect the modeled moral values to become part of the child's superego.

Outcomes: What Kind of Person Results?

If the process of identification and superego formation is successfully completed, Freudian theory would expect the individual to have integrated and to be able to demonstrate a socially acceptable level of moral behavior. The child at this point would be controlled not by fear of parental authority, but through dread of superego punishment by guilt and conscience. In order to avoid the unpleasant feelings of shame and guilt, the child must behave morally, that is, according to society's standards and values.

On the contrary, since the price of moral behavior is the suppression of fundamental instinctual desires for the sake of community life, the moral individual often unconsciously harbours deep-seated feelings of resentment and frustration against the social order which force him to renounce so many natural satisfactions. His level of frustration or "discontent" may occasionally exceed his personal tolerance threshold resulting in outbreaks of immoral or otherwise anti-social behavior or again, neurosis and other forms of mental illness. This is how Freud saw the process of moral development within his own society, yet he did not consider this approach to the origins of morality to be the only one. Rather, he insisted that education to morality in the future could proceed along two paths: first, a revision of society's moral aspirations, that is, a lowering of the societal standards that would take into consideration the realities of human nature and; second, the development of man's rational faculties in the appreciation of society's benefits and the necessity of limiting instinctual drives in the interests of the human community.

The individual resulting from this type of moral education would be what Freud called a "third Adam," a man who is no longer controlled by shame and guilt nor subject to violent aggression of the moral conscience. The morality of this new Adam will be characterized he says by rational awareness of human nature and instinctual realities; he will make conscious decisions to forego personal instinctual satisfaction for the sake of society. Morality, then, will no longer mean an unwilling or unconscious subjugation to external authority made internal, but a rational and

conscious choice to endure instinctual privation for the choice to be moral within the community.

Freud, despite all the gloominess, had somewhat noble dreams of what men and women might be, given the proper kind of moral education—more rational, more fully conscious, with the principles of morality centered within the person and not coming from some extrinsic, societal source. But still there remained that enmity between society and the individual. Freud saw this antagonism between the individual's instinctive goals and the goals of society as at least a shadowy threat always lurking in the background. His vision does not encompass that harmony between the individual and the collective that Whitehead described as both desirable and possible. Freud missed the religious vision of that peace created by the harmony of individuality and relatedness. Perhaps, ironically, Freud's system fails because it is not religious.

Socialization—Behavioristic Approaches

Philosophy: What is Moral?

From the behavioral or social learning perspective, moral education is but one of the many types of education the child receives as a member of society. An individual is said to be socialized when his behaviors and attitudes correspond to the standards and attitudes of his parent society, giving him the ability to function adequately within the community. As such, one of the major roles of socialization is to effect a practical means of social control. To this end,

> socialization efforts are designed to lead the new member to adhere to the norms of the larger society or of the particular group into which he is being incorporated and to commit him to its future. The group's values are at least to be recognized by him as having legitimacy. (Clausen, 1968, p. 6)

In social learning theory moral behavior is dependent not upon maturational or developmental processes but upon learning and conditioning through the rewarding of appropriate behaviors and attitudes. This distinction is extremely important in social learning.

What then constitutes morality in social learning theory? Majority consensus, the opinion of the group. Morality and moral behavior refers to the

ensemble of behaviors and attitudes which society in general values as right or appropriate. Following this definition,

> moral behavior is behavior a social group defines as good or right and for which the social group administers sanctions. Moral values are beliefs, again shared in a social group, about what is good or right. (Maccoby, 1968, p. 229)

Consequently, the moral person is he who demonstrates the greatest number of desirable or "good" behaviors and attitudes. This is a quantitative approach.

Sociology: What is the State of Society?

Moral values, by virtue of the way society defines them and chooses to abide by them, are not fixed or immutable but vary from place to place and time to time according to the consensus of the majority. In all but the most static, stable societies, moral standards and norms are in a continual state of flux as interpretations and applications of rules and principles change, are redefined or modified by the evolving nature of society (Clausen, 1968, p. 6). In the process of becoming socialized, the child adopts whatever moral values are prevailing in his social context, or he does not and remains either amoral, immoral, or premoral in his society's view, but it is inconceivable for him to espouse another system of morality. As Maccoby informs her readers, "[In social learning theory] there is no provision . . . for a new generation to acquire a set of values systematically *different* from those held by their parents" (1968, p. 245).

Society, although its moral standards and values may be in perpetual motion, still maintains a remarkable cohesion and exerts its control over the individual. Given the time span of generations, the majority consensus regarding particular values may change with attendant effects upon community moral expectations and norms, but as the transmission of values proceeds from parent to child, the chain of tradition is maintained more or less intact although individual links may be replaced. With the passing of a number of generations the chain may come to be composed of more new links than old, and so the process goes on; but the chain of tradition remains.

Psychology: How do People Change Their Moral Behavior?

From the point of view of social learning theory, children learn moral behavior through two primary modalities: identification with powerful role models, and reinforcement of appropriate behavior. Identification and modeling here are understood in a more impersonal sense than in the Freudian tradition whose concepts of superego and ego Bandura and Walters consider burdened with "surplus meaning" that tends to overly "personify the controlling forces" (1963, p. 162). In response, social learning theorists seek to demonstrate how moral behavior results not from the identification with and integration of parental superego values, but rather from social training and reinforcing of desired behaviors and attitudes.

As in psychoanalysis the acquisition of moral behavior also involves both external and internal sanctions which exert control through shame and guilt. However, in social learning these responses do not represent an integration of the parental authority but rather the activation of a conditioned response. "Guilt," write Bandura and Walters,

> is mediated by an internal moral agent, which originated and developed from sanctions imposed by the parents or other primary socializing agents, but which is now completely independent of an individual's current social experiences. (p. 163)

Clearly the moral individual has acquired, through conditioning and reinforcement, at least the minimum number of society's behavioral expectations. Parents do contribute significantly to the moral formation of a child, but the greatest influence rests with the agent who holds the power of reward and punishment—usually, but not necessarily, the parents. The contents of morality take the form of various rules and ordinances, obedience to which is rewarded and reinforced by the parents, teachers and society at large. In the process of learning appropriate behavior, the controlling responses of shame and guilt are also conditioned into the child's moral character. Evidently, morality in this view has no link with maturational or developmental processes but is completely a matter of learned behavioral responses to various stimuli.

Education

How do teachers teach morals? The moral educator, from a social learning perspective, need not undertake any activity appreciably different from that of any other teacher. Social learning theory sees morality as essentially no more than the integration and adequate performance of a set of behaviors defined by society as moral. As with any behavior, what one would call moral behavior is acquired through conditioning. In the course of normal education the teacher rewards the child for displays of socially acceptable, moral behavior in the appropriate situations. Thus the principles of moral education follow the same fundamental principles of learning theory in general. As Maccoby explains:

> For social learning theorists, the acquisition of moral behavior and values is not different in any significant way from the acquisition of any other class of behavior. If one wishes to understand the acquisition of morality, one must study the processes which underlie the acquisition of any behavior, that is to say, the processes of learning. (1968, p. 241)

How do students learn morals? Following the above, children learn moral behavior as they do any other type of behavior. They are presented with role models early in life, models whose influence tends to persist and is reinforced as part of socialization. In this view children are not active moral agents seeking out their own norms or moral behavior, but passive, almost the classical blank slates upon which society engraves its moral expectations. Theoretically, as long as a strong enough reward is present, children will accept whatever example their models hold forth as desirable behavior. Through proper modeling and rewarding this technique would produce very acceptable moral individuals. Nonetheless, in spite of the seeming simplicity and clarity of this approach to moral education a serious reservation surfaces with Bandura and Walters' observation that learned behavior does not imply performed behavior (Maccoby, 1968, p. 258). In other words, the demonstration of moral behavior in a learned situation does not mean a child will act morally in a real-life situation. Learned principles are not necessarily lived principles.

That moral behavior, although conditioned, does not automatically become fully internalized is a troublesome point in social learning theory. Internalization is problematic on two counts: first, according to theory,

behavior is always controlled by external, discriminative stimuli, only sanctions are internalized (p. 259); second, apparently independent, internally motivated behavior may in reality be behavior for which the subject receives the approval, actual or imagined, of some personally significant but smaller reference group or individual (Bandura & Walters, 1963, p. 164). In sum, internalization of moral behavior is dependent upon some sort of external reinforcement of modeled behavior accompanied by internally produced sanctions; this sets up a contradiction in terms of locus of control which does not permit the postulation of a purely autonomous moral agent. As a result, the child learns moral behavior but remains passively identified with and controlled by the rewarding person.

Outcomes: What Kind of Person Results?

Social learning produces an individual who fulfills the better part of society's expectations, moral or otherwise. Since the child has been conditioned through reward and punishment to display appropriate moral behavior in given situations, his continued performance of that behavior remains contingent upon consistent reinforcement during the learning of that behavior. Unless the child receives strong counter indications for different moral behavior, his initially learned pattern of responses should continue indefinitely. In the final analysis, the child resulting from the social learning way of moral education does not become an autonomous moral agent but remains a conformer, passively controlled by others' expectations of him.

The "moral person" who emerges from social learning theory's approach to moral education is not very appealing. One need not go to the extreme images of Alex in Anthony Burgess's *A Clockwork Orange* to be repelled by the thought of a programmed moral behavior. Conformity, often *blind* conformity, is the theme, and this is hardly moral behavior. Perhaps social learning theory reminds us best just how potent an influence reinforcement, modeling and identification are in moral education. It tells us how these forces can consciously be used by teachers to shape desirable behavior—whatever "desirable" might happen to be. Even more ominously, social learning theory reminds us of how powerful unconscious forces are in shaping moral behavior—forces that sometimes the subject and also the teachers of morality are not aware of themselves.

Values Clarification—Subjectivity in Action

In the tradition of John Dewey, three authors, Raths, Harmin and Simon have given us an influential book, *Values and Teaching*, which attempts to align value education (moral education included) with the spirit of a democratic society. Their ideas and techniques for "Values Clarification" have throughout almost two decades influenced many popular workshops and set new directions for massive curriculum re-building in the schools.

They, like Kohlberg as we shall see, arrived on the American scene just in time to meet typical North American needs: First, they encouraged democracy, a sacrosanct political institution; secondly, they caught the swing of the '60s toward individualism, self choice and self-actualization in all the varieties of meanings Maslow's term came to take on; thirdly, they opened the door to values teaching in a society where religion was often barred from the schools by legislation. Values Clarification seemed to permit some sort of moral education that avoided the issue of any kind of dogma or moral code, and concentrated instead on the individual's own personal arrival at a unique and subjective hierarchy of values. In a pluralistic society making special efforts to avoid all "absolutes," they presented a timely alternative that promised to avoid the nemesis of "keeping dreary watch over ancient values," and to move instead into the more exciting fast lane of democratic rugged individualism based on the glories of subjectivity in valuing. The process of valuing was the shared mandated goal; the content of valuing was strictly left to the individual.

Philosophy: What is Moral?

The Values Clarification approach to moral education starts with the presupposition that values of right and wrong, or "oughtness" are determined by each individual for himself. This position offers itself in opposition to traditional thinking which sees moral education as a process of indoctrination whereby the child is taught society's immutable moral values and is expected to assimilate, integrate and demonstrate them in his everyday behavior. Values Clarification, on the other hand, takes the position that values, and the moral behavior they motivate, are not unchanging, objective absolutes but variable personal reactions and responses to real-life situations. Rightness or wrongness in a given situation or context is determined by the individual's unique and personal reflections upon the values

he holds. These personal values are the foundation and guide on one's moral behavior.

Sociology: What is the State of Society?

In Values Clarification, societal values as objective, consistent, principles do not exist. Although society may hold a particular value or group of values stable over a certain span of time, eventually even these succumb to change and are replaced by different interpretations and applications as customs and traditions change. In society, then, values are in the end no more than the combination, conflicting or agreeing, of the subjectively determined values of the individual members of society. As one perceives life and its contingencies in different ways, as personal situations change, so too the values one holds change. Consequently, if values are personal and subjective, making societal values impossible to define objectively and with certainty, there can equally be no objective ethical principles which serve as the foundation of society. The subjective experience of the individual and the values he ascribes to it become the base of any values and ethics in the larger society.

Psychology: How do People Change Their Moral Behavior?

Due to their subjective nature, values are seen as the result of one's interaction with and reflection upon life's experience. It follows, then, that two individuals with vastly different experiences would necessarily hold significantly different values. Because of these differences in personal experience, individual values and the behaviors they produce can in no way be consistently predicted or normalized.

Nonetheless, Raths, Harmin and Simon propose that while it is impossible to determine the most appropriate values for someone, there are certain criteria which must be met before a value can be defined as such. In ordering these criteria Raths and his associates have presented what they call the "process of valuing" (1966, p. 28), which contains the seven conditions they consider essential to value formation. Each of the seven criteria must be met before one can be said to hold a value. The seven criteria are as follows:

1. Choosing freely. The value must be the product of free choice, no element of coercion may be involved.

2. Choosing from among alternatives. Values are freely chosen and free choice can only occur in the presence of at least one alternative.
3. Choosing after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative. True values are born of rational and intelligent consideration of alternatives, with an understanding of the implications and consequences of the choice.
4. Prizing and cherishing. One must be happy and proud of one's values, esteem them and hold them dear.
5. Affirming. One is proud of one's values and is not afraid to be associated with them even where public affirmation of values is demanded in spite of the threat of ridicule, etc.
6. Acting upon one's choice. Values must give direction to life and effect change in one's life. Values must translate into action.
7. Repeating. Values are persistent and recur throughout one's lifetime. Values tend to initiate patterns of response to experience. (pp. 28-29)

Only when an individual has fulfilled all of these criteria does he possess values in the proper sense of the word. Once one's values have been "clarified" or brought to conscious awareness and have been assessed according to the above seven criteria, their impact upon moral behavior is direct and significant. Moral ideas change as the values underlying them are more fully recognized and understood, accepted or rejected.

Although Values Clarification was intended for the examination of a broad range of values ("Do I value stamp collecting, picnics in the park, popular music?") it was also intended for and used in clarifying moral values. Using this technique, individuals would change their moral values through a consciousness-enhancing process. This involved a new awareness of what the individual professed to be his values, the examination of them under the seven criteria, and acceptance or rejection of them into a personal hierarchy of values. The situation that aroused these value questions could be a real value crisis in one's own life or a contrived value conflict produced by a trained workshop leader or teacher in a classroom.

Education

How do teachers teach morals? Raths, Harmin and Simon have provided a variety of strategies for using Values Clarification in the classroom. Many of these value clarifying strategies stem from a person-centered tradition; that is, the emphasis is always on what the student is thinking, expressing and feeling. One of the principal techniques advocated by Raths and associates is the clarifying response which is the teacher's way of

> responding to a student that results in his considering what he has chosen, what he prizes, and/or what he is doing. It stimulates him to clarify his thinking and behavior and thus to clarify his values; it encourages him to think about them. (p. 51)

In employing the clarifying response the teacher must avoid all moralizing or criticizing—any suggestion of being judgmental. The purpose of the response is only to induce the student to reflect more deeply upon his statement, his position in order to make his values more evident. The clarifying responses themselves must be open-ended so as to convey no expectation on the teacher's part of a specific reply or value statement from the student. Raths, Harmin and Simon present some thirty clarifying responses to be used in teacher-student conversations. Many of these lead the student to consider one of the seven criteria for valuing in formulating his response: "Is this something you prize?" or "Did you consider any alternatives?" or again, "Was that something that you yourself selected or chose?" (p. 57).

Another important classroom strategy for values clarification is the values clarifying discussion. In this type of discussion the teacher leads a group of students to express their beliefs and attitudes, their values, on various topics or dilemmas. In directing students through the values clarifying discussion the teacher,

1. endeavors to examine alternatives and consequences in issues,
2. does not tell them, directly or indirectly, what is "right" for all persons and for all times,
3. is candid about his own values but insists that they not be blindly adopted by others,
4. sometimes limits behavior that he considers ill advised but never limits the right to believe or the right to behave differently in other circumstances,

5. points to the importance of the individual making his own choices and considering the implications for his own life. (p. 115)

At the end of the discussion the teacher asks for a summary of what value positions have been taken. Role-playing, the contrived incident, the value continuum and other similar values clarification strategies may also serve as grist for the value clarifying discussion mill. Regardless of which particular strategy is used, the teacher maintains value neutrality and affirms the students' choice of values.

How do students learn morals? Properly used values clarifying techniques, maintain the authors, will get students actively involved in the process of choosing, affirming and acting upon their own values, and this in turn will extend into the realm of moral behavior. Implicit here is the theory that students learn morals by first becoming aware of the values they hold, and through the values clarification process, becoming actively committed to those values or to others they have alternatively selected. Morality is based upon a sound understanding of, and commitment to personal values. Arriving at that understanding and commitment is the goal of values clarification.

Outcomes: What Kind of Person Results?

Ideally the values clarification approach to moral education produces an individual who knows what his values are, why he holds them, and who is not afraid to act upon them. As a result of applying the seven criteria of valuing he has learned a process by which he can identify his values in any given situation, through any experience, and at any time in life. Therefore moral judgments and behavior should pose no problem to him. Values Clarification will have made him an autonomous moral agent whose actions are consistent with his beliefs, attitudes and ultimately, his values.

No need to critique Values Clarification extensively here. Many others including Kathleen Gow in her popular work, *Yes, Virginia, There is Right and Wrong*, have extensively criticized the subjectivistic approach to morals and have tried to lead the way back to a more conservative ethic of right and wrong with its emphasis on clear definition of moral content in teaching and on the importance of preserving and passing on moral standards to succeeding generations.

Raths, Harmin and Simon have, however, made their contributions to moral education; among them the emphasis on consciousness. To remind us that we all have values and live by them whether we know it or not, and to prod us on to reflect on those values, be conscious of what they are and to make deliberate choices of whether we want to keep those values and live by them is a valuable service. This prodding creates the possibility of creating a personal hierarchy of values and hierarchy of aims, creative of genuine multilevel moral development. Secondly, Raths, Harmin and Simon have presented us with a definition of value more rigorous than some other authors would demand. To say that a value is not a value unless it is lived, unless it flows into action and sets some theme for one's life is a radical departure from some other concepts of value (e.g., Rokeach's) which require only that a value be professed. One could argue on purely speculative grounds the relative merits of each definition of value, but to maintain that the proof of a value is in the action is akin to the grandmotherly wisdom that, "the proof of the pudding is in the eating." The stress on consciousness and the need for a hierarchy of values to also be a hierarchy of aims are two valuable elements of the Values Clarification heritage.

Cognitive-Developmental Approaches—Kohlberg and Others

The name Lawrence Kohlberg has, at least in North American circles, become almost synonymous with moral education. Like the Values Clarification movement, Kohlberg's Cognitive-Development theory came along at a time when it met society's needs for a system of moral education that eschewed the "bag of virtues" approach and sought instead to teach individuals how to think well on moral issues. Again, content yielded to process and this fit in well with the American political and educational landscape of the time.

Philosophy: What is Moral?

In Cognitive-Developmental theory, morality is determined by each individual as a function of his own cognitive and rational capacities, at whatever level they may be operating. Thus, in the stage/level perspective offered in the cognitive-developmental approach, each member of society is morally sophisticated only to the highest level of moral reasoning that he

can understand and appreciate. From this perspective, therefore, it is not possible to present a blanket statement of what society holds as moral, for that varies with individuals; rather, it can at most be determined that the majority of society gravitates and functions at some particular level of moral reasoning, usually termed "conventional," and that society's moral expectations reflect either the level of the majority or some higher stage.

In spite of the difficulty in defining absolutes of morality, Kohlberg outlines some of the philosophical considerations that go into the formation of a moral statement or judgment. For Kohlberg, "moral judgments tend to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and based on objective, impersonal, or ideal grounds" (1968, p. 490). That is, all judgments that qualify as moral judgments per se would do so regardless of who makes the statement, where and when he makes it. The universality, objectivity and consistency of the statement is of fundamental importance.

In his earlier writings Kohlberg is more concerned with the structures of moral reasoning than with its contents. The entire focus of the Cognitive-Developmental point of view dwells upon the evolution of moral reasoning, how the conceptual structure expands and is modified to deal with new and ever more complex moral situations. With this emphasis placed upon the development of the cognitive processes, it is possible, in Kohlberg's view, to assign worth to a moral judgment without considering its content—what counts is the process by which the judgment is arrived at.

More recently, however, Kohlberg and his colleagues have developed a set of twelve norms which refer to the specific content of moral reasoning, norms which represent the central values of any social system (Arbuthnot & Braeden, 1981, p. 68). With this set of norms it is possible to evaluate both the structure of moral judgments and the value of the moral content they contain.

As a person proceeds through the various levels of moral reasoning, his moral judgments increasingly reflect the concept of justice, a concept that applies universally and objectively to all individuals in all situations. As Kohlberg explains:

> It is also evident that moral development in terms of these stages is a progressive movement toward basing moral judgment on concepts of justice. To base a moral duty on a concept of justice is to base that duty on the right of an individual; to judge an act wrong is to judge it as violating such a right. (1968, p. 490)

By "right" Kohlberg intends the equality and reciprocity which each member of society expects to enjoy in his interactions with the state and other individuals. A higher level moral judgment, therefore, upholds and promotes this expectation objectively and impartially . In the Cognitive-Developmental paradigm, then, morality is defined in terms of cognitive level or stages of moral reasoning based upon the principle of justice. This concept of justice assures the fundamental right or expectation of individuals in relation to each other and to society. A moral judgment is a cognitive judgment, a choice of action which fulfills the right of the individual to the extent possible, or more properly, conceivable at one's given stage of moral reasoning.

Sociology: What is the State of Society?

The Cognitive-Developmental view on the relation between society and morality lies somewhere between the theories of socialization and the cultural relativism of moral values, and Utilitarianism which deems that act right which affords the greatest good for the greatest number (Kohlberg, 1968). Kohlberg points out that in reality, moral judgments in all cultures embody features of both socialization and utilitarian perspectives. The extremes of socialization theory and Utilitarianism are not incompatible opposites but are merely two points along a developmental continuum. Socialization represents the earliest stage of moral development while moral judgments based on utilitarian principles represent a higher level of moral reasoning.

> Moral judgment and emotion based on respect for custom, authority, and the group are seen as one phase or stage in the moral development of the individual rather than as the total definition of the essential characteristics of morality it was for Durkheim. Judgment of right and wrong in terms of the individual's consideration of social-welfare consequences, universal principles, and justice is seen as a later phase of development. (p. 487)

Cognitive-Developmental theory consequently holds that individuals pass through a series of moral stages characterized by the development of increasingly complex cognitive structures whose focus shifts progressively from specific to general, universal principles, moral statements and

judgments. In this context, then, moral development is directly linked to cognitive development.

In society one can observe a number of stages or levels of cognitive development, similarly, varying levels of moral development can be found. Individuals, organizations and institutions may, according to Kohlberg, be found at three levels of moral development—Pre-Conventional, Conventional, and Post-Conventional, indicating a process from egocentric self-serving moral reasoning, through social conformity to principled moral thinking at a high level of abstraction and generalization. Just as the majority of society gravitates around a certain level of cognitive development, so too in morality does society tend to cluster on, and function by the standards and norms of a particular level of moral reasoning. This of course does not mean that the moral judgments made by individuals at the same level of moral development represent the same set of moral values; rather, what is common between them is the process and structure of the moral reasoning behind them. As was emphasized earlier, what is important in moral judgments is the structure, the principles involved, not the actual content of the judgment. In other words, from the Cognitive-Developmental point of view society's norms, rules, and mores may change over time, but the principles behind them and the processes by which moral judgments or choices are made remain stable.

Psychology: How do People Change Their Moral Behavior?

In the Cognitive-Developmental model people change their moral ideas through the maturation and development of cognitive process. This may occur naturally as a result of development, or it may be induced by being exposed, or rather confronted by the challenges of higher level moral reasoning. In this view moral advance is definitely based on cognition rather than emotional or learned responses.

In the presence of higher level moral reasoning processes, the lower level individual experiences cognitive dissonance, an unpleasant mental state that demands resolution. When faced with this type of cognitive disequilibrium the individual can follow either of two routes: assuming he is aware of the discrepancy between his thinking and that of the more adequate higher level. He can ignore the tension or he can attempt to understand the structure and processes involved in the higher level pattern of

moral reasoning. In the latter case, maintains Kohlberg, an understanding of the more advanced level of moral reasoning usually leads to dissatisfaction with that of the lower level. This discontent with one's own mode of thinking and the awareness of its shortcomings are often sufficient to promote a shift to the next higher stage of moral reasoning. As one progresses through the sequence of stages, one's moral reasoning becomes more abstract and grounded in principles, most notably justice. As a result, each successive stage is necessarily more generalizable and universal.

In summary, individuals change their moral ideas (and Kohlberg maintains, against criticism, their moral behavior too) as a result of cognitive development. This may come about through normal maturation and development, or it may be occasioned by exposure to higher levels of moral reasoning. The basic theoretical position behind the Cognitive-Developmental approach is that for most individuals, cognitive dissonance is an unpleasant state of disequilibrium that seeks resolution. In theory this resolution should represent achievement of a higher stage in the sequence of moral reasoning.

Education

How do teachers teach morals? In Kohlberg's approach to moral education teachers do not teach morals but moral reasoning. The aim is to elevate each student to the highest possible stage of moral thinking, to the most universal and principled level of moral reflection. To this end Kohlberg supplies a variety of moral dilemmas which in the classroom are used to spark debate and discussion. Each dilemma is carefully constructed to include the following qualities:

1. It presents conflicting claims which superficially appear to be plausible and reasonable.
2. It focuses upon the particular level of moral reasoning shared by the majority of the students in the group.
3. It involves some life experience which is meaningful for the students.
4. The facts of the moral issue are clearly defined and determined so that the focus centers upon the moral issue itself.
5. It includes questions which force students to think more deeply upon the moral issue or issues presented.

Many of Kohlberg's dilemmas such as Heinz and the druggist are well known, but Joe and the summer camp is another standard example:

> Joe is a 14-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper route and saved up the $40 it cost to go to camp and a little more besides. But just before camp was going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, and he (Joe's father) was short of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money saved from the paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so he thinks of refusing to give his father the money.

To be most effective the moral dilemma should be integrated into the general educational program and not restricted to only one particular classroom setting. The force of the dilemmas comes from their evident relation to real-life situations. Any school subject that deals with life concerns is an appropriate background for Kohlberg's moral dilemmas.

After the dilemma has been presented the teacher invites discussion by posing some provocative and stimulating questions. Effective discussion questions are of six major types:

1. *Perception* questions check whether students understand what's been said.
2. *Participation* questions get one student to respond to another's argument.
3. *Clarifying* questions call on students to explain the meaning or significance of their statements; e.g., "What do you mean by honesty?"
4. *Role-switch* questions ask a student to put him/herself in the place of different characters in the dilemma.
5. *Universal-consequences* questions ask, in effect, what would happen if everyone behaved or thought in one certain way.
6. *Seeking-reason* questions ask WHY, probe for reasoning or justification.

How do students learn morals? As a result of the dilemma discussion, conflicts may be set up in students' minds which render past moral assumptions inadequate and consequently, inappropriate. Through the active cognitive exercise of giving justifiable and defensible reasons for moral choices, students are exposed to higher level moral reasoning which may resolve the

cognitive discomfort they experience. The student learns morality as his cognitive moral reasoning abilities develop as a result of maturation, or as he adopts the patterns of what Kohlberg calls higher stage moral thinking.

Outcomes: What Kind of Person Results?

If Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach to moral education has been successful, the outcome should be an individual who functions at a higher level of moral reasoning than that demonstrated at the outset. Kohlberg's moral dilemmas should have awakened a new awareness in the student, an awareness of the inadequacy of his habitual mode of moral reasoning. As he cannot tolerate such inadequacy the student will have adopted the next highest level above his own.

Higher stage moral reasoning is not automatically followed by matching moral behavior. Ordinarily, one can observe similar behaviors often stemming from different levels of moral reasoning. This difficulty, compounded with the fact that individuals at varying stages of moral development tend to make different behavior choices or moral responses in the same situations, leads the cognitive-developmental theorist to concentrate primarily upon the quality or level of the moral reasoning process and not the content or behaviors deriving from it. In the end one should wonder at this; is not the ultimate aim of moral education none other than moral behavior?

That Kohlberg has such a huge influence on moral education is a mark of his own personal genius. His philosophy, based on Piaget and Rawls, was carefully developed in the beginning, and, though much flawed according to his ardent critics such as R.S. Peters, it formed one of the best thought-through moral philosophies of modern times. His research, again much criticized, (cf. Kurtines & Grief and others) was at least research, making it outstanding among many moral education theories which often rested on untried purely speculative foundations.

Kohlberg, as I have said, answered to the needs of his time. He also happened to produce a technique of moral education that caught the interest of educators and the imagination of entrepreneurs. His neat six stages of moral reasoning (later reduced to five) were something handy for amateur psychologists to use to categorize people and thus acquire an air of "understanding their level of moral development." These stages, plus the dilemma

technique of moral education, spawned the creation of many new dilemmas and teaching aids. This made the theory eminently suitable to inspire the production of books and kits that promised quick understanding, and the ability to accurately score responses to dilemmas. With this ready information for the teacher appeared a profusion of teaching aids offering ready-made shortcuts to unprepared teachers suddenly required to become moral educators. That the cognitive developmental approach became superficial and gimmicky was indicative of the seeming simplicity of the concepts, stage and techniques, and indicative too of the crying need teachers had for some sort of help in performing educational tasks they were not prepared for either philosophically or methodologically.

A "Kohlberg Bandwagon" did develop, but the horde of followers who rushed to get on should not blind us to the genuine contribution Kohlberg made to principled moral education, and ultimately to religious education.

Emotional-Rational Approaches—Love in Action

While philosophers and psychologists in North America were busy creating moral education systems that could be used in schools where religion and doctrinal tradition were forbidden, scholars in Great Britain were faced with a task quite opposite in many respects. For many years England was a comparatively monolithic society with the Church of England as the established Church and the education system rather well defined along elitist lines that favored the conservation of tradition. Religion was an established and compulsory part of the curriculum. With changing times educators were faced with the task of presenting religious education to a pluralistic society. To many scholars the answer to the question of how to present religious education was to develop something much more akin to moral education, adapting it to meet varying needs, varying demands, and varying interpretations. Thus, for, in a sense, opposite reasons from their counterparts in the United States who were forbidden to teach religion, moral educators in Great Britain set out to meet the legal requirements for compulsory religious education by devising approaches to moral education that would work in a pluralistic society.

Among these many scholars were John Wilson of Oxford University who attempted a rational approach to moral education, and Peter McPhail of Cambridge who developed an Emotional-Rational theory of moral

education. At this point we will pursue the McPhail approach partly because it is more holistic and because McPhail and his associates have created concrete techniques and teaching materials for moral education.

Philosophy: What is Moral?

Peter McPhail in his Emotional-Rational approach to moral education developed for the British Schools Council, seeks above all else to help students create for themselves a moral lifestyle. For McPhail, a moral lifestyle incorporates certain essential qualities, qualities which are not essentially different from traditional moral values. What is different is the motivation behind the demonstration of these values in moral choices and judgments, and the means by which such values are acquired or taught. In the following discussion it should become evident what differentiates McPhail's model of moral education from the traditional authoritarian approach as well as the other models considered previously.

Some of the qualities of moral behavior as defined by McPhail are: care, affection, tolerance, understanding, compassion, sensitivity, concern, and respect. These are not a "bag of virtues" as in the traditional view, that is, being imposed from the outside upon the individual, but rather, prerequisite elements or values that must be brought forth from the child and consolidated into the framework of his personality. In this view, McPhail would maintain that true moral behavior must emerge from within the child as a function of his personality, as a total emotional and rational response to a situation.

The context for integrating and manifesting these moral qualities is a lifestyle based on care and consideration for others and self (Kupchenko, 1981, p. 107). McPhail reduces this type of lifestyle to its essential, "love in action" (McPhail, Middleton & Ingram, 1978). In this light, morality is any mode of behavior, attitudes or responses that translates into "love in action."

> Our aim is not to develop a theory of moral behavior, nor to increase children's capacity to argue morally, nor to improve their ability to say good things. It is the practice of doing good things, of actually taking another's needs, feelings and interests into consideration as well as one's own, which concerns us first and foremost. Our purpose is to help children not only to know what "love in action" is, but also to act in love, in affection—to act warmly and caringly. (p. 5)

As the designation "Emotional-Rational" suggests, McPhail understands morality, or better, the process of being moral, in terms of both emotion and reason. In his program, McPhail places the primary emphasis on the emotional component of morality since he considers the motivational power of emotion or affect to be greater than that of reason alone. This is not an attempt on his part to deny the role of reason in making moral choices and judgments, but he reminds his reader that a moral judgment based merely on rational principles is not in itself a necessary and sufficient cause for moral behavior, and that behavior is his objective.

> Our concern is the practical one that people shall express in action their concern for others' needs, feelings and interests. We know that, whatever moral principles or procedures people advocate, and whatever stage of moral reasoning they may lay claim to, in the final analysis, to act morally, everyone has to be concerned with (and sensitive to) real-life situations. (1978, p. 3)

In summary, morality as defined by McPhail in the Emotional-Rational approach to moral education is a practical, concrete style of life that incorporates and demonstrates "love in action" at all levels of interpersonal relationships from self to family to the community, society, and the world at large.

Sociology: What is the State of Society?

Any discussion of society in the context of McPhail's Emotional-Rational model of moral education must begin with what he terms "the fundamental need . . . to get on with others, to love and be loved" (McPhail, Ungoed-Thomas, & Chapman, 1972, p. 3). That is, the basic human need is relationship, man is an interactive creature; he creates his world through interaction with his environment and he creates himself and others through human relationships (Kupchenko, 1981, p. 107). The state of society at any one time reflects the state of individuals' relationships within that society, the degree to which their fundamental need is, or is not, being met. McPhail's concept of morality, "love in action," is ultimately the individual's striving to fulfill this fundamental need to "get on with others, to love and be loved."

The qualities of moral behavior; care, affection, tolerance, and so forth, are the lasting human values in society that make life full and complete. It is these essential factors which constitute the building blocks of relationships, and these, as in McPhail's concept of morality, must be manifested in action through the everyday living of a considerate lifestyle. As a result of such "moral" living, a richer society, a better world will be created, a world in which

> individuals' needs, interests and feelings were taken more into consideration and where man showed greater care and responsibility for the rest of creation as well as himself. (McPhail et al., 1972, p. 4)

Indeed, the challenge of this vision in society lies in how one balances consideration for others without denying one's own needs (McPhail et al., 1978, p. 6). This challenge McPhail addresses with his emphasis on the role of both emotion and reason in the process of making moral choices. While rationality in moral judgments is significant and necessary, the primary influence is provided by emotions, if only they can be clearly felt and listened to. Our better emotions, which are by nature altruistic, are not always accessible and operating in moral choices. Without their guiding influence one cannot always act or choose morally in accordance with those values which make life satisfying and complete. The McPhail approach attempts to establish or restore the missing connection between emotion and reason in society by means of the various exercises and dilemmas set up in the classroom. How the use of such techniques results in moral awakening or change will be treated in the following section.

Psychology: How do People Change Their Moral Behavior?

In the McPhail paradigm the key to a morality which is based upon human interaction is ultimately communication. A "morality of communication" underlies all morality and, consequently, any sound attempt at moral education (1972, p. 62). The quality of person to person interaction McPhail envisions is based upon Buber's "I-Thou" relationship. For such a relationship to exist four communication abilities are required:

1. *Reception ability*, meaning the ability to be, and remain, "switched on" to the right wave length, to listen, to look, to receive the messages sent out by others.

2. *Interpretative ability*, meaning the ability to interpret accurately the message which another person is sending, what he really means, what he really wants.
3. *Response ability*, meaning the ability to decide on and adopt appropriate reactions—to meet another's needs. It involves decision making, evaluation, the use of reason as psychological know how.
4. *Message ability*, meaning the ability to translate appropriate reactions into clearly transmitted unambivalent messages. (p. 63)

Personal morality, as a function of relationships, can begin to change only as individuals begin to acquire these abilities necessary for a "morality of communication." As their quality of communication develops people's moral ideas may begin to change as they:

1. improve their ability to recognize their own and others' needs, interests, and feelings;
2. improve their ability to interpret accurately the messages, both verbal and non-verbal, which other persons are sending;
3. improve their ability to predict the possible and probable consequences of actions;
4. improve their ability to see things from another's point of view;
5. develop a strong sense of identity and see themselves as people who have a contribution to make in their community;
6. identify the various legal and social rules of our society;
7. identify the various expectations and pressures put on them by society;
8. learn to choose, to decide in a particular situation, what they will do so long as it is consistent with the needs, interests, and feelings of others as well as their own. (Kupchenko, 1981, pp. 108-109)

Education

How do teachers teach morals? Within McPhail's Emotional-Rational model teachers do not "teach" morality per se, but rather use various methods and techniques to help students know and experience "love in action" (p. 110). Each of these teaching methods are to be used in small groups ranging from four to ten students. McPhail outlines six teaching strategies which may be used with moral education materials in any number of classroom settings and with different ages of children:

1. *Expressive and communicational activities:* Can be used alone or in groups, and can involve speaking; writing prose, poetry and plays; modelling, photography, etc. The intent is to motivate greater honesty and innovation in solving problems.
2. *Discussion:* To use when the subject is of immediate interest to the students and good participation can be generated.
3. *Drama:* Very effective with children who would otherwise be hesitant to participate in role-play or simulation. Following a script can effectively facilitate the perception of who one really is *vis à vis* the role being played.
4. *Role-play:* Assigned roles based on children's situations can greatly increase their understanding of how they tend to behave in real-life contexts.
5. *Simulation:* An unscripted and unprepared playing out of a situation in which individuals literally "do their own thing"—an ideal approach because it can be tailored to be relevant to individuals and involve the students totally.
6. *Real-life involvement:* Both a method and an end in itself. Helping people is the best practice for helping people. The true test of "love in action" (Kupchencko, 1981, p. 110).

The teacher can use any of the above six teaching strategies deemed appropriate. However, McPhail suggests that they are best employed progressively as each represents a closer step to the actual concrete practice of morality. However the teacher decides to deal with the learning situation, he or she "must take a modeling role, demonstrating care and consideration for each student (p. 115). The classroom climate should be one of warmth and acceptance, one in which all the students feel comfortable and secure. As McPhail is wont to say, morality is not "taught but caught" (McPhail et al., 1972, p. 4).

As part of the School Councils Project, McPhail and his associates have devised the *Lifeline* program for use in the classroom. The materials included in the accompanying kit consist primarily of situations, moral dilemmas which proceed from the extremely personal to the less personal, the community at large, the country, the world. *Lifeline* initially challenges students on three fronts: "Sensitivity," "Consequences," and "Points of View" (p. 1).

McPhail explains the rationale behind the threefold approach of the *Lifeline* moral education materials kit:

> "Sensitivity" is designed to improve pupils' ability to recognize their own and others' needs, interests and feelings and to help them understand why people behave as they do. "Consequences" puts the emphasis on improving boys' and girls' ability to predict the possible and probable consequences of actions. "Points of view" involves learning to choose what to do in conflict or disagreement situations after first considering one's own needs and then those of the other person involved. The three approaches together prepare adolescent boys and girls to act considerately towards other people because they are able to take the role of the other, to put themselves in other people's shoes. (p. 100)

In addition to the three types of materials described above, the program contains two more components, the "Proving the rule" and "What would you have done?" series. The former transfers the moral judgment or choice developed in the first section of *Lifeline* to its application in relationships within small groups and communities. The aim in this series is for students to

> develop a strong sense of identity and see themselves as people who have a contribution to make in their community, without at the same time telling them what kind of adults they ought to be or what system of values and beliefs they ought to have. (p. 112)

The final section of the *Lifeline* program, the "What would you have done?" series, presents factually based incidents occurring in different cultural settings around the world. Here students are led to consider the effects of differing cultural, social, and economic conditions on people's behavior (p. 134). The objective is to encourage students to develop a "sense of compassion, independence of mind, or of autonomy, and a willingness to act upon one's beliefs" (p. 138).

McPhail prescribes no set methodology for dealing with these various education materials, apart from the six general teaching strategies described above; teachers should use their own creativity in finding ways to integrate the *Lifeline* program in the classroom.

How do students learn morals? In the Emotional-Rational approach to moral education, students must assume an active learning role. In addition

to acquiring knowledge about the community's standards, rules and other moral and legal expectations, they must explore their own personal feelings, needs and responses to situations in which moral choices are required. They must be able to take on the perspective of others, to walk in others' shoes as well as in their own. This objective is promoted by working through, confronting students with various moral dilemmas and situations, either of their own invention or those McPhail provides.

The process of learning morals is, however, incomplete if the newly developed or discovered awareness of emotions, personal values, and rational judgments are not actively expressed and actualized in terms of concrete actions, moral response. Morality in this approach is definitely not a purely intellectual game of moral stages and levels, a theoretical and non-committal affair; it concerns active doing, the actual practice of morality.

Outcome: What Kind of Person Results?

McPhail's Emotional-Rational approach to moral education should produce a balanced individual, sensitive, emotionally developed, who uses both emotion and reason in responding morally in any variety of situations. In choosing "love in action" he is considerate and sensitive to both his needs and the needs of others, he is profoundly influenced by the interrelation he knows he shares with all of humanity. Above all, the person coming from an Emotional-Rational education is a doer who lives and practices his values and his morality.

McPhail's Emotional-Rational approach to moral education is the one which comes closest to encapsulating in practice the psychological principles of moral education that are the theme of this book:

1. McPhail's is a practical, action-oriented approach, not merely an improvement in the level of abstract reasoning.
2. It is holistic, taking into account the whole person, cognitive and affective, with an emphasis on the powerful role of emotions in making value judgments. It is an ethic of care and responsibility.
3. It seeks to refine and develop "fineness of feeling." It moves toward higher levels of emotional and instinctive functioning. In some ways it is, like other theories, based on the concept that development comes from disequilibrium created through moral crisis. But the crisis is one of the whole person, not just of the intellect—more in the line of positive

disintegration of lower level functions to make way for higher level functions.

4. It is replete with content, and not just a style change. It is not afraid to espouse certain virtues, taking at the same time, deliberate steps to define them clearly. It is objectivistic.
5. It recognizes the power of identification and modeling as do the Freudians and social learning theorists, without however leading us to the anomalies and limitations of these theories.
6. The theme "love in action" flows naturally from process thinking, in fact precisely from the ideas of Whitehead himself.
7. If perhaps "love in action" is a term too ephemeral for the positivistic scientists to get hold of and research as systematically as they would like, it is nevertheless a moral response to the real experiences of life lived and moral education taught.

Crossroads in Moral Education Today—Demands and Alternatives

Today when renewed interest and renewed passion for moral uprightness mark some in our society, anyone setting out upon the difficult, challenging task of actually doing moral education is beset by voices calling in all directions that theirs is *the* way to go. I think that today moral educators stand at a crossroad where the voice of ultra-conservatism is especially strident, calling us to follow that direction in the name of a way of thinking that has become particularly popular in recent times—a way of thinking that has been forced on us by economic necessity and by the inevitable swing of the moral education pendulum which is seen to have reached new extremes of permissiveness, subjectivity, and substitution of form for content. It is time, many say in an atmosphere of "back to the basics" education, to get back to law and order in moral education. For many, the call for a new moral order means a rather simplistic and rabid return to a rather ruthless indoctrination—a type of indoctrination that outdoes the traditional character education we have looked at as the first of our "ways" of moral education. For many it is the obvious solution for our social ills. For those who reflect, this archconservative approach to moral education is no solution but on the contrary an entrenchment of those very forces that create moral weakness and immaturity.

For these reasons I would like to examine, using the same format we have used in exploring the "classical ways," this contemporary alternative which one may feel pressured to follow. I call it an alternative because I will subsequently contrast it with another approach available to us today which builds on the major themes we have explored in this book, an approach which I am calling Multilevel Moral Development. But first let us look at the reactionary approach.

Reactionary Archconservativism

Philosophy: What is Moral?

The philosophical grounds of this approach are quite shallow. It looks back with golden memories to that which we remember or at least imagine we had in the past. What is moral is what we "always" believed and good men lived by but which we have recently lost somehow. The "good days," and the "old ways" were comforting and reassuring. A man knew where he stood with his fellow man and, above all, with God. The rules for salvation, though strict, were clear-cut. The line between the good and the bad was distinct. Above all, authority was respected, and no ordinary man had to shoulder the burden of choice. Respect for authority whether it was the bible, the church, the government or parents clearly delineated righteousness.

Sociology: What is the State of Society?

Society, by contrast with the pristine goodness we once had, is in chaos today. Traditional values are ignored, as is evident from the way people live and make their own decisions. Above all, respect for authority has gone. The answer is a prompt re-establishment of strong authorities who will enforce law and order so that the common good can prevail. Clear rules strongly enforced with clear-cut and even extreme penalties, including the death sentence, are necessary. A man, for example, has a clear right to protect his private property with his gun.

Psychology: How do People Change Their Moral Behavior?

Control is important. If clear enunciation of rules and laws doesn't control behavior, reward and punishment must be used. Good behavior is measured in the degree to which it conforms to the dictates of authority.

Education

How do teachers teach morals? Teachers must clearly enunciate moral principles which children must follow. They must convince students of the necessity of following them by citing authorities. The authorities may be secular or religious. Religion is a strong ally to the moral educator since religion is essentially a set of clear-cut moral norms and carries with it sanctions that have eternal punishments or rewards.

Youngsters must be shielded from contact with vice or at least have its evil consequences pointed out to them before they can be lured by it. It is dangerous to expose them to situations where they must decide for themselves. There is really no great need to educate them in making choices since authorities and rules will always be there to guide them. More important that they commit the rules to memory, and be trained to follow them.

How do students learn morals? The key to good behavior is respect for authority. Above all the student must learn respect. Much of what needs to be known can be committed to memory.

Outcomes: What Kind of Person Results?

The child who comes through this education system can follow one of two main routes: (a) He will be a passive person who blindly keeps rules, without questioning the authority that imposes them, or (b) He will be a rebel against authority, rejecting all kinds of external authority, yet at the same time at a loss to find any guidelines within himself and unfamiliar with personal choice.

I have painted a bleak and probably somewhat simplistic picture of the archconservative approach. Yet I would hesitate to call it unrealistic. Perhaps the picture is all too real, presenting the graphics of the siege mentality which drives many to this rather extreme approach to moral education.

The alternative, Positive Disintegration (which I have modified and developed into a system of moral education) is the less obvious but ultimately more attractive solution because of its inherent ability to develop all that is

best in human beings. I present this approach now, using the same chart format that outlined the other ways of moral education.

Multilevel Moral Education

At the beginning of this chapter on the ways of moral education you found a line from T.S. Eliot's *Ash Wednesday* I repeat it now in its context:

> Suffer us not to mock ourselves with falsehood
> Teach us to care and not to care
> Teach us to sit still
> Even among these rocks . . .

These words are especially significant here for they round out our theme and illumine it with words of beauty that are themselves a prayer for illumination. They touch upon the theme that the eminent British moral philosopher, R.S. Peters (1969) came to see as the ultimate question of moral education: "How do children come to care?" That is the question we come face to face with as we conclude this study. Moral education is too important and too delicate a task for teachers to confound with "falsehood," when, if we listen, we can hear our students demand: "Teach us to care." It is their need, calling for our response.

Interestingly, perhaps in response, the psychology of moral development and education seems to be turning in a new direction at the present time. Perhaps Carol Gilligan (1982) from a woman's perspective has provided one of the strongest incentives for this change in direction by distinguishing an ethic of responsibility and care from an ethic of principles, rules and justice. The ethic of principles has long held sway in studies of moral education. Presently, the ethic of care is taking the place it should rightly have as a legitimate approach to morality. Kohlberg, one of the most cognitive of cognitivists, has recently (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984) accepted the legitimate role of "intuition," "heart" and "conscience" to generate a judgment of responsibility. Nel Noddings (1984) has gone a step further and tended to identify caring with a feminine approach to ethics and moral education, pointing out the elements of openness and relatedness that are intrinsic to real caring. One danger at the present time is to be caught by the human penchant to dichotomize, calling one ethic masculine, the other feminine, calling one an ethic of the head, the other an ethic of the heart. That

could take us back to the cognitive-affective dichotomy that has plagued psychology and led us to think in terms of rather simplistic dualities. That is why there is needed at the moment a theory and a mode of moral education that is truly holistic. While avoiding the demands of reactionary archconservatism, the teacher must not fall into the trap of oversimplification. Whitehead (1925) said, "Seek simplicity, and distrust it."

What we need now, then, is a way of moral education based on a comprehensive philosophy, a holistic psychology and practical in its implications. It must be a way of expressing the ethic of caring by incorporating two principles adapted from R.S. Peters (1974, p. 295) that pervade such an ethic:

1. To be rational is to care about truth.
2. To be whole is to care about persons and things and to have found oneself in the perspective of relationships.

The approach I am proposing to meet our common and current need is one I am calling "Multilevel Moral Education." Firstly, that title acknowledges that, at its foundation, it rests on Dabrowski's Theory of Positive Disintegration with its core theme of multilevelness. Secondly, the title hints that it goes beyond Dabrowski's theory, incorporating the contributions of the theologians, philosophers, and psychologists we have reviewed, together with whatever is unique to the present work.

Philosophy: What is Moral?

The multilevel view speaks to this basic philosophical question by first asserting that an objective morality is possible, desirable, and, in fact, necessary. This objectivity is not "absolute" in the sense of being handed down from some divine source by a process of traditional revelation, to be passed on by traditional indoctrination. On the other hand the Multilevel Approach avoids the chaos and moral anarchy of utter subjectivity which leaves morals equally in the hands of everyone as though all were equally capable of understanding and caring. The answer it presents is that morality is *determined* by (and not just *discovered* by) reflection on the part of individuals. These individuals are to be found at various levels of development. All individuals in a sense have some say in what shall be considered moral. The extent and effect of that say is in proportion to the individual's

power; the moral objectivity of that say is in proportion to the individual's level of development. The level of development of each individual is a function of developmental potential, which in turn is a function of those aspects of the person which Dabrowski has labeled "overexcitabilities." We can see these as special sensitivities, two-way channels, open to receiving stimuli that are emotional, intellectual, imaginational, sensual and psychomotor, and open to acting on the world in the same five modes. Positive Disintegration theory reminds us of the primacy of emotional development, but without opposing this to cognitive development. Instead, returning to the diamond metaphor with which we began this book, we can, looking from various perspectives, describe the person as a spectrum of functions, a spectrum of ways by which one may be sensitive to a situation and act upon the world outside. These sensitivities are ways in which the individual interacts with his world. Dabrowski described five colors in his spectrum; others may discover a different variety of hues. The important thing is that we have a holistic image of the one who makes moral choices, thereby getting some grasp of the varieties of perspectives that one might have. Certainly, the greater the diversity, the greater the possibility of integration. The greater the sensitivity to beauty, the greater the possibility of creating moral beauty. Morality is beauty with all the harmony and peace integral to it.

Given that everyone is not equally open to the appreciation of beauty, moral beauty included, and given that only some as a result will reach higher levels of development, it follows that the moral judgments of some will be more objective than those of others since objectivity is the fruit of *authentic* subjectivity, and not of subjectivity in itself. Those at higher more authentic levels of development make objective moral judgments. This is illustrated in the remarkable convergence of the moral principles of the eminent persons who have graced human history. It is the high level of authentic development of great moral leaders (who are often religious leaders) that creates objective morality.

It is the task of each human being to work out what is moral, not just for oneself, but in response to objective moral standards. Initially, and if one becomes fixed at lower levels of development, these values and moral norms must come from authority outside oneself. But advancement through levels of development creates the possibility and even demands greater and

greater inner-directedness and answering to personal ideals, which, to the extent they are objective, correspond with the values, norms and ideals of a healthy society. Each individual is in some sense then responsible for determining what is moral. Each is an occasion in the process of the moral development of the cosmos, contributing to it in proportion to his or her own level of consciousness and development.

Sociology: What is the State of Society?

Society is itself a multilevel situation in which individuals can be found at all levels, some stagnated at primary integration, some in motion through the levels by the process of positive disintegration. The numbers of individuals who have reached higher levels of development is by necessity (like Maslow's "growing tip" of the human race) very small since these levels require rare combinations of many dynamisms of the developmental potential. Various interpretations of what is moral can be expected then from the different levels of development within society, ranging all the way from the indifferent and pathological with no sense of rightness and wrongness (psychopaths and sociopaths) up to the highest levels of moral sensitivity and moral action.

Within the individuals who make up society, moral values exist in a hierarchy. By actualizing these values in society, individuals make a real contribution to the building up of society and indeed the universe. Individuals can, if they so choose, add value to the world and contribute to society's development through their own inner development. This inner development, if it is full, flows into social action. Each person is an "occasion" (Whitehead) in the process of building the universe and contributes value to that universe in proportion to the level of consciousness attained and according to the positive assent to the demands or lures given by ones time and place in the creative process. One's place in society, one's time in history, united with the unique inner dynamisms of the individual, coincide to create a never-before-never-to-be-repeated opportunity to contribute beauty and value to the process. The likelihood of making this contribution and the richness of it are in direct proportion to the level of consciousness of the individual. With consciousness so crucial in making the nexus between individual value and societal value, religion in its sense of fullest consciousness (and not merely institutional membership or adherence to creeds) is a vital

part of society. It is society operating at its highest levels. Without religion, society is incomplete and lacking in higher level moral direction.

Psychology: How do People Change Their Moral Behavior?

How do people change their moral behavior? The psychological questions of moral education are answered by the theory of Positive Disintegration in this way; Since society itself is composed of people at various levels of development, moral education must keep in mind that moral decision making abilities vary from individual to individual. Some are at higher levels than others. Thus a simplistic "democratic" view does not apply to reality. Not all people have the same ability to make moral decisions and thus a total trust that all individuals should be their own subjective guide is unwarranted and unrealistic. Persons at lower levels of development (and this does not mean children just because they are younger) need explicit moral teaching, guidelines and rules intelligently interpreted to them. All individuals need some sort of crisis situation in which they will be forced to question their values and encouraged to move on to a hierarchical organization of their values and to seeking higher level values. The famous "moral dilemma" approach is one means of doing this, but with emphasis on its ability to touch and arouse fineness of feeling. Above all every person needs the incentive and guidance to convert a hierarchy of values into a hierarchy of aims—to actually act upon one's values.

Beauty of landscape, music, architecture and art will help; but even in the ugliest of situations, one can nourish morality if it is filled with the beauty of persons who can lure the emotions to greater sensitivity, moving one to create moral beauty in one's own life.

Not only does the multilevelness proposed by the theory of Positive Disintegration remind us of the fact that not all persons are at the same level of development, it reminds us of the role of psychology to induce movement upward through these levels. Gradually dissatisfaction with one's world, with society, can lead to dissatisfaction with oneself and inner conflicts. Feelings of inferiority toward others can be transformed into feelings of inferiority toward oneself and a clear moral sense of what one "ought" to be as opposed to what one "is." Ultimately the goal is to be guided by a personal ideal, based on a hierarchy of values and a hierarchy of aims. Intrapsychic development is combined with inter-psychic development, and the

individual, increasingly aware of his relationships with his society, may find himself maladjusted to that which "is" in society, perceiving principles beyond the common norms and feeling obliged to live by them. This in the case of the more highly developed individuals takes the form of positive maladjustment, which, though it may run against the grain of many who accept social norms unquestioningly, will be ultimately more humanizing of the whole social milieu. Movement through the levels is painful and agonizing, the pain coming both from inner conflicts and conflicts with a society which is not ready for the higher level principles of morality that are proposed and lived by those who rise to higher levels of development. The New Testament is full of accounts of Christ's conflicts with the pharisees who represented the religious establishment of his time. Over and over again He breaks their low level rules of morality, appealing to a higher moral principle. For example: when He cures a man on the Sabbath and the pharisees object that this constitutes work which is forbidden, He teaches them the higher principle of love of neighbor and care for human welfare. Finally, the sufferings of continual conflict with the establishment lead to the ultimate agony of crucifixion and death at the hands of those He chided for their moral narrowness. Internal agony, external conflict are the price and at the same time the source of moral growth.

A practical danger lurks in Dabrowski's concept of positive maladjustment. It is the temptation to too easily label one's own maladjustment as positive, to see it as growthful when it is merely obstreperous; to see it as reflecting higher level principles when really it is only an expression of lower level primitive needs. But this is a problem of individuals and not of the theory. Dabrowski is most hesitant in labeling maladjustment as positive unless it is accompanied by signs of other dynamisms of higher levels. Positive maladjustment, far from being a kind of license to follow one's subjective whims is rather an idea that puts heavy demands on the individual to be authentic. "Objectivity is the fruit of the most *authentic* subjectivity."

Education

How do teachers teach morals? By its very nature Positive Disintegration theory evokes a more holistic answer to this question than any approach to moral education that emphasizes technique or philosophy alone. Positive Disintegration is a theory comprehensive of human

development. Its scope is broad, taking us beyond philosophy alone or mere techniques. It also has a very personal aspect, a lure drawing the reader to apply the theory to self. It is not a speculative study of others as specimens of development, but the kind of theory that inevitably forces reflection upon oneself and quietly demands self-evaluation. That is why, in answering the question, "How do teachers teach morals?" we cannot slip immediately into techniques, bypassing the teacher; rather we must look first at what is demanded of the teacher.

An old philosophical adage says: "No one can give what he does not already have." A teacher cannot give something he or she does not already possess whether it be an idea, a motivation, an inspiration, a determination, a love or a goal. This does not mean that students are limited by the level of development their teachers have attained and cannot go beyond. History is full of students who have gone beyond their masters. But this is transcendence and sometimes development "in spite of" and the student goes on because of his or her own developmental potential. The point I am trying to make comes back to that important word "consciousness." Teachers are effective in moral education in direct proportion to their consciousness of the real values they hold. Unless the teacher is reflective on his or her values, value education and moral education will be a haphazard affair with the hidden curriculum (or rather the unknown curriculum) often more potent than the values that appear in the lesson plan. This reflectiveness, this awareness, this consciousness is especially needed in a system of moral education that does not take an extreme moral indoctrination approach, nor does it take the opposite view that the teacher must pretend to be morally neutral. This approach requires that the teacher take a moral position. Teachers can't be expected to have worked out a firm position on every moral dilemma (capital punishment, abortion, genetic manipulation) but the modeling they can present in these specific moral problems is recourse to values, their values, and how they are trying to work through their values to find practical solutions to the moral problems that confront them. It is real life modeling of the agony of moral decision making, much more powerful than trite recitation of rules from tradition or authority.

Thus the starting point for the teacher is self-consciousness in the sense of being conscious of the values one holds and conscious of the values one subsequently transmits. Positive Disintegration theory with its emphasis

on hierarchy of values brings out the idea that a value educator does not so much give values to her students as help them to re-arrange the values they have into a better hierarchy. Everyone has values; they may not be conscious of them; but they have them right from infancy (when the newborn values pleasure more than pain) up to the person who has reached Dabrowski's fifth level, who has a complex, intricately hierarchized elaboration of values. Values education works in the process between these two extremes, asking the students to reflect on their values, know what they are in full consciousness and then challenging them to rearrange these values in a hierarchy ultimately more humanizing to themselves and the world around them.

How do students learn morals? In the section on how teachers teach morals I have said very little about techniques, emphasizing instead the personal demands placed on the moral educator; techniques will become clearer as we see them flowing from their true source—the needs of the developing person who is to be taught.

While, in looking at the "ways" of moral education, we have not restricted education to a formal school setting, including also family and religious settings, we have tended to see our scholars as bright faces grouped rather homogenously in the typical classroom according to age. This "homogenous grouping" makes things rather neat for any theory of moral education that presumes most people of the same age are going through the same phase of development. But Positive Disintegration theory does not tie stage to age; it throws the emphasis on *individual* level of development, the way each person experiences morality in his or her life. All too neat oversimplifications will not do; the task is more challenging than that. Instead of following age-related presumptions about the level Johnny is at, or even test data on his stage of moral reasoning from the way in which he answered some speculative moral dilemmas, the teacher is challenged to look for those dynamisms that indicate his developmental potential, the presence, even though germinal, of those dynamisms which, as we have seen, constitute the caring person—emotional, intellectual, imaginational excitability; empathy, the ability to get outside childish egocentrism and see things from another's point of view.

Morality is not a science the child learns, but an art he lives. Moral learning goes beyond words to action. Values must be lived to be real

values; and values will be taught and learned by being lived. That is why the beauty of goodness is not just something to be admired and commented on at a distance like a landscape, but something to be involved with. Education is a process, as we have seen in Lonergan's philosophy, that leads from experience through understanding and judging to deciding—actually setting directions in one's life. If one *really* cares, one *must* act. That is why the teacher who is a moral educator. ensures that there is an action component in it all. Complete moral education flows into service to others.

If an educational model is to be true to the principles of Positive Disintegration, it must express the fact that moral growth comes about through disintegration of lower level functioning and replacement with higher level dynamisms. We have talked about "higher level feelings" and how the "informed heart" guides the individual to better, more objective moral judgments. But merely to state that encouragement of higher levels of emotional sensitivity is essential to moral development is not enough. It can be the kind of pronouncement a professor of educational psychology might make from his ivory tower because it seems he doesn't have to get involved with "real kids." It becomes meaningful in terms of practical implications for the teacher, including the Religion, Social Studies and English teacher, when we get down to what is more basic and more real with the children we have in schools. Most teachers in reality are faced with many students at the level of primitive integration. Many students must begin to be truly moral by learning how to actually experience authentic feeling. It seems strange to talk about actually experiencing real emotion. We live in a world full of intense emotion. The trouble is that it comes often in packaged containers neatly tailored to fill the gaps between commercials on television. So much of what we "experience" doesn't really involve us. No wonder then that adults can watch a real-life murder in our cities and not even lift a phone to call the police because they don't want to get involved. Positive Disintegration challenges this non-involvement by encouraging real participation, by not protecting the child from the experiences of real life and from feeling the appropriate emotions—fear, disappointment, sorrow, loneliness, confusion—all part of the human condition, all part of being able to feel for others too, to identify with them, to know their hurts and to be moved to act morally to prevent those hurts. It is the task of moral education to replace apathy with a caring which asks earnestly: "What would be

most humanizing in this particular situation?" This is the justice that we are exhorted not just to reason to, but to "hunger and thirst after."

Positive Disintegration theory says that one comes to experience this passionate sense of justice and act upon it by the process of disintegration through crises. It is classical developmental theory, as we have seen in chapter III, to say that growth comes about through crises. If any theory centers on this theme and presents the teacher with the challenge of using crisis in moral education it is the theory of Positive Disintegration. The moral educator should not only allow but promote emotional and moral crises in students.

Intense emotional experiences need not be a catastrophe for the child, but, under caring circumstances, an opportunity for growth, a "eucatastrophe" as J.R.R. Tolkien (1975) calls it when talking about the emotional power of fairy tales:

> The consolation of fairy stories, the joy of the happy ending . . . or more correctly of the good catastrophe, the sudden, joyous "turn" . . . this joy is not essentially escapist or fugitive. In its fairy tale—or other world—setting it is a sudden and miraculous grace . . . It is the mark of a fairy story of the higher or more complete kind that, however fantastic or terrible the adventure, it can give to child or man that hears it, when the "turn" comes, a catch of breath, a beat and lifting of the heart, near to (or indeed accompanied by) tears as keen as that given by any form of literary art. (p. 68)

An example of a fairy story that presents this "turn" as a moral dilemma is *The Little Mermaid*, in which the dramatic climax is a clash of life and death, a conflict of self interest and care for others. The little mermaid, victim of the contrivances of the forces of evil, is faced with the dilemma of choosing her own life and all she is familiar with or the life of the prince whom she loves. She stands over the sleeping prince, the knife poised in her hands. It is a dramatic, absorbing moment of real moral conflict when children can be challenged to choose with head and heart by putting themselves in the place of the little mermaid.

Perhaps a note of reality should be included here: The potency of this moral dilemma first struck me while reading this fairly tale at bedtime to my daughter Carolyn who was then five years old. I stopped at the dramatic moment and asked her what she would do if she were the mermaid. New directions in moral education, it seemed to me, were hanging upon her

reply. Perhaps it was the lateness of the hour. Perhaps it was the complexity of the dilemma too much for a little head. Perhaps it was Dad overeager for an answer. Her reply after very little thought: "Oh Daddy, forget about your question, just get on with the story and see how it turns out."

Individual failures aside, art, especially literature, does have a power to draw the child and the adolescent into intense feelings and emotional involvement. *Billy Budd* by Herman Melville is a complexity of moral dilemmas, with emotional intensity enough to draw in adolescents to identify at least with the gentle sailor if not with the captain who condemns him to death. Which adult who has seen the film *Sophie's Choice* can forget the terrifying scene on the station platform, with the concentration camp trains panting in the background, when the German soldier presents Sophie with the "choice" of having one or neither of her children live? The nightmare of having "chosen" one of her children to die haunts Sophie in a lifetime full of pseudo-choices. This is existentialism expressed in a most concrete and most dramatic mode—the kind of stuff to draw forth reflection on the choices one makes (or imagines making) in one's own life.

These are three examples, geared to levels of development that illustrate the potency of great literature to induce positive disintegration. There are many many others some of which have been collected by moral educators and made available in booklets, kits and tapes (The "Ethics in Education" newsletter published by the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Toronto, is an excellent source of ideas.). We have already examined the dilemma situations McPhail has published in his Lifeline Series. These have the happy quality of being real-life dilemmas very close to the day-to-day experience of the students they are aimed at. The experienced moral educator will soon come to realize that, a step beyond all the literary, all the published moral dilemmas are the real-life dilemmas students carry within them. Converting these into experiences of *positive* disintegration is a deep challenge not only to the teacher's techniques or knowledge of theory, but to the teacher's own self.

We have seen in our study that goodness and beauty walk hand in hand. Beauty must be there if people are to be good. If it is through sensitivity and fineness of feeling that one rises to higher moral levels, then moral education cannot neglect beauty. Art is there to remind us of how others respond to things as they are; art education is integral to moral education. But art is

there, too, in lives lived to remind us of how one may in harmony and peace respond to their place and time in the process. The beauty of lives lived is there not just as a source of moral injunctions but as a lure drawing forth sensitivity and fineness of feeling.

Outcomes: What Kind of Person Results?

Certainly it would be unrealistic to think that Multilevel Moral Education is going to raise every student up to Dabrowski's higher levels, but it is realistic to think that this kind of moral education can draw out the best of the developmental potential to the degree that it is there in each individual. In the beginning, the young child (or the adult at lower levels) may simply go through the motions of moral behavior, simply conforming before he or she can grasp the point, the principles behind behavior, and assent to them. Education and the therapy that goes with it from the Dabrowskian point of view help develop the overexcitabilities and the dynamisms that Dabrowski has described and hierarchized. At a minimum, moral education would challenge the tight lower level structures the individual has been enmeshed in, and it is reasonable to expect that a teacher or parent can from most students draw forth the ability to role take, to empathize, to reason better, and, above all, be somewhat more sensitive to moral beauty.

Persons who come forth from this way of moral education will be at various levels of development. Minimally they will have been exposed to some moral standards that have objective validity. Hopefully they will have been lured on beyond mere conformity toward the ideal of making conscious moral choices for oneself, accepting responsibility for them and converting them, beyond abstract principles, into life lived. If beauty has brought forth sensitivity and fineness of feeling leading to autonomy, then education ultimately becomes self-education, therapy ultimately becomes auto-psychotherapy, for the dynamisms are within oneself.

This morality will be objective but sensitive to the possibilities that may come from human experience; it will be rational and caring, thoughtful and reflective, yet practical and active. It will, in a word, be the most authentic level of subjectivity the individual is capable of. Ultimately the kind of person who results is a religious person holding a sense of perspective and shared meaning carried over into practical outcomes, participant in the universal process—a generous contributor to the lasting value of the cosmos.

REPRISE

"Apart from the religious vision, human life is a flash of occasional enjoyments, lighting up a mass of pain and misery, a bagatelle of transient experience."

—A. N. Whitehead
Science and the Modern World

This quotation may seem like a negative note on which to end a book on religious and moral development. But we are used by now, when coming to something important, to find it a paradox. For here Whitehead has picked up a thread that we have found running through both religious and moral development. Religion is what one does with his own solitariness. Religion is that solitary quest for meaning which we share as best we can with those around us and ultimately with our God. When this solitary quest becomes a quest for moral beauty, one is struck by the transitoriness of it all. Everything we know in this world is an occasion that is born, flourishes and then must perish. Every moral motivation, every high moral principle that we come to, must, if we are dealing with true ultimates, come under the scrutiny of that ultimate moral question: "Why be moral?" Why try to live a life of moral caring, when few of the people around seem to care in their day-to-day life and yet appear to enjoy an undisturbed existence? Why try to contribute to the building of a world which seems to be bent on its own destruction which we must taste now and then in the catastrophes that nature herself produces, and that mankind now has the power to produce? Why try to communicate with a God who never answers as we would like him to do? How can you love a life which makes burdensome moral demands on you without offering the consolation of telling you the world is moral and just. Where is the order and sense, if any, and where do I fit in?

Life becomes fulfilled in creative work, human love, suffering and social reconstruction, as one realizes that life itself was never promised as a purely

rational process; birth, life and death are processes beyond reason. Salvation, in the sense we have used it here—its root meaning of health, wholeness—comes comes only if we step back from life and see it as a whole. The mystical experience and acceptance of life which usually involves the postulation of a supernatural other—God—can be had only if we see this life whole. To see life whole is to love and accept life because it is to see ourselves as necessarily part of it. It is a matter of getting perspective on life, and that is the function of religion. Whitehead's shift from "goodness" to "beauty" is a new perspective discovering morality in the harmony, unity and proportion of beauty. It is religious in its dimensions and happiness is its by-product. This experience of happiness is not destroyed but enhanced by the awareness of the transitoriness of it all. The beauty of art, and, above all, the beauty of nature, is the beauty, like religion, of one eternal system in itself, not merely one view or another of it. Beauty as a function of religious awe, puts things into perspective.

I once sat with a friend, watching the sun set over a lake. The sun had not yet turned a radiant red, but the white path of light between us and the sun made the restless water sparkle. My friend remarked, "The water is sparkling like diamonds." Why then was the lake not as "valuable" as a field of diamonds? If it sparkled like diamonds, why did it not have their value? We knew we could not rush out and collect the "diamonds"; we would find only glistening water slipping through our fingers. The water had taken on a transitory beauty; but diamonds, we are promised, "are forever," and that is why they are coveted. It is, then, the permanence, or at least the promise of permanence that makes diamonds "valuable." But even diamonds are not really "forever." They, like our lives, are occasions in the process, and the task of the person in the religious search for value and goodness and what is truly worthy of our quest, is to cherish now the beauty of the brief dancing light on the shifting water in the vast perspective on the whole scene that is the gift of religion experienced.

"We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time."

—T.S. Eliot

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